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At the intersection of the autobiographical, the historical, and the fictional, Laura 
Alcoba’s Manèges (2007) [La casa de los Conejos/The Rabbit House (2008)], Héctor Abad 
Faciolince’s Traiciones de la memoria (2009), and Albertina Carri’s Los rubios (2003) deal with 
contemporary quandaries in the aftermath of the Latin American regimes of the seventies and 
eighties. They make a sideways approach to protracted, polarized discussions on issues 
surrounding recent history and politics of memory—including present-ramifications that impact 
concrete governmental policies. The critical reception of Abad, Alcoba, and Carri shows signs of 
an analogous turn toward polarization. I argue that such turn is unwarranted, for these works 
challenge our interpretive practices precisely by appeal to rhetorical strategies and innovative 
uses of textual performativity that preclude settling on any one reading, thus eroding the basis of 
 	
any “strong,” polarized view. Shifts from direct report to free indirect discourse in three-person 
dialogue scenes, for instance, prevent us from matching utterances and speakers. In the absence 
of textual markers to justify one matching over others, favoring and settling on any one of them 
involves forcing the text into an arbitrary interpretive framework. Thus, we violate the formal 
structure of these texts and foreclose a more nuanced assessment demanded by the very texts: if 
we can’t make justified matchings, we are limited but urged to increase the projection of 
tentative matchings. Since each set of speaker-utterance attributions yields different scenarios, 
the upshot is a palette of varied interpretations of the events, actions, and characters of the same 
dialogue scene. This “centrifugal” move – into the text—is complemented by a “centripetal” 
analogue that sends readers outside the text, into the “real world,” in search of “missing pieces” 
whose necessity is hinted at by the texts themselves. This requirement to restitute what is missing 
and unsaid also tends to go unnoticed--or ignored. Such blindness, which leads to misreading 
and exerting violence on texts, also plagues interpretive approaches to sociopolitical phenomena, 
whether their focus be current events, recent history, or memory-related issues. If sound, this 
assessment calls for a deep revision of our interpretive practices.  
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1 So, the absence, and not the presence, of Insensatez will (not) be noticeable in the pages that follow. 
Yet, if there is a single momentary merit or felicitous passage in them, it will be in no small part due to 
that something that needed to be absent, which Edmundo knew Moya would be able to make me see. This 
is too subtle, too important, and too badly written to make any sense. With my excuses to the reader, I 
must say I will be satisfied if these words make Edmundo remember that intervention. And to round up 
the cryptic section of these notes, I’ll mention the Sunday workshops, the risks of irse de mambo, and the 
New Voices colloquia—all hermetic endeavors that deserve a dissertation of their own. Information about 
the latter, however, is available in a few clicks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 History, Past, Present, and Representation. 
 
Like much of the Southern Cone’s cultural production devoted to the aftermath of the 
dictatorships, and whose authors were young at the time of the events (and, often, though not 
always, related to the desaparecidos), Laura Alcoba’s and Albertina Carri’s works have been 
discussed within a framework of reception that has been consolidated fairly recently. It is neither 
the only one nor the one that has proven to be significantly better (in whichever way one may 
want to cash out the term) than others. However, given that it has become almost a standard 
point of reference, it seems appropriate to begin with a brief outline of this view., which will 
fulfill two functions. First, it will be an initial springboard from which we will easily move 
towards other features of historical and literary context. Second, since much of the critical corpus 
is either based on, or refers to this view, an early presentation will have provided us with a 
minimal background to which we might come back, briefly, when our discussion of the critical 
reception of these works may require it.   
This view, or family of views, fall under the label of cultural production of the “post-
dictatorship generation” (i.e., the generation that follows that of the desaparecidos in the 
Southern Cone, also known as “the children of the disappeared,” an awkward label, yet useful to 
distinguish them from the disappeared children who were either abducted along with their 
parents, or born in illegal detention centers, placed in military or pro-military families, and 
sought after by Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo).  
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Following the well-known presentation offered by Ana Ros, it will be important to 
highlight three of the main (if not the three main) conceptual points on which this view or family 
of views rest: 
a) the reappropriation of Marianne Hirsch's influential concept of “postmemory;”  
b) the view, or family of views, that pose a radical break between the seventies 
generation and the following ones;  
c) given point b) above (i.e., provided the alleged generational break is accepted), it 
follows that post-dictatorship cultural production must involve some form of (implicit or 
explicit) struggle to understand, or to reach some “prosthetic” stand-in for understanding the 
previous generation’s decisions. The outcome of this process ranges from rejection and 
differentiation – sometimes construed as sheer incomprehension – to mixed or ambivalent 
negotiations, to acceptance and reconciliation (in some cases, the latter involves some sort of 
vindication of the cause for which the seventies generation gave their lives); and, closely related 
to this last point, at times even expressing the desire to give continuity to the previous 
generation’s projects. (Ros 2013, chap. 1-3).   
This framework has elicited a significant number of stimulating discussions of Alcoba 
and Carri --and also, it is worth highlighting, --a still growing number of politically and 
culturally relevant works. In fact, Ana Ros highlights that Los rubios gave traction to a vigorous 
creative and critical movement that hasn’t ceased since Carri’s foundational, initial “trigger” or 
“ice-melting move,” as she puts it not without humor. For, while Los rubios was well-received in 
film festivals, its initial reception was not quite ice-melting, but rather blood-curling.  
Both film and filmmaker were harshly attacked (e.g., Kohan 2004 and, from a more 
conservative standpoint, Sarlo 2005; but see, for a prompt reply, Page 2005 and Nouizelles 
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2005). The more virulent attacks came from the more visible and influential strands of the 
Argentinean Left –particularly, by the so called “memoria montonera”  
As the name itself suggests, the memoria montonera refers -- not exclusively, since 
former cadres of other armed organizations share its tenets -- to the organization Montoneros, the 
biggest in Argentina and the Southern Cone, and among the top ones in all of the Americas, to 
the point of being able to send combat units to Nicaragua. (The effectiveness of this action, as 
well as the opinion of the Nicaraguan guerrillas about this expression of Latin American 
solidarity, however, are a matter of contention.)   
This idealized version of their role and practices in the seventies includes an intense 
emphasis on "the memory of the lost ones,” in a context of “self-referential fixation” (Vezetti 
2009, 137). Needless to say, to honor the memory of the dead is not per se objectionable. But, in 
the memoria montonera’s version, it is enhanced and infused by the notion that “the best ones are 
the ones who died... as if death, especially death in combat, were the ultimate criterion to judge 
the value of any political conduct" (140; emphasis added).2   
Undergirding this last notion, and vertebrating most tenets, as well as the ethos, of the 
memoria montonera, is the core belief in the “sublime nature of valor and sacrifice” (Vezetti 
2009, 147).
 
3 
																																																								
2 Part of the resistance Los rubios met from some left-wing quarters obeyed in part to the fact that a very 
daughter of desaparecidos seemed to defile their memory – that is, the normative or “correct” way of 
articulating their memory. Alcoba’s work was met with a kinder reception, though it would seem that a 
belated reaction is in the making.  
 
3 Part of the resistance Los rubios met from some left-wing quarters obeyed in part to the fact that a very 
daughter of desaparecidos seemed to defile their memory – that is, the normative or “correct” way of 
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Though certainly the most visible and prevalent, this is not the only construction of the 
Montonero past. Other configurations of montonerismo cannot be discussed here, but the mere 
statement of two of their common features – shared by all, however much they may differ in 
some respects –can give a gist of their contrast with the memoria mntonera. First, they show an 
eagerness to explore that past, without ever considering it exhausted or closed. Second, they 
share a more open, dialogical, self-critical and undogmatic attitude, which --without disowning 
their past--rejects the sacralization of violence and the enshrinement of a fixed, idealized 
narrative of heroes and martyrs. The indispensable works of Sergio Bufano, Claudia Hilb, and 
Matilde Ollier are but a few in a long list, whose references are given in this footnote.4  
In this regard, it is important to highlight two tensions that will hover over the following 
pages. First, the memoria montonera is the configuration of the past with which many militants 
who fought alongside Carri's and Alcoba's parents feel most identified.  
Second, the differences and tensions we perceive among the different memory 
configurations existed as differences in conception within Montoneros since their very early 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
articulating their memory. Alcoba’s work was met with a kinder reception, though it would seem that a 
belated reaction is in the making.  
 
4 The pioneering work of El Kadri and Schmucler is still a most lucid reflection; Ollier 2009, and  
Rodeiro are fundamental to understand these issues, as are the very recent Carnevole 2015; Crenzel 2015, 
and Hilb 2010 and 2015; last but not least, the already mentioned Vezzetti 2002, 2009, and 2015. In 
particular, his 2009 is an excellent review fo the history and variety of cultural production of armed 
struggle. Lastly, the journal Lucha Armada (2006-2016) – Armed Struggle – edited by Sergio Bufano, has 
collected some of the most important work on these issues, from a variety of contributors and political 
standpoints and experiences: memories by former combatants; fieldwork; studies from theoretical 
perspectives ranging from reconfigurations of Marxism to Feminism, etc.  
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days. This led to fallouts and splits. 
 However, neither the first splits that Montoneros suffered since its foundation in 1970, 
nor the ones that followed in 1974, 1976, and 1979, managed to alter the overall direction of the 
Montoneros leadership. Notably, as early as 1971, one of the founding groups of Montoneros, 
the Columna Sabino Navarro, elaborated a written critical report explaining the reasons for their 
decision to split. Their analysis and recommendations were prescient—and ignored.  
The same occurred with the better-known series of reports that Rodolfo Walsh, 
intelligence officer of Montoneros, presented throughout 1976 and early 1977 to the Leadership 
(henceforth, CN, for “Conducción Nacional,” a 12-member committee that was the maximum 
authority and decision-making center in the organizational structure of Montoneros).  
Why was the CN so unwilling to listen, so intent on keeping their course?  
Pilar Calveiro – former cadre of Montoneros – explains that the organization became 
refractory to criticism mainly due to two reasons. First, because of the growing militarization of 
the OPM (Spanish acronym for “political-military organization,” as Montoneros decided to call 
themselves as of 1975). Second, because of an exacerbation (and, one may add, a simplification) 
of the teleological nature of Marx’s philosophy of history. As Calveiro puts it,  
 
 
armed struggled became the maximum expression of politics first, and politics itself later 
... The militarism of Montoneros reproduced the authoritarian logic that they were trying 
to question ... and [its leadership, as well as an undetermined number of militants] 
regarded themselves as indestructible, destined to a final triumph that was part of a 
predetermined historical destiny (18-19).  
 6 
 
This conviction about a “predetermined historical destiny” might have seeped into the 
elaboration of the memoria montonera, for it certainly coalesced in an equally rigid narrative that 
admits of no deviations, as Carri herself suggests: 
 
 
La historia corre el riesgo de la santificación … [de] una mitologización del pasado que 
no nos permite tener una mirada crítica… la necesidad de reconstruir una memoria 
histórica y clausurar hasta el más mínimo de los misterios, dejándonos sin espacio para la 
sorpresa o la pasión. Lejos de acercarnos a una postura reflexiva nos expulsa del conflicto 
verdadero… [impidiendo] una verdadera interpelación [del pasado] (History runs the risk 
of sanctification… a mythologization of the past that doesn’t allow us to have a critical 
gaze… the need to reconstruct a historical memory and close off the slightest mystery 
leaves us without space for surprise or passion … Far from helping us take on a reflective 
stance, it expels us from the true conflict... [impeding] a true interpellation [of the past, 
Carri 2007, 17) 
 
Paradoxically, so stringent are the normative parameters of the memoria montonera’s 
narrative, that their claims to truth run parallel to, and seem to mirror, those of the juridical 
discourse, as Gabriella Nouizelles dubbed the “web” of conservative views, mostly right-wing, 
which level charges against memory-based narratives. An oft-repeated critique targets the 
allegedly tenuous standards of evidence of testimonial and other memory-based accounts or 
discourses.  
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It is particularly fitting, then, that none of the works to be discussed should argue for any 
claim in particular, neither in the form of arguments embedded in the narrative, nor in the sense 
of “thesis novels,” or conventionally “historical fiction.” Instead, they perform the equivalent of 
a reductio ad absurdum argument. Each in its own way, Abad, Alcoba, and Carri seem to accept 
the challenge of the juridical discourse, up the ante, and attempt to show that no claim could ever 
meet the artificially high evidentiary standards of the juridical discourse – including those claims 
advanced by the juridical discourse itself.  
A particularly incisive case against the juridical discourse is discussed in Chapter 1, 
devoted to Abad Faciolince’s Traiciones de la memoria (2009), which also presents a singular 
performance-critique of certain types of memory configuration.5 The book is composed of three 
interrelated “autobiographical stories,” in which illustrations, photos, and other visual material 
share space with the text proper, or, at times, fills the whole page with a collage-like display of 
juxtaposed photos, handwritten notes, facsimile copies of notebooks, Department of State 
memoranda, among other material and symbolic objects.  They purportedly establish a “record” 
or “proof” of every step Abad takes in the pursuit of something (a publication; an engraving) or 
someone (a publisher; a witness) who might confirm the authenticity of a Borges poem—a poem 
his father read on a radio program, in the afternoon of an August day in 1987, shortly before a 
death squad assassinated him on the streets of Medellín.  
Chapter 2 is devoted to Carri's hybrid film Los rubios (The Blondes, 2003), which 
seemingly shifts between the documentary and the making of the documentary, appealing to 
																																																								
5 While Abad and his work are, strictly speaking, alien to the Argentine disputes about the memoria 
montonera, the case of Traiciones is remarkable in that, without falling for clumsy extrapolations or 
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fictional elements such as the scripted participation of an actress playing the role of Carri. This 
shift is indicated by the use of color and black and white respectively. When the color/black-and-
white code is broken, we are no longer able to distinguish "real" documentary from 
"fictionalization." Still, many critical treatments of Carri's film lean on the director's off-camera 
commentary as the main thread or pillar on which to base their interpretive efforts. Despite the 
richness of many pieces of this sort, I argue that once the code is broken, there is no textual 
marker that justifies this choice. I further argue that this interpretive move obscures subtly 
layered formal and thematic threads in which a variety of stances regarding individual and 
collective memory, responsibility, and identity are presented.  
The film ostensibly follows Albertina Carri's search for information about her parents, 
well-known intellectuals who joined Montoneros – as briefly hinted above, one of the largest 
guerrilla organizations in Argentina. In 1978, Carri’s parents were abducted by the Army. It was 
one of the few cases in which the “quasi-disappeared” were allowed to contact their families; 
still several months later, they were disappeared by the same branch of the Armed Forces. Carri 
was about to turn six years old.  
Lastly, Chapter 3 discusses Laura Alcoba’s Manèges: petite histoire argentine (2007), a 
hybrid narrative – based on, and making use of, autobiographical material – written in French, 
Alcoba’s language of adoption since she was ten, when she left Argentina to join her mother, 
exiled in France.  If in all three works the overall plot, themes, and threads are clear --both in 
virtue of their initial textual presentation, and because they are based on well-known, high-
profile cases – it is perhaps in Alcoba’s narrative where this “clarity” is paramount.  																																																																																																																																																																																		
forced analogies, it does an impressive job in addressing those issues—which, despite the Argentine 
particularities, are also a live issue in other Latin American countries (Bartow 2005). 
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The narrative structure and plot of Manèges can be summarized thus: initially, a fairly 
straightforward narrative voice alternates between an "adult" Laura Alcoba (in 2006), and a six-
and 7-year old Laura (in 1975-76) who lives with her mother and a young couple – Diana 
Teruggi and Daniel Mariani --in a Montonero safe-house where a rabbit-breeding business is a 
mere front that hides a clandestine printing press – the press that issued Evita Montonera, the 
official media outlet of the OPM.  
Laura and her mother left the safe-house and went into exile shortly before a military raid 
obliterated the house, the press, and its inhabitants, except for the newborn child of the couple, 
three-month old Clara Anahí. The search for the child conducted by her grandmother, Isabel 
“Chicha” Mariani, eventually led to the creation of Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo, of which 
Chicha was co-founder and first President (reelected, her tenure eventually lasted 10 years, 
during which the now-world-famous DNA bank was established) In this context, the tension 
between Alcoba’s and Carri’s works on the one hand, and the normative configurations of 
memory construction – or “memory regimes” advocated by the memoria montonera will have to 
be part and parcel of our discussion. 
 
1.2 Formal Structure: Centripetal and Centrifugal Conditions. The Walsh Proofs. 
 
“The effect of fiction,” wrote Ricardo Piglia, “depends on a reading capable of restoring 
the context and deciphering the understatements of the story” [“el efecto de la ficción depende de 
una lectura capaz de reponer el contexto y descifrar los sobreentendidos de la historia”] (Piglia 
2014, 13). This twofold condition is presented in the prologue to the recent, long-overdue edition 
of Rodolfo Walsh’s collected stories, published as Cuentos completos (2014). It is a good point 
of entry to our discussion of the formal demands of the works to be discussed.  
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Note that, as stated, Piglia’s formulation is suggestive, but too broad or vague: what 
context? Background information? Isn’t that trivially true? In the remainder of the Prologue, 
Piglia elaborates, and makes it more Walsh-specific. For our purposes, this first, broad version 
will do.6 
Still, Abad, Alcoba and Carri are not simply replicating a formal procedure. Consider, for 
instance, Walsh’s “Esa mujer” (“That Woman”). Strictly speaking, here there is no need to 
“restore the context of the story.” There is nothing lacking. It is “complete,” as it were. When it 
is said that one needs to restore its context, what is meant is that the meaning and connotations of 
the story become immensely richer if we know who “that woman” is. But even if we don’t know 
it, the story about an unspecified dispute between two men “por el cadáver extraviado de una 
mujer” [“about the lost corpse of a woman”] (Piglia, 13), is in and by itself a most remarkable 
story.  
Ironically, and probably intentionally, here it is Piglia who understates the nuances and 
complexities of the brilliant dialogue, in which Piglia’s “two men” engaged in a “dispute” are 
explicitly identified in the story as a journalist and a general. They are having a discussion in 
which the former wants the latter to tell him where that woman is buried.  
Still, Piglia is unquestionably right when he says that until and unless we know who that 
woman is, “el relato no funciona políticamente [the story doesn’t work politically]” (Piglia, 13). 
																																																								
6 An earlier formulation of the same idea, while still not sufficiently specific, may add to the 
understanding of his view: “The sense of fiction isn’t just linguistic; it depends on the external references 
of the narrative, and on the extra-verbal situation…. To show that referential truth, without ever naming 
it, is a key narrative technique” [“El sentido de la ficción no es sólo lingüístico, depende de las referencias 
externas del relato y de la situación extraverbal. … Mostrar esa verdad referencial, pero nunca nombrarla, 
es una técnica narrativa clave en la ficción… (Piglia 2013, 8)].   
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For all its remarkable qualities, the story changes dramatically if and when we know that esa 
mujer is Eva Perón. And more so, if and when we know the story behind that dialogue: the 
military stealing the embalmed corpse of Evita; the succession of events that delayed moving the 
body to some undisclosed cemetery in Europe—delays that involved disputes among the 
personnel in charge of the body, which included charges of necrophilia; accusations to the effect 
that a high-ranking officer wanted to keep the body as a way to exert symbolic control over the 
mass of Peronists—and over Perón himself – as well as way to gain leverage in the internal 
disputes within the Armed Forces.  
Still, in “Esa mujer,” the effect of fiction doesn’t entirely depend on the restitution of its 
historical, factual context; but its political effect does; and, again, the story is certainly 
impoverished in the absence of contextual information.  In Abad, Alcoba, and Carri, the lack of 
certain contextual information doesn’t merely occlude richer interpretations. It severely 
impoverishes interpretation, certainly; but, in some cases, it renders (parts of) the text almost 
unintelligible. The three texts, however, have what earlier was called a “centripetal” effect – they 
deploy “nudges” or subtle allusions or suggestions so that the reader restitute the missing 
context. That’s why, differences aside, Piglia’s formulation of the “requirements” of Walsh’s 
fiction is helpful. That’s why these texts require,  
 
 a) a reader willing to go beyond the text, into the world, in search of contextual 
information — whether it be other texts, testimonies, confrontation of testimonies and/or texts, or 
any other sources that may enable her to restore – reponer y restituir – the needed context. The 
suggestions are varied: from Abad’s explicit invitation to go online and check a recording of his 
murdered father reading a Borges poem, to Alcoba’s glaring silences and absences – which may 
shift abruptly toward brief essayistic fragments or micro-stories in which the “call” for external 
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information is embedded. Consider, for instance, the following fragment from her brief 
discussion of her search for the meaning of a term that, she claims, was crucial for the 
articulation of her narrative; it is perhaps the most conceptually explicit plea, and therefore, the 
one that resonates the most with Piglia’s formulation. Alcoba doesn’t exactly speak of reponer el 
contexto (restore the context) but suggests that she needed to remember the meaning of a term, 
because  “this term [n.b., embute], so often pronounced and heard, inextricably linked to these 
fragments of Argentine childhood that I make the effort to retrieve and restitute, I have never 
encountered in any other context” (“ce terme [n.b., embute] tant de fois prononcé et entendu, 
indissociablement lié à ces morceaux d’enfance argentine que je m’efforçais de retrouver et de 
restituer, je ne l’avais jamais rencontré dans un autre context,” 49). 
But, how is the reader to know when to look for contextual information? The nudges or 
suggestions are often very subtle, and the reader’s failure to see them is, to certain extent, a 
measure of the failure of our interpretive practices. Here, the second prong of the twofold 
“condition” may have a role to play.  Both Walsh and our three authors demand, then, 
 
b) a reader capable of deciphering the “understatements” of the story, as Piglia puts it. 
He gives a variety of examples, emphasizing Walsh’s use of allusion and elision, of subtle 
connections between terms, which will resonate even if they are pages apart. In our case, we 
shall find these and others. More generally, we mean the set of (and interaction among) different 
formal elements at work in the process of reading – roughly, the formal structure of the text, the 
operations it allows, suggests, or constrains the reader to follow. What earlier we called the 
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“centrifugal” impetus or effect of the text, i.e. a demand for some form of intra-textual scrutiny, 
whether it be tracking specific features, or straightforward exercises of close reading. At the risk 
of redundancy, let us add that this involves attention to rhetorical strategies, modulations in 
narrative voice and point of view, iteration of figures or semantically dense terms, syntactical 
and lexical choices, performative effects, and whichever other formal devices or operations may 
be at work during the process of reading.  
These two requirements may at times work in tandem; and, whether on their own or in 
tandem, they “work” on the reader at both an individual and a collective level. The individual 
reader will have to reassess her interpretive approach and capacities, but also, the extra-textual 
“missing pieces” she will have to search for – the “restitution of context” -- will often require 
some form and degree of intersubjective activity. Only a careful reading might allow us to spot 
both “centripetal” markers – nudges for the reader to restore contextual information --- and to be 
attentive to “centrifugal” effects, textual “sleights of hand,” which, if unnoticed, derail 
interpretation. And both operations are enhanced if and when these “searches” involved 
collective discussion. 
One such “mixed” strategy involves the use of juxtaposed texts, combinations of text and 
image, and the use of texts in unorthodox ways – as graphs, so to speak. The former will be 
found in Abad; the latter, in Alcoba. And in the two Walshian stories that follow.  
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Walsh's "La aventura de las pruebas de imprenta" (“The Adventure of the Galley 
Proofs”), in his Variaciones en rojo (1953), has the components and unfolds within the standard 
framework of a typical detective story: a wife returns home, finds her husband dead --a bullet in 
his head, a pistol by his side --and no other signs of violence. Suicide or disguised homicide? For 
our purposes, the relevant aspects of the story emerge from the combination of two features: 
 
          a) The victim was a galley proof corrector and translator; his unfinished work --some 
galleys of the last translation he was working on; handwritten corrections -play a central role in 
the story;  
b) The participation of Daniel Hernández --amateur sleuth and Walsh's alter ego – who, 
like the victim, is also a corrector --is allowed to assist with the investigation.  
 
It is Daniel who calls attention to the galleys, picks one, examines it, and decides that a 
certain kind of reading of all the galleys will provide them with the key to solve the crime. He 
calls the galley he picked up first a “graphic,” which is ironically accurate. Although it is a text, 
it plays both roles.  
First, it plays the role of a graphic in the sense of being an illustration of the 
methodological point he wants to make. That is, the scrutiny of the texts left by the victim will 
yield the answers they are looking for. Second, the comparison of the different galleys' physical 
features (e.g., minor typographical differences, handwritten corrections, and so on) will turn the 
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form and shape of every single letter, whether it be printed or (perhaps more relevant) 
handwritten, into clues first, and evidence later.  
To give a coarse example: a shaky “A” that diverges noticeably from the handwritten, 
typical “a” of the victim becomes a clue: the distorted letter points at something that may be 
relevant to the investigation. Again in rather simplistic terms: the shaky “A” becomes evidence 
of a physical disruption of either the victim or his environment.  
Thus, the difference in the drawing of the letter has become a clue first, and evidence 
later, it makes sense, then, to say that the inserted texts – the galleys – as well as the handwritten 
text of the victim, play a role as graphics that is at least as important as (and, in principle, more 
important than) the role they play qua texts. Yet, a variance makes sense only if measured 
against a pattern--a pattern slowly emerges or becomes visible to the discerning eye focused on 
the details of design and drawing of frequently occurring letters--specific vowels, for instance.  
The more fine-grained the distinctions the discerning eye can make, the more it will be 
able to “see” in the galleys—to “read” in the galleys. Yet this discrimination is not in the text, 
but in the drawing of the letters of the text.   
In a way, Daniel will not read the text, but the events inscribed in the design of the 
drawings of the letters; the events tracked by the texts/graphics; the events whose trace is 
discernible in those graphics, up to the last one – the event that caused the death of the corrector.  
Still, they are texts, and this fact puts pressure on the possibility of literally reading the 
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texts of the galleys, beyond the formal scrutiny they will undergo as graphics. The tension or 
temptation to read them will vary from reader to reader, but it will be there, even when the 
narrative --the main text, especially in the voice of Daniel --slyly insists on the visual, graphic, 
formal role of the foreign, inserted pages.  
Moreover, the texts of the inserted pages have, on the face of it, nothing to do with the 
story we're reading. In a way, then, they interrupt our reading. Still, underneath the surface, the 
disparate texts do begin to connect with one another -and with the main narrative. There are five 
such insertions; one every ten pages or so; they are sufficiently close to one another so as to 
trigger first, and give traction later, to the interplay among the different texts.  
Even if one decided to ignore the texts qua texts, it would be difficult not to catch a word 
or a phrase here and there, reading them almost involuntarily. And although Daniel doesn’t 
explicitly use the content of the text to solve the crime, the seemingly disparate texts that appear 
on the page, juxtaposed, begin to look more like a counterpoint, commentary, or dialogue, than 
like heterogeneous, mute objects.  
The vigorous interpretive movement that ensues is, then, the result of this setup which 
Walsh prepared for the reader, about which he has Daniel say nothing, with the probable 
exception of an indirect comment, embedded in the following dialogue excerpt which will be 
relevant to our reading of Abad’s, Alcoba’s, and Carri’s works:  
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“You would probably read faster than an experienced proof-reader, because you have no 
experience.”  
The police chief laughed.  
“That’s a good one,” he said. “I’d read faster because I’ve no experience? What good is 
experience for, then? “  
“To read slowly.” . . [Y]ou would read faster, but less efficiently, bypassing numerous 
errors. (65; emphasis added)7  
 
--Probablemente usted leería más rápidamente que un corrector avezado, porque no tiene 
experiencia.  
El comisario se echó a reír.  
--Eso sí que está bueno – dijo --. ¿Yo leería más rápidamente porque no tengo 
experiencia? Entonces, ¿para qué sirve la experiencia? 
--Para leer despacio.  … [U]sted leería con más rapidez, pero con menos eficacia, 
pasando por alto un gran número de errores (65; emphasis added) 
 
 
 
Lastly, Walsh’s “Nota al pie” (“Footnote”) presents a variation of this multi-textual 
configuration. In this case, there will be fewer threads, but sustained for a longer period of time. 
The story seems to present in the body of the text a straightforward, or at least uninterrupted 
narrative: that of one Mr. Otero's civil but rather contrived exchange of platitudes with the 
landlady of León, a translator who worked for Otero's publishing house (“la Casa”) until that 
very morning, when the landlady found the dead body of his tenant and a suicide letter addressed 
to Otero.  																																																								
7 Unless otherwise noted, this and all other translations are mine. 
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Narrated mostly from a “close” third-person point of view, the story follows Otero’s 
movements and thoughts, his discomfort and hesitation: “no quiere quedarse, no quiere irse, no 
quiere admitir que se siente traicionado” (“he doesn't want to stay; he doesn't want to go; he 
doesn't want to admit that he feels betrayed;” 419), for León’s suicide makes him feel as if he 
hadn't been “una especie de padre” (“a kind of father”), and not just a boss or a friend, as they 
both had admitted to each other “so many times” (“tantas veces;” 420). 
A small asterisk takes us to a footnote in italics. Even if we do not want to read it, the 
main text goes on further down the page until the distance between text and footnote makes it 
almost impossible not to read that line—the opening of Leon’s letter – which goes thus, 
“Lamento dejar interrumpida la traducción que la—” ("I am sorry to leave unfinished the 
translation that the—;” 419). 
We turn the page and learn that Otero is not interested in the letter, because with a letter 
neither of them “gains the most miniscule part of what they would have gained talking" (“no 
gana una ínfima parte de lo que ambos hubieran ganado conversando;” 419). 
Now, on this second page, the divide between footnote and main text is more salient --
there are three or four lines of footnote (i.e., the continuation of Leon's letter to Otero). The 
tension and rivalry between main text and footnote increase; they compete for space on the page 
--and for the reader’s attention. “Why, León?" (“¿Por qué, León?” 421) is Otero’s obstinate 
question to restrain the escalation of León’s footnote -- his voice -- taking over the page.  
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“One hundred and thirty books translated for the House” (“he traducido para la casa 
ciento treinta libros;” 146), thinks León after going over his early days at The House, his first 
breakthroughs, the mastery of the craft, until he reached a moment when he felt he could put his 
own touch, even make a judgment call at the thorniest junctures of a difficult passage. And from 
those heights, the fall: the crushing awareness that what was expected of him --the objective to 
which he must aim --is syntactical correctness and uniformity; that his aim as a translator must be 
invisibility. From then on, the long years of increasing deterioration.  
With an undetermined combination of frustration, sadness, and resignation, León writes 
almost in passing that, if such was the aim of translation, then it was tantamount to “perpetuating 
in Spanish the essential lineage of imbeciles” (“perpetuando en castellano el linaje esencial de 
los imbéciles;” 446). Otero’s thoughts, limited to less than a third of the page now, become 
restless, and he “suddenly has the dark feeling that everything was aiming at him; against him” 
(“tiene de pronto la oscura sensación de que todo viene dirigido contra él”); and he knows that 
"for quite some time now, León’s life had turned him [Otero] into a perplexed witness of his 
death” (“la vida de León en los últimos tiempos tendía a convertirlo en testigo perplejo de su 
muerte;” 447). 
The main text is now a single line on the top margin, the mirror-image of the first page of 
the story. And when we turn the page, there is no more main text; or rather, the whole page is 
finally taken over and turned into a footnote, or the footnote turned into main text. The only 
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trace, the only two-fold trace of the previous textual configuration, is given by the fact that the 
text remains in italics. León's delirious or deranged questions, are addressed not so much to 
Otero, but to “Mr. Appleton,” the dictionary.  
 “One hundred and thirty books,” León thinks; “an average of eighty thousand words per 
book, six letters per word” (“Ciento treinta libros de 80,000 palabras a seis letras por palabra”), 
all written on the same old typewriter, the same old keyboard, worn out, “every key sunken; 
every letter on every key erased” (“cada tecla hundida, cada letra borrada;” 446).   
The result of the distracted multiplication of averages doesn’t yield mere “quantitative” 
data, but also – in virtue of carefully chosen but inconspicuous words – a glimpse of León’s 
mental but also physical breakdown. “Sixty million strikes are too much,” he says. “Even for a 
good Remington. I stare at my fingers in disbelief.” (“Sesenta millones de golpes son demasiado; 
aún para una buena Remington. Me miro los dedos con asombro;” 446). 
Two quick observations that anticipate our main discussion. First, the formal possibilities 
these two stories explore will be pushed further, and quite visibly, by Abad; and, less explicitly 
but no less effectively, by Alcoba and Carri. Second, Otero is oblivious to, or incapable of seeing 
León --or himself, for that matter. Would reading the letter have made any difference in Otero’s 
assessment? Walsh leaves the issue undetermined, and, although it would obviously depend on 
how Otero would read the letter, it is reasonable to conjecture that we would probably be in front 
of the same sort of “misreading” we “see” in the main text.  
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On first blush, this kind of interrelation of formal structure, (mis)interpretation, and 
“blindness” to features of texts and of human relations – in which some kind and degree of 
violence are at the core of that interrelation – is already present in classics of the Western canon. 
Nabokov’s Pale Fire (1960), for instance, might very well fit the bill.  
Our intention is not to establish a hasty comparison or homology between Walsh and 
Nabokov. Yet, as a suggestive juxtaposition, and, mainly, as an instrumentally useful heuristic 
device, it will be helpful to keep Charles Kinbote in mind as we progress in our discussion.  
It is easy to laugh off Kinbote’s delirious “readings” of John Shade’s poem. Likewise, it 
is deceptively easy to spot Otero’s blindness. Yet, it is disquietingly revealing to notice that the 
problems to which these characters point – inextricably connected with the formal structure of 
the narratives – are far from alien to us. Indeed, they are far from being entirely charted, let alone 
solved.
 
8 
																																																								
8 Consider the use of endnotes in Pale Fire vis-à-vis the interplay of main text and footnote in “Nota al 
pie,” and the interrelation of main text, “galley text,” and handwritten notes in “La aventura…” Of the 
three, it is in Pale Fire where we find more physical distance between the two texts, i.e., Shade's poem 
and Kinbote's exegetical notes. This suggests at least three very different interpretive and physical ways 
of reading the book. Kinbote emphatically prescribes reading Shade's poem through the lens of his 
commentary, without which, he warns us, the poem would be barely intelligible. We can, then, go back 
and forth between poem and endnote. Yet, given widespread reading habits, it is difficult not to read 
Shade's poem in its entirety --on its own -and only then read Kinbote's set of endnotes, perhaps leafing a 
line or a stanza of the poem to (try to) make sense of Kinbote's exegesis. A third possibility is to consider 
the Shade and Kinbote sections almost as separate books, or as texts that are amenable to a range of 
connections, but that do not require them. Of course, we don't have to – perhaps in a stronger sense: we 
cannot—choose one of these (or other) possibilities over others; but we can explore them. Yet, as Nafisi 
and White have pointed out, it is ironic (and, one could add, worrisome) that an almost Kinbotean set of 
prescriptive “preferences” or “arguments” to favor one reading over others should have sprung among 
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While these problematic issues will hover in the background of our discussion, our 
explicit use of Kinbote will be that of a rather simplified but effective figure of the "violent 
reader," who ploughs his or her way through the end of the text, projecting his preconceived 
interpretive desires onto the textual material. Blind or myopic at best, attached to a set of 
practices that have little to do with (and little room for) texts that don't fit his scheme, this 
Kinbote-like construct will serve as shorthand for instances in which readers incur in (some kind 
or degree of) interpretive violence.  
If Kinbote and Otero are figures of violent interpretive practices, Abad Faciolince’s 
narrators evoke – and develop further – other, perhaps subtler forms of interpretive violence, 
which may be linked not only to Kinbote, but also to his less coarse but close Nabokovian 
relative from Lolita, Humbert Humbert. In turn, Abad’s narrators and H.H. will bring into 
sharper focus (and will speak to, or be spoken to) the child narrators or child perspectives central 
to Alcoba’s and Carri’s works.  
 
    .  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Pale Fire scholars. One should, at the very least, begin to suspect that neither Otero nor Kinbote are as far 
from us as we may initially think. Boyd, Rorty, and Castillo discuss this issue, too. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Beyond Oblivion: Abad’s Traiciones de la memoria (Memory Betrayals). 
 
 
1.1 Recording or Disappearing. 
 
Abad's three-part narrative, or, three "autobiographical stories" takes the formal approach 
of Walsh's pieces, but develops it much further. The main text is blurred by a constellation of 
letters, photos, e-mails, and facsimile reproductions of artisanal chapbooks, handwritten journals, 
drawings, and maps. The process of reading invites crossings in the manner of Walsh's "proof-
reading" story, yet, in Abad's case, there are also literal, explicit suggestions, such as when the 
narrator asks the reader to examine a photo or read the text (in longhand) of a facsimile 
reproduction (or photo?) of his journal --or when he invites the reader to listen to a recently 
found recording of his father reading a Borges poem at a radio program, on the very day of his 
murder.  
From the very first sentences, Abad’s pessimistic view on his personal memory seems to 
concede that the standards of evidence of testimonial accounts are far from stringent enough, and 
that memory is painfully fallible. At the same time, Abad won't make any firm claim about his 
experiences (or he will counterbalance them, even contradict them, by appeal to other claims or 
implicit suggestions that are inconsistent with the prior claim, even when this second claim or 
suggestion isn't sufficiently grounded either). This leaves the narrative in a temporary state of 
suspension. However, he does gather as much "evidence" as he can, in the form of photographs, 
emails, letters, scrapbooks, and other minutiae— and always tries to put in writing his 
experiences shortly after the event he wants to record took place. 
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 The first and longest story of the three begins with a self-deprecating statement that 
seems to submit to the most conservative or skeptical views on memory, yet without mentioning 
any theoretical or political debate on the issue. In what seems a bittersweet, humorous, 
hyperbolic fashion, Traiciones begins with Abad remarking that his memory – “esa peculiar 
forma de la brutalidad” ["that peculiar form of brutality"] --is responsible for his inability to be 
"completely sure of whether I'm reminiscing or inventing" whenever he looks at the past (p. 11). 
Not only does he seem to give in from the outset --fabrication is the favorite and ideal target of 
memory critics --but he also formulates the thought in a way reminiscent of recent studies that 
lend support to the view that memory is, in fact, much less reliable than we tend to believe 
(Chabris). “Almost always,” Abad writes, “that is the past: something that no longer is, and of 
which all we have left are traces of words" (“algo que ya no es y de lo cual solo nos queda el 
rastro de las palabras;” p. 12).  
Having presented this proviso, the first story, “Un poema en el bolsillo” (“A Poem in the 
Pocket”) jumps straight into its triggering event: Abad's retrieval of a forgotten memory – the 
memory of yet another retrieval: that of a handwritten poem lodged in the pockets of a dead man, 
gunned down minutes earlier.  
Now, in light of his introductory proviso on his brutally bad memory, one may 
legitimately ask how he could remember the bloody event with which he began his story, an 
event that he claims to have forgotten? Abad himself gives us a first, provisional answer, 
dropping in passing a detail about the murder and the poem in the pocket:  
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Yo, por ejemplo, no me acuerdo ya del momento en que esta historia empieza para mí. Sé 
que fue el 25 de agosto de 1987, más o menos a las seis de la tarde, en la calle Argentina 
de Medellín, pero ya no me acuerdo bien del momento en que metí una mano en el 
bolsillo de un muerto y encontré un poema. En este caso tengo suerte; apunté en un 
cuaderno ese momento. Apunté en mi diario, aunque nunca pensé que lo fuera a olvidar, 
que había encontrado un poema en el bolsillo de mi padre muerto. Ese momento yo ya no 
lo recuerdo. Pero aunque no lo recuerde, tengo la prueba, tengo varias pruebas, de que 
eso sucedió en mi vida, así ese instante, ahora, esté desterrado de mi memoria. (I, for 
instance, no longer remember the moment when this story began. I know it was on 
August 25th, 1987, around 6 pm, on Argentina Street, in Medellín, but I no longer 
remember well the moment when I put my hand in the pocket of a dead man and found a 
poem. In this case I'm lucky; I wrote it down on a notebook at once. I wrote it down on 
my journal, although I never thought I'd ever forget that I had found a poem in the pocket 
of my dead father. That moment I no longer remember.  But I have proof; I have several 
proofs that that happened in my life, even if that instant is now uprooted from my 
memory; 16-17; my emphasis). 	
 
         A rather short paragraph in longhand, written on the pages of an old notebook, is la prueba, 
one of the many "pruebas" (roughly equivalent to the English "piece of evidence," and, with a 
different shade of meaning, "proof"). Abad seems to give so much importance to (what he 
regards as) the probatory value of this journal page, and seems so intent on showing us this is so, 
that when we turn the page, we see a photographic reproduction of the page in question. Abad 
has even added a note in longhand --superimposed to the journal photo --indicating the lines in 
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which he referenced the “poem in the pocket.” The text has been interrupted by an image… of a 
text. Just as it happened when Walsh’s proofreader story was “interrupted” by the insertion of 
galley proofs and handwritten corrections, one may wonder whether it might be worth it to 
explore the “graphic evidence;” i.e., to decipher Abad's handwriting, or turn the page and 
continue reading the main text. 
9 
 
If a page earlier memory was reduced to “traces of words,” Abad goes further when 
specifying the nature of forgetting. He begins to sketch his view on what forgetting is by posing 
a rhetorical question whose answer will echo throughout the book. “¿Qué queda de la vida,” asks 
Abad, “si uno no la recuerda ni la escribe? Nada. Hay muchos pedazos de nuestra vida que ya no 
son nada, por un simple hecho: porque ya no los recordamos.” (“What is left of life when one 
neither remembers it nor writes it? Nothing. There are many parts of our lives that are nothing, 
due to a simple fact: we no longer remember them;” 15)  
Abad claims that not only his "bad memory," but memory in general -memory as a 
human capacity --works in such a way that forgetting something means losing it forever. Yet, 
what is the precise sense of this loss? Abad seems to be saying that both the memory and the 
event "disappear" and become nada (which in Spanish means both "nothing" and "nothingness"); 
that the content of our forgotten memories – persons or events – are annihilated.  
Now, the psychological phenomenon of forgetting could plausibly be conceived as 
“losing forever” the memory of an event or a person – and in this sense, this ‘loss” could be 
construed as disappearance; as the obliteration of the memory (i.e., of the capacity to bring to 
consciousness one specific representation of a specific event or person ---or whichever the 																																																								
9 Did he really reference the poem in his journal? With some effort, one can read the line highlighted by 
Abad, and it turns out that it is, at most, a paraphrase of the Borgesian line. 
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content of the forgotten memory may be). In this sense, we may say something like, “Nothing 
remains of the event… in our minds or memories” and, perhaps, elide the “where” and say, 
“Nothing remains of the event.”  
But Abad seems, at times, to shift from the above claim --a claim about psychology (i.e., 
about memory and forgetting) --to a claim about ontology (i.e., about the existence of entities – 
objects, living beings, actions, etc. – and their conditions of creation and annihilation). However, 
this seemingly problematic view is happily bypassed when he subsequently explains that writing 
can save our memories from being lost forever. Abad had forgotten, but then “brought back,” 
retrieved, in and through words, the memory of the moment when he saw and kneeled by his 
father, gunned down seconds earlier but already dead; and, following a quasi-instinctive drive to 
feel the body, reached his pockets, and took the sheet of paper that contained the Borges poem – 
a copy in longhand, written by his father. A very specific memory of a very specific event, which 
he had forgotten until he read his journal entry. Because he wrote it down, both memory and 
event were saved from disappearing forever; from becoming nada.  
Abad’s efforts to prove the authenticity of his memories regarding the poem are 
motivated, in part, by his openly avowed bad memory (which is made more disquieting if we 
take at face value his view on the utter irretrievability of forgotten events). But there is a further, 
more specific, personal reason. The memoir about his father, El olvido que seremos (2006) 
[Oblivion. A Memoir (2012)], owes its title to a line of the very poem he found in his father’s 
pocket. Shortly after its publication, an eccentric figure in the literary ambient accused Abad of 
falsely attributing the poem to Borges to give more luster to his memoir.  
Initially, Abad didn’t give much importance to those accusations; he even added that he 
doesn’t care much for the notion of authorship. Why, then, his change of heart? Why such an 
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anxiety, such obsession with finding evidence to prove that Borges was indeed the author of the 
poem found in his father's pocket? “If the inept Colombian justice system cannot find the 
murderers [n.b. GLL: “authors” of the murders}, I, at least, will find the author of the sonnet or 
sonnets” (34) he writes. Abad doesn't give any further explanations, and the first impression is 
that of being exposed to a black-humored non-sequitur whose odd effect is in part caused by the 
combination of lexical choices usually associated with moral outrage, and the blatantly 
nonsensical reasoning.  
However, isn’t this too hasty? Could there be a relevant connection between 
corroborating – proving – the authorship of the murder, and corroborating — proving—the 
authorship of the poem? Perhaps, if he left the accusation unclarified, his credibility --and that of 
the memoir --might be weakened. This, in turn, would make his word, as well as the memory and 
life of his father, more vulnerable to attacks: doubts about his credibility, coupled with poor 
memory, would leave Abad with fewer resources to refute aspersions, to put it mildly.  
In this context, Abad’s awareness of the problems that his bad memory might lead to 
became particularly acute when his initial attempts to settle the matter by resorting to “proofs” 
that his father’s handwritten poem was indeed penned by Borges failed miserably simply 
because he couldn’t remember where or how he got to know that the piece was authentic. 
Second, if the poem isn't a Borges original, it would mean that his father was deceived – or 
betrayed by either himself or others --in the one thing Abad regarded as symbolically and 
ethically uplifting and undefeatable about an event that has little of that. Abad feels it is a 
consolation of sorts --and something that captures a core feature of his father’s character – to 
know that in the very moment in which he was being murdered, he had a copy, in his own 
handwriting, of a Borges poem he had just read to a radio audience. As if, in a way, the 
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juxtaposition of objects and acts – bullets and poem; assassination and collectively engaging 
with a poem – emphasized the difference between all that the death squads represented, and all 
that his father represented. The lofty or naïve or clichéd air of these lines takes on quite a 
different meaning if the reader is cognizant of, or searches for, alternative accounts of the same 
event, which Abad himself hints at.
10 
 
Traiciones seems to suggest that being deceived about the poem would add another layer 
of violence – what Hannah Arendt dubbed the violence of the modern lie --to the other, more 
explicit one that was the murder. In Arendt’s view, lying aims not so much at hiding a fact or an 
action (and making the target of the lie believe something different), but at destroying the fact or 
action (and replacing it by a false account that would have the same force and “reality” of the 
obliterated one). Again, this view bears a certain resemblance to that of forgetting qua 
annihilation. (Arendt 1967 and 1971; Caruth 2011; Jay 2009 and 2011).  
In light of these considerations, Abad’s odd-sounding “explanation” --“Si la inepta 
justicia colombiana no puede hallar a los asesinos, al menos yo podré hallar al autor del soneto” 
[If the inept Colombian Justice cannot find the murderers, at least I will be able to find the 
																																																								
10 The disparity between this formulation and a very similar one found in Oblivion is almost a practical 
joke—or a “memory betrayal”? Something was lost or forgotten or omitted in the move from 2006’s 
Oblivion to 2009’s Traiciones: the comforting thought that his father had just read, and still carried with 
him, a copy of the Borges poem at the very moment when he is gunned down lacks the literal and 
metaphorical flipside present in Oblivion, as well as in Los falsificadores de Borges (2012), an account of 
roughly the same events, given by Jaime Correas). According to these accounts, the hit-list on which his 
own name was clearly written shared room with the poem, in the same pocket, but somehow it dropped 
out of the picture in Traiciones. Readers cognizant of this discrepancy surely appreciate the irony, or the 
performative contradiction between claiming to be deeply interested in proving one’s memory reliable, 
and allowing such a blatant disparity between two books that are obviously connected to go unchecked.  
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author of the sonnet"]  (34) – seems to make more sense. Very incisively, Catalina Quesada 
summarizes the issue thus: “To the question of how to narrate history … and the voluntary 
betrayals bewen discourse and reality,” she writes, referring to the betrayal of the justice system, 
and perhaps to the false charges against Abad, “one must add … the involuntary betrayals that 
hide the truth on which justice ought to be based” (218).  
Thus, despite Abad’s initial emphasis on the evidentiary value of both his writing on the 
journal and the photo reproducing the journal, he soon realizes that this “evidence” --both 
material (the journal; the photo) and symbolic (language, or his written account of the event) --is 
more vulnerable and precarious than he initially thought.  
Not only the State paraphernalia of the judiciary, but also the inconsistencies Abad finds 
in the archives and records of papers, journals, and other written “sources” (?) undermine his 
faith. But even that which we do write or “tell” immediately also involves a certain degree of 
loss.  
However, what at first seems an air-tight device to save our memories and experiences 
soon proves to be less straightforward. “If life is the original, memory is a copy of the original, 
and our notes, a copy of memory” (“Si la vida es el original, el recuerdo es una copia del 
original, y el apunte, una copia del recuerdo” (15), writes Abad to encapsulate the inevitable 
time-gap that separates event and writing of the event – often mediated by memory of the event.  
This time-gap, especially in cases like Abad’s strange memory flaws, also involves some 
loss. Lastly, in the very act of going over the text to make sure we have recorded our memory (of 
the event) with as little loss or distortion as possible, we engage in an act of recall that is already 
a “mental” narrative.  
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And, as such, following Borges, we get further away from the accurate memory.
11 
 
 
Como decía el mismo Borges, y es un hecho supongo que neurológico de la memoria, 
recordamos las cosas no tal como ocurrieron, sino tal como las relatamos en nuestro 
último recuerdo, en nuestra última manera de contarlas (As Borges himself used to say -- 
and this is, I guess, a neurological fact of memory - we remember things not exactly as 
they happened, but as we narrated them in our last recollection, in our last way of telling 
them; 149)]  
 
Increasingly anxious with every dead end, Abad follows myriad clues, some of which take him 
abroad. The reader follows his search, page by page, often stopped by a photo, derailed by an 
email, propelled by one of Abad's conversations with one of his many interlocutors, or by a 
poem found on the back of the photo of a book found in a small library... or disoriented by the 
multiple stimuli coming off the page, just as Abad stops, too, equally disoriented --or so he 
makes us believe.  
Soon, Abad finds himself hearing a string of stories ranging from the plausible but 
inconclusive, all the way to the surreal or the grotesque: Borges in a New York City bar, in the 
70s, dictating poems to one María Panero, whom he had just met and fallen in love with; Borges 
somehow linked to the editors of an obscure student magazine in a far-away province in 
Northern Argentina; Borges modeling for Guillermo Roux, the acclaimed artist, while a French 
journalist tries to interview Borges, whose answers are one-liners—line after line of the same 
																																																								
11 Underlying these worries, there is the question of whether there is such thing as a direct transcription of 
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poem he had already, allegedly, dictated to María Panero.  
In this context, Abad resorts to Bea Pina, his hermetic friend, to whom the book is 
dedicated –whom he describes as playing many roles – confidante, helper, and even “hada 
madrina” (41), Bea is “an epidemiologist expert in finding strange things” [“una epidemióloga 
experta en averiguar cosas raras”] (42). Bea Pina sounds, actually, rara herself. She is, at times, a 
very human, very helpful friend. But for the most part, her presence adds yet another layer to the 
texture and atmosphere of the story --a mix of magic, fairy-tale, supernatural protection, humor, 
and, somehow, in the mix, something hard to spot but not to feel, a vague but pervasive feeling 
of threat; “she lives in the middle of Finland, "ella vive en el centro de Finlandia, en la mitad de 
la nada [n.b., en medio de la nadad], en medio de la nieve y de la niebla" (41-42). Besides the 
barely disguised paraphrase of the Nazi motto for the Final Solution, there is the return of the, by 
now, very charged "nada": "in the middle of nothingness" though of course the English 
equivalent would be "in the middle of nowhere."  
But Bea herself has, or is, a spectral presence;12
 
we only know of her from Abad's 
comments, and from a few fragments of her emails, mediated by Abad's choice to include them 
in his text. No photos of her; no records whatsoever of the existence of this woman who plays a 
key role in Abad’s search; in the search conducted by a man obsessed with documenting and 
“proving” each and every move; each and every source.  																																																																																																																																																																																		
(non-verbalized) memory into a written account.  
12 Bea is a nameless, incorporeal presence that, from her first intervention (appearance?) establishes a 
firm, complex “feel;” her presence is pervasive. Yet it is a presence that echoes Abad’s earlier reference 
to Lichtenstein’s knife: a knife without a blade, whose grip is missing, and, again in Abad's words, "an 
object that can exist only in words, which cannot be shown, but which you can see in that phrase" (p. 12). 
Bea Pina herself seems to be made of words, or of "traces of words."  
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Let us reiterate, however, that this unsettling, ominous feeling is just one component in 
the blend of impressions that Bea Pina seems to elicit. It is not that she simply triggers dread. She 
adds more complexity to the emotional texture of the narrative, formally achieved by the 
juxtaposition, crossings, and blends of threads of embedded micro-narratives, themes, registers, 
and genres—it's as if one genre were slightly more prevalent for s short while; as if, for instance, 
the “feel” of the detective story prevailed or seemed to prevail at a certain moment, only to fade 
or morph into something like a parody of the autobiographical essay. These shifts are sometimes 
smooth and almost imperceptible, and others abrupt and jarring, as a sort of Brechtian 
intervention.  
These shifts are brilliantly articulated in a recent study on the mechanisms of 
hybridization at work in Traiciones, which discusses the various strategies and effects achieved 
by the nimble manipulation and torsion of three canonical genres: short fiction, autobiography, 
and essay—and a fourth, perhaps most destabilizing one, which is forefronted by the use and 
“presence of visual documents that link the text to the journalistic genre” [“la presencia de los 
documentos visuales que vinculan el texto con el género periodístico”] (Dulou 146)  
Further, the discussion of intra-generic hybridization is particularly important for our 
purposes. In the case of the cuento as genre (short fiction), the critic teases out the nimble 
combinations or shifts involving the detective story, the fable, the fairy-tale tradition, and the 
erudite, Borgesian sub-genre of cuento --all of which, when combined with intra-generic threads 
of the essay, the autobiography, and the journalistic genres, yield “moments” in which the reader 
tackles configurations such as the “short story of detective intrigue, erudite, and scientific” 
(“cuento de intriga policial, erudita y científica” (146).  
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This label doesn’t refer necessarily to a hybrid sort of cuento, for each of the components 
of the said configuration may make use of one or more elements of one or more subgenres of the 
four main genres examined by Dolou. Therefore, the above coinage might be construed as 
“cuento [by now, a placeholder for “narrative of unspecified nature] de intriga policial [elements 
of the detective story], erudite [elements of the scholarly essay and/or the Borgesian strand of 
the short story genre] y científica [elements of the subgenre “investigative journalism”].”13 
 
 
Even granting that Bea has something of a spectral presence, this new occurrence of nada 
in Abad’s description of his friend’s dwelling place, in addition to the web of associations Abad 
established earlier, brings back the echo of the chain Nothingness--Oblivion--Murder—
Disappearance. Abad's lexical choices, then, keep alluding to the semantic web in which “nada,” 
“annihilation,” “disappearance,” among others, might seem to refer to the “methodology” of the 
Southern Cone military regimes. 
   It is puzzling that, although Colombians had first-hand experience with disappearances 
--Abad himself had a concrete, personal memory involving disappearances in his native 
																																																								
13 Now, while these hybridization mechanisms are pregnant with possibilities, they have also elicited 
forms of misreading in which the text has been smoothed over or reduced to one (or one governing) 
genre. It has been called “collection of essays” and, perhaps more interesting in terms of the seriousness 
of the Kinbotean dangers, it has been read as a “rigorous investigation” in historiography; or, more 
specifically, as “an important tool that contributes conceptual and methodological elements … for the 
historian,” which might even foster a renewal of the so called “new cultural history.” [“una importante 
herramienta que aporta elementos metodológicos y conceptuales para …[el] historiador … [elementos 
que podrían contribuir a una renovación de la nueva historia cultural;” Cassiani 175).  
 
 35 
 
Medellín14
 
--he seems to track closely the case of Argentina, without saying so explicitly, but, 
instead, carefully planting hints that allow readers to make the connection first, and the 
reasonable, increasingly strong, but inconclusive conjecture that Argentina’s desaparecidos are, 
somehow, related to the puzzle of authorship – authorship of his father’s murder; of the poem in 
his pocket.  
The cumulative effect of these allusions would be almost irritating (in a black-humored 
way) if Bea Pina, finally, hadn't brought with her the presence of concrete, Argentine 
disappearances that might be linked to Abad’s search for the authorship of the poem. She sends 
an email to Abad, with information about the aforementioned María Panero, who is, apparently, 
the young woman who might have written down the poem upon Borges' dictation.  
Bea Pina says that this María Panero is an Argentine who had been in NYC around the 
time of Borges' talks, and --and here the text is "interrupted" again: the next four pages have no 
"proper" text; four attachments from Bea Pina's email are "pasted" on those pages: three 
																																																								
14 Consistent with the comparative absence of (or, rather, with the few but carefully chosen set of 
references to) Abad’s father, Traiciones omits that in El olvido que seremos (2006) – Oblivion. A Memoir 
(2012) – there is a vivid account of a day when Abad-as-a-young-boy, at home with his father, heard a 
knock on the door, saw his father open, heard the distraught neighbor explain the paramilitary had 
disappeared her son; that no one was willing to help. The brief but vivid account ends with the image of 
the boy, still standing, stunned – the rage of his father when hearing of the widespread, paralyzing fear or 
cowardice or indifference; the rage rapidly turning into urgent need to leave the house, at once, with his 
neighbor, to search for—what? A vague, unlikely solution. Everything happened fast; his father gone, 
with the same courage, the boy thought (or was it, the text suggests, overconfidence – or irresponsible 
naiveté, or suicidal recklessness?) with which decades later he would walk Calle Chile, then turn into 
Argentina, then stop, abruptly, cutoff by the squad that swiftly but calmly and professionally, riddled him 
with bullets at point-blank range.  
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declassified US Department of State memos from the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, and a letter 
from Panero's family pleading for her.  
There's no paraphrase of the memos. The change of register and lexicon, the cold distance 
with which these documents are usually written, and the story the memos tell --neither gore nor 
details; just the description of an "erroneous" or “mistaken” disappearance --abduction, torture, 
long negotiations, disputes between "hardliners" and "moderates" within the Armed Forces 
(another military lie: simply a power-struggle; the "hard-liners" vs "'moderates" was a macabre 
fiction), Panero's family sending letters to the junta, and, finally, her release --make the 
experience of reading those memos quite jarring.  
Are the memos reliable? A prior question: are they real or forged? Earlier, Abad claimed 
his journal had “proofs” of his acquaintance with the Borges poem – he had quoted it! Or, almost 
-- a close scrutiny of the photographic reproduction of the page in question, and a detailed 
reading, only show a few lines that might allude to, among many things, the putative Borges 
poem. It is neither a quotation nor a clearly paraphrastic passage.  
 Is Abad placing in front of us a big warning clue to the effect that we should not take his 
word at face value? Is he putting into question the word of the survivor/victim/witness? Or is he 
“reading” too much into his journal entry, without malice, simply because he knew the poem, and 
therefore, against that familiar background, something that Abad sees as a clear reference to the 
poem strike us as bearing a tenuous resemblance to something vaguely Borgesian?  
Perhaps because “no one likes to be lied to” (“a nadie le gusta que le  mientan”), Abad 
persists. And at his point, so do we, tempted to find out whether any of these accounts is real.. 
The memos are, indeed, veridical.15
  
But they are only a fragment of the story.16 																																																								
15 They can be retrieved from the Declassification Project at the NSA/Washington University website. 
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As Abad begins to question the truthfulness of certain interlocutors and sources, we begin 
to question some of Abad's unaccountable oddities. Following one of the many leads, he strikes 
conversation with a fellow Borges-phile (who will soon prove to be one of the three-fold 
Ariadne's thread of Abad's search), and, later, when writing to Bea Pina about the news of his 
trip, he mentions that one of his new friend’s favorite stories, or, in Abad’s opinion, “his real 
favorite, is “El Evangelio según San Mateo,’ or something like that; I didn’t remember it” (“uno 
de sus cuentos, su preferido. ‘’El Evangelio según San Mateo,’ o algo así; yo no lo recordaba;” 
118). This statement sounds, once again, off-putting and almost nonsensical --as if Abad were 
laughing at our expense.  
It is abundantly clear that he knows the work of Borges very well; and in some respects, 
perhaps too well: he figured out a wrong date given by a witness because she mentioned that 
Borges' cat, Beppo, was meowing around. Abad catches the mistake immediately: Beppo had 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Moreover, Telam (Telecommunications Office of the Government of Argentina), and other organizations 
have the records of the criminal cases that took place during the Dirty War, and Panero is one of them. 
Survivors from the illegal detention centers giving testimony in the 2012 trials concerning the systematic 
plan to abduct and “relocate” the newborns of “subversives” declared under oath having met Panero, 
briefly. 
16 At some point in the process of researching online whether the Panero case is veridical or a mere 
fabrication, one learns that the squads were after María Panero, but they mistakenly caught her sister, who 
had the bad luck of being an “M” --Susana. M. Panero. Soon enough the sisters met in the torture 
chambers; Susana was released fairly quickly, but María wasn’t. After long, tense negotations, she was 
offered the “right of option,” i.e., to either leave the country as an exile or deportee, or to stay under better 
detention conditions by “making her legal” – issuing the necessary paperwork to forge a legal detention 
that would, ipso facto, make it legal, and, as such, a little bit less vulnerable—legal detainees had, in 
different degrees, access to lawyers and a precarious structure that might secure their survival. Yet, no 
one was exempt from “fugue attempts” – cold-blooded executions.   
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died long before the date provided by the witness. How not to be mystified, then, when we hear 
Abad botching the title of one of Borges' well-known stories of his later period, “El Evangelio 
según Marcos”? And then again, is it worth interrupting the reading and checking out the short 
story? Could it give us another clue that we may find illuminating? Or will it be yet another piece 
of information that points at something undefinable that we know could help, but whose meaning 
we will grasp once it's too late?  
A quick paraphrase of the story fits in a five-sentence footnote.17
 
It is, among other 
things, one of the most impressive narrative exemplars of misreading—an extreme case of failure 
in our interpretive and dialogical practices. What to make of Marcos? And, what to make of the 
illiterate family? This “nudge” – the potential clue of Abad’s “forgotten” story --is actually worth 
following. In this respect, Traiciones ranges from subtle hints to explicit invitations. For 
instance, when Abad finds a recording of the radio program in which his father gave that last 
reading of the Borges poem, he invites the reader to check it out on a website whose URL he 
provides.  
In the turmoil of succeeding tips and trips, Abad loses the "original", i.e., the sheet of 
paper, crumpled and with stains of dried blood, on which his father had copied the poem, in 
longhand, on the day of his murder? Being so valuable to Abad --to the point of considering it 
"evidence" that "proves" he was truly was by his father's side --how could he lose it? Yet lose it 
																																																								
17 Marcos leaves the city and goes to the pampas to preach. One family shows enough interest to receive 
him in their home, where he teaches them to read and interpret the Bible. One afternoon, months later, he 
hears clinging sounds of tools and wood, and almost at once realizes that he had misconstrued --misread, 
failed to see, failed to hear --what was really going on. Now he does hear, quite clearly, the metallic 
sound of the hammer with which the head of the family has just finished building the cross. With fervor 
and gratitude, the family will follow the teachings of the Gospels. Marcos knows, before the children 
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he did. Or so he claims. Foreseeing the reader's doubts, he adds, "Me dirán que eso no puede 
pasar, que uno no pierde ni arroja a la basura algo asi, un documento tan íntimo, un papel tan 
importante” [You'll say that that can't happen; that one just doesn't lose or throws away such a 
personal document, such important sheet of paper] (21).  
Indeed, when handling things dear to us, when doing things that by their very nature 
require a certain degree of concentration and focus, it is reasonable to think that one would be 
attentive –indeed, more attentive than usual. Abad sounds defensive --how could he have had 
such a lapse of attention? Did the “original” ever exist?  
Following a clue given by the least likely source – a mythomaniac --Abad arrives in 
Mendoza, an Argentinean province in the Northwest, where he meets Jaime Correas, former 
editor of a long-extinct university magazine. His trip and meeting with Correas is, as will happen 
throughout the book, "proven" by the insertion of photos, texts of Correas' old literary 
magazines... and a long email to Bea Pina (87) telling her about his findings.  
Correas turns out to be, first of all, a real person; or at least, a Mendoza website features a 
Jaime Correas who looks very much like the one that appears in Abad’s photos. And he is, in 
fact, the Correas who published Los falsificadores de Borges (2012), his version of the events 
whose narrative account Abad gives us in Traiciones.  
Correas virtually solves the mystery that had obsessed Abad for months. In a nutshell, he 
tells Abad that Borges dictated a handful of poems to three different amanuenses, in three 
different locations. The next two pages feature photos of the old magazines with the Borges 
poems; then, we are back to Abad's email to Bea Pina.  
 																																																																																																																																																																																		
open the door and the Passion begins, that he will die on the cross that very day.  
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Then, eight consecutive pages reproduce Borges' chapbook in full, edited and published 
by Correas. On the next page, two blank pages: the left one, however, has a reproduction (a 
photo?) of a blank page, which seems to be a reproduction of that very same page.  
While it's not unreasonable to suppose that readers would stop for a moment to ponder 
about this strange, unexpected mise en abyme of sorts, the suppositions one may make in this 
regard may well be as numerous as the readers who face the blank pages in question. But we do, 
at some point, turn the page, and, finally, we see a good-old-fashioned text, with no interruptions 
or distractions of any kind--three pages of uninterrupted reading, and, on the fourth, only text, 
too, but a most disorienting opening:  
“As you know, our project was to write this story in four hands” (“Como sabes, el 
proyecto era escribir esta historia a cuatro manos;” 113). 
Has Abad switched points of view? Previously, he had asked questions --or wondered 
about certain issues --and briefly addressed the reader, indirectly, without using the second-
person. The abrupt change in point of view is jarring; and the story to be written "in four hands," 
which we are supposed to be acquainted with ("As you know…") is a complete mystery.  
Then, it dawns on us that what we are reading isn't the "main text" but the same email 
Abad sent to Bea Pina from Mendoza --the one we had started to read a few pages earlier, in 
which we learned of Correas' publication of the Borges poems, the Cortázar book. For almost 
100 pages, Abad's memory appeared to be much weaker than "normal." (?). Some of his alleged 
lapses were likely to sound peculiar --even implausible. And yet, now, a few pages of text and a 
few pages of photos suffice to make us go through a similar experience – a frustrating lapse of 
memory that, on the face of it, is equally, if not more, implausible.  
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Much of the work Traiciones does is achieved through the nimble use of these 
performative loops: the reading of the text causes the reader to experience what the narrative 
(until then) seemed to be merely saying and, at most, trying to show.  
Bluntly put, this specific kind of performativity isn’t about the text doing what it says, but 
doing to the reader what it says and does. In turn, the effectiveness of these performative loops 
owes much to the interplay and shifts between main narrative, email, and image. Still, as seen in 
the example above, it doesn't take a highly sophisticated device, but merely a few combinations, 
to give us a rather unsettling first-hand, almost physical experience of the fragility of memory.  
Chastising Abad for his singularly poor memory first, and for having lost the "original" 
poem later, or beginning to question the veracity of his words --it all appears now as expressions 
of ignorance on our part--of a certain deficiency in our self-interpretation (i.e., we think we 
would not have lost the poem, but we also thought we didn’t have such a poor memory 
ourselves), and, a fortiori, in the interpretation of the actions, words, and mishaps of others. Is it 
so easy to become some version of Walsh's Otero, Nabokov's Kinbote, or Abad's narrator in 
Basura? Or is it Abad who is "playing us" by dint of an ingenious arrangement of pages? Still, 
isn't this last question an Otero-sounding attempt at exculpating ourselves? After all, whatever 
premeditated page-arrangement there may be, it is still the case that it took just a few pages for 
us to lose our bearings.  
Even the context to understand the "four-handed book" is given just a few pages earlier, 
though not before subjecting us to another performative loop that is activated thus: “I told him I 
preferred that each wrote his book on his own, and that, if we wanted, we could publish them 
together, one bound upwards, the other downowads, in a single volume” (“Yo le dije que prefería 
que cada uno escribiera su libro, y que si queríamos lo publicáramos juntos, por dos lados, 
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anverso y reverso, de un mismo ejemplar,;” 113), we read, and, despite a vague air of familiarity, 
we can't quite make out who the interlocutors are.  
The account goes on, and reaches a dead end – in terms of our understanding of the text – 
and a climax – in terms of the performative loop --when we read this passage:  
Me dijo que otras personas en quienes confiaba le habían dicho que el libro iba bien así. 
Yo le dije que las personas en quienes yo confiaba me habían dicho que el libro así iba 
mal y que la historia no se entendía, se volvía morosa (He/She told me that other people 
whom he/she trusted had told him/her that the book was going well as is. I told him/her 
that people whom I trust had told me that the book was not going well as is, and that the 
story was not quite comprehensible; that it was becoming sluggish; 113-14). 
 
 
This last sentence both describes and creates what we as readers are experiencing. We 
don't quite understand, and whatever story this is, it has begun to feel sluggish… Yet, as we read 
the last clause, and we recall that it's an email from Abad to Bea Pina, we realize that the four-
hand book, whose story wasn't altogether intelligible and was becoming sluggish, is no other 
than the book we are reading. That email was sent during the process of writing the book we are 
reading; i.e., it was integrated into the book itself, and Abad is telling Bea about a conversation 
he'd had with Jaime Correas, during which they discussed different options with a view to 
writing an account of the meandering paths that led to corroborating the authenticity of the 
poems.  
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As it happened, the copies of the magazines provided by Jaime Correas in Mendoza, as 
well as his account of the way the poems were written and published, convinced Abad that he 
was at the end of his search. Borges, very blind by then, had to dictate his brief poems or short 
prose pieces to occasional amanuensis. In a period of frequent travels and a relatively intense 
social life, those poems found a written outlet when Borges met with Dominique Rey, a French 
writer who was preparing a book on Borges, and Franca Beer, wife of Argentine artist Guillermo 
Roux.  
Correas put Abad in touch with Beer and Rey, though by then Abad didn't feel he had to 
meet them in order to corroborate their accounts. He already believes them and has a general 
idea of the sequence of events that led to the writing of the poems. And yet, he does feel that he 
has to meet them, for very different reasons:  
 
Tenía que hablar cuanto antes y oír de su propia boca el mismo relato, o alguno parecido al 
que Jaime y Coco me habían hecho. Quizás [oír] las variaciones de ese mismo 
relato…porque una memoria solamente es confiable cuando es imperfecta, y … una 
aproximación a la precaria verdad humana se construye solamente con la suma de los 
recuerdos imprecisos, unidos a la resta de los distintos olvidos …. El relato sustituye a la 
memoria y se transforma en una forma de olvido. Sin embargo, tiene que haber elementos 
de memoria precisa. Hay detalles nuevos, en todo caso, en relación al relato del libro. (I 
had to speak with them as soon as possible, and listen to them tell me the same narrative, 
or one that resembled that of Jaime and Coco. Perhaps [listen to] variations of that same 
narrative… because memory is reliable only when it’s imperfect … an approach to the 
precarious human truth is built only with the addition of inaccurate memories joining the 
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subtraction of the various instances of forgetting… the narrative replaces the memory and 
becomes a form of oblivion. However, there must be elements of precise memory. There 
are new details, in any case, in connection to the narrative of the book; 149)  
 
Indeed, when he next visits the Roux/Beer couple, their account matched the version according 
to which Borges had dictated those poems to different amanuenses in different places. Abad did 
notice, however, some variations and inconsistencies that, ultimately, did not alter the basic facts 
– again, the “brute facts” or “brute elementary data,” pace Arendt. .  
 Roux mentioned in passing that he made some quick sketches of Borges, in pencil, while 
he was revising the poems with Beer, and that he had given copies of the sketches to J. D. Rey, 
the third and last amanuensis, who published a few poems in his magazine with Roux's sketches 
on the cover. The artist asks Abad whether he would like to take a look at the originals, and soon 
he's back from the next room with a big envelope that reads, “Borges Originals.”  
Remembering that Rey had told him, with some pride, that he had in Paris the Roux 
originals, Abad asks the artist whether he's certain that those are the originals. He is. Abad 
insists. Roux smiles, looks for an eraser, and chooses an inconspicuous spot on a corner of the 
sketches: drawn in pencil, he knows they will give in easily at the first gentle contact with the 
eraser.  
Stunned, Roux and Beer see the sketches unaltered, immune to the action of the eraser. 
They could have sworn they had kept the originals. Rey could have sworn otherwise. Roux takes 
a pencil, and using the copy as a model, in a few minutes he sketches an almost identical 
drawing, “gives it to me, and says, There you go. Now it's an original. Have it. It's a present” 
(“me la entrega y me dice: “Ahora es un original. Se lo regalo;” 178)  
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1.2 Originals and Copies. Identities and Characters. Seeing and Judging. 
 
 
The tremendous ease with which original and copy collapse into each other raises 
disquieting questions, and seems to put even more pressure on the multifaceted nature of archival 
documentation. 
A particularly interesting example is that of the US memos. After creating an 
“environment” in which the level of trust on, and skepticism about, Abad’s text—among others -
- Traiciones has managed to make us doubt the authenticity of US Department of State 
memoranda, which, ironically, shows us how the Argentine military regime forged documents at 
will, and in so doing, literally created legal and factual conditions, events and even persons – in 
the legal sense – as much as they literally disappeared them. 
The problem of “original/copy” – and “authentic/inauthentic;” “genuinely X” or “falsely 
X” --- is reconfigured in the second story. Abad goes back to his years as an exile, in Italy, 
immediately after the murder of his father.  
Penniless, Abad resorts to the aid of Amnesty International, but, in time, jaded and 
angered by a combination of factors, he decides to go on his own. Helpful as the Amnesty 
entourage was, he couldn’t help feeling he was being exhibited as an exotic specimen from a 
land of murderers and massacres to appease the conscience of well-meaning Europeans, 
reinforcing the Eurocentric, victim-centered view on human rights and humanitarianism.  
Some scenes take on the tone, imagery and flavor of the grotesque. And, we find 
passages that, in the same tone, push the (perceived) mockery that the critics of Carri saw in Los 
rubios.  
Passages like the following are closer to the irreverence and more frontal challenges of 
works that came out after Los rubios and Manèges , (e.g., the texts of Mariana Eva Perez and 
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Ángela Urondo Raboy), even if they do have a family resemblance, and, probably, a mutually 
fruitful influence. On top of his many other penuries, Abad cringes when he finds himself, as per 
the directions of Amnesty’s event organizers, among Argentine and Chilean exiles:  
 
los exiliados latinoamericanos, con esa mirada triste ese aire miserable esas ganas 
morbosas de ser compadecidos, esas historias interminables … de los milicos y los 
desaparecidos… Esos eran casi todos argentinos y chilenos, llevaban decenios de 
exilio… haciendo constante alarde de sus horribles recuerdos de tortura y mostrando 
las cicatrices en los dedos [y a veces, en los actos y ceremonias]me sentaban Y a 
veces, en los actos y ceremonias] me sentaban al lado de un compañero chileno o 
argentino que inevitablemente me abrazaba y lloraba.  (the Latin American exiles, 
that sad face that miserable air that morbid desire to be pitied, those never-ending 
stories . . . of the military and the desaparecidos. Those were, almost all of them, 
Argentines and Chileans; they had decades in exile … boasting about their horrible 
memories of torture, and showing scars on their fingers. [And sometimes, at this or 
that event] they’d sit me next to an Argentinean or Chilean compañero who 
inevitably hugged me and cried; 212)  
 
When he decides to stay away from Amnesty as much as possible, and begins to look for jobs, 
however, he finds that the attitude of the well-meaning ladies who visited the “South American 
exhibit” was but one version in a spectrum that included, for instance, the recoiling of an 
interlocutor upon learning that he, Abad, was Colombian, “despite” his light-skinned 
complexion. 
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These attitudinal and micro-behavioral changes (e.g., subtle changes in tone of voice, 
posture, and other forms of body language) are not always registered by our conscious, 
deliberative “screens” -- regardless of our position as objects or perpetrators of these sub-
agential interactions (Frankfurt 2007; Saul 2015) or Charles Taylor’s “sub-violent” attitudes—
and “sub-violent hatred (Taylor 2011).  
Still, these “micro-inequities” (Brennan 2014) or low-intensity “-ism” forms of 
discrimination (i.e., non-overt expressions of sexism, racism, etc.)18do have a range of harmful 
effects that are related to, and sometimes overlap with, the effects of systematic, explicit 
psychological abuse; of social isolation (in “liberty”) and solitary confinement (in prison).  
In this context, Abad denounces the attribution of global character traits—if he was 
Colombian, he had to be a bloodthirsty narco. And he gives a seemingly pedestrian example:  
 
Por cómo se tarda Fulano en contar el dinero para pagar la cuenta, le atribuimos una 
personalidad, un fantasma de avaro; por cómo nos mira o no nos mira Zutana, le damos 
su fantasma de coqueta, de santurrona, de madre, de puta, de pura, de calculadora, de 
buena, de falsa buena, de rica, de tonta, de peligrosa, etc. (Because of how much time 
																																																								
18 From Sarah Ahmed to Susan James, Angela Smith to Charles Taylor, Sarah Brennan to David 
Velleman, research programs embedded in theoretical frameworks ranging from queer studies to 
cognitive science to social and affective neuroscience converge on the study of phenomena that share 
relevantly similar features, whether they be called “sub-violent attitudes” (Taylor 2011), Spinoza-inspired 
“passivity” (Ahmed 2010, for the Deleuzian Spinoza variety) or  “passionate perceptions” (James 2012  
for the analytically-informed Spinocist variety); “testimonial and hermeneutic injustice” (Fricker 2012); 
“micro-inequities” (Brennan 2014 and 2016) or, at a more consciously explicit level, indictments 
displaying varying degrees of symbolic and institutional violence achieved by “semantic displacements” 
(Carnevale 2016) 
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John is taking to count the money to pay the bill, we attribute to him a personality, a 
ghost of miserly; because of the way in which Mary looks or does not look at us, we give 
her, in turn, her ghost of coquettish; of puritanically or hypocritically saintly; of mother, 
whore, calculating, good, posing as good, rich, dumb, dangerous, etc.; 260). 
 
The reader of course agrees, and keeps on reading. Unless there is something off, not 
quite right, in the example. Let us reread it; let us go over Abad’s assignation of characters traits 
to Fulano (male) and Zutana (female). 
The one attribute projected onto Fulano is certainly negative – stingy. Many of the 
attributes projected onto Zutana are also negative, but “buena,” for instance, is, well, 
tautologically positive. If Zutana is good, i.e., a good person, our judgment of her ought to be 
positive.  
Now, a closer scrutiny might allow us to argue that the attribution of character traits 
projected onto Fulano (male) can be slightly modified, and our judgment of him (or of that trait) 
will be correlatively modified as well. All we know is that he's taking his time to count the 
money. If we assume (and project onto him) that he's stingy, there must be an intermediate piece 
of information that should give us some reason to call him stingy, to judge stinginess negatively 
or, if the intermediate piece of information is different, there is room to change the attribution, 
whether in kind or degree.  
Let's suppose we learn he's counting the money very slowly because, due to a 
miscalculation, he insisted on paying everybody’s bill, only to find he is short of money. We 
might have to drop the attribution of stinginess, and, perhaps, replace it by “careless,” “absent-
minded” – even negligent or prodigal. Still, we may still consider he has “stingy” impulses 
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(which, say, tend to “occur” when he has overspent). We might, then, recalibrate the attribute, 
without necessarily rejecting it altogether. But we would quite likely change the evaluative 
judgement. Depending on the kind and degree of stinginess – for instance, if he has very 
infrequent and “mildly stingy” outbursts – we would have to qualify, even if we maintain, the 
attribute. More importantly, we would have to change our judgment—a censoring or 
condemnatory judgment wouldn’t be justified. 
Now, of the attributes projected onto Zutana, which ones admit of this kind of 
modification? “False,” “dangerous,” “impure” … In none of these cases does the valence 
change: at most, we might say that Zutana is less “false’ (in the sense of “hypocritical”) than we 
might have thought; less “calculating” or “dangerous” – but our negative evaluative (perhaps 
moral) judgment will only diminish in degree. Dangerous she is, and condemnation she deserves. 
We may need to recalibrate the kind and degree of condemnation or censoring attitude or action 
to an “appropriate” level. But the kind, the quality – the evaluative negative judgment—remains. 
And so does the censoring attitude. “Dangerous” or “false” cannot be escaped. On the other end 
of the spectrum, let us consider “pure.”  
Even in a non-moral sense, there is no such thing as purer than.  By definition, there is no 
such thing as degrees of purity. One may speak loosely or metaphorically of more, or less, pure 
than (e.g., refined alcohol being purer than…). But, strictly speaking, something is pure, or is 
not, and if the latter is the case, what we have is degrees of impurity. A drop of water in a gallon 
of alcohol makes the alcohol not pure; perhaps it's irrelevantly impure – that’s why we speak 
(loosely) of such things as “99.99% pure.” But is it pure alcohol? It cannot be. It is a solution of 
00.01 % water, and 99.99% of alcohol. But pure it is not. 
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. Now, when we extrapolate this "attribute" to a person, the same rigidity remains, but 
made much worse due to the strong evaluative component that “purity” as an attribute of 
character carries with it. Regardless of the normative context – ethical, legal, religious – the 
slightest “impurity” would ipso facto deserve some sort of negative judgment and, probably, of 
censoring or condemnation. One is either pure, or else, ipso facto, impure in some way or 
another, and to some degree or another.  
And then again, just like in “dangerous” (more, or less, dangerous, but always deserving 
of a normatively negative judgment), once we “fall” from purity into impurity, there is no way 
out. The ramifications of this conceptual-normative system are well known (e.g., possible 
associations with the notions of contamination and/or sickness; of sinfulness or inherently evil 
natures, etc.). 
Abad’s casual example of how lamentable global attributions of character are may turn 
out to be, if read carefully, much more problematic – and revealing of a much deeper, and much 
more deeply ingrained, problem. 
Individuals or groups that fall within this kind of “second-nature” attribution system are 
harmed in a variety of ways. Unsurprisingly, women have been, and still are, one such group. 
Children – again, perhaps unsurprisingly – are another such group.  
Commonplace as these statements may be, in the next two chapters we will see how both 
groups – blended in the figure of the female child – can be harmed in a variety of rather different, 
perhaps more unfamiliar or subtler ways.  
 
 
 
 51 
 
1.3 The Proofs of Abad. Disappearing Links: Evidence, Truth, Memory.  
 
The search for links that may secure a reliable connection between event and evidence --
on the basis of which we accept to believe the truth of a statement that affirms the reality of the 
event in question ---has failed systematically: neither photos nor tokens such as books, journals, 
tickets, or emails give the kind of warrant that the juridical discourse demands of testimonial 
accounts. The memos can be forged; the recording can be doctored to sound like Abad Gomez's 
voice. The photos, which Abad naively thought would provide incontrovertible evidence, are, in 
the end, images whose bearing on, and connection with, a particular action or person is far from 
self-evident.  
First, the reductio becomes clearest when we realize that not even advocates of the 
juridical discourse could say anything with a minimum of confidence in their utterance's chances 
of meeting their very own standards of truth. That is to say, either the bar has been raised too 
high when it comes to the juridical discourse's assessment of testimonial accounts, or their 
standards of truth, as they are, cannot be met even by their most zealous advocates.  
Second, it shows that memory and memory-dependent claims and activities (e.g., 
testimonial accounts) are not "mirrors", or photo-or video-like images, nor linguistic correlates or 
any other sort of token of that general class, stored in our minds and amenable to be shown and 
then put back as if it were any run-of-the-mill physical object.  
And yet, this doesn't lead to a skeptical rejection of all accounts of memory, but, rather, 
to the acknowledgment that a realistic, reliable view of memory will have to accept 
discrepancies, areas of confusion, forgotten aspects or features of the recalled event --in sum, a 
degree of precariousness and imperfection --which can only be ameliorated if we assume a 
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humbler position and are fully aware of our precarious epistemic position.  
Third and last, it showed Abad that memory, with all its imperfections, can be faithful to 
central "facts" --what Arendt called “brutal elementary data.”  
To sum up, we have begun to argue that our epistemic positions in general, and our 
mnemonic capacities in particular are more modest than we tend to think; that we have no 
airtight protection against the possibility to inflict harm on others, even if and when we do so 
(especially when we do so) unwittingly; lastly, that the link between belief, evidence, and event 
is not and cannot be as accurate, or as well-the juridical discourse makes it out to be. 
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CHAPTER 2: Whose Voices? Whose Memories? Memory, History, and Identity in 
Albertina Carri’s Los rubios (2003) 
2.1 The Problem: Form, Authority, and Interpretation.  
 
Almost fifteen years after its release, Albertina Carri's Los rubios (The Blondes, 2003), 
might still be regarded as “the single most controversial Argentine film in years, if not decades” 
(Anderman 107). Of course, Los rubios was not an ex nihilo creation, as Anderman’s own 
overview shows us, by focusing on the hallmarks and general characteristics of the cinematic 
production of the last 50 years– roughly, from the 1960s through the first decade of this century. 
Also, diachronically, we can see how Carri’s work was not unrelated to that of other children of 
the disappeared. María Inés Roque’s Papá Iván (2000), and Andrés Habbeger’s (h)istorias 
cotidianas (2000), are, as it were, close relatives of Los rubios – as close and as far and different 
from one another as relatives can be, that is.  
The reading of Carri's film advanced in this chapter, then, will leave out an explicit and 
sustained dialogue with its predecessors, though it will engage with them indirectly, by 
addressing some of the more recalcitrant and “controversial” topoi of the film. At the same time, 
it will follow, broadly, the tracks of the previous chapter. Roughly, I argue that, if in Traiciones 
the critique of interpretive practices rests on certain ways in which the text engages us in a kind 
of violent, quasi-Kinbotean reading, in Los rubios a different but complementary and equally 
violent kind of Kinbotean torsion occludes interpretive possibilities.  
Again, just like Kinbote, who "reads in each new work the same ghostly presence of his 
own story" (Castillo 1985, 55), we, readers and interpreters, tend to construe the film as either an 
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attack on, or a vindication of, whichever issues we may favor or loath. In turn, these operations 
can be analytically divided in the two main groups already presented earlier:  
 
a) intra-textual or centrifugally oriented strategies that deprive us of anchoring points, 
and which therefore prevent us from making warranted, or text-supported choices of any of the 
many threads and narrative devices that compete for our attention; and  
 
b) extra-textual or centripetal effects resulting from the formal structure of the film, 
which requires --as did the structure of Walsh’s “Esa mujer” and of Abad’s Traiciones – that its 
“nudges” to the reader be heeded, i.e., that it is on the reader to seek contextual information 
beyond the film proper, without which interpretation will be either impoverished or even quite 
likely to go astray.  
 
Conversely, and only by way of illustration, we shall present a few discussions of Los 
rubios that focus on allegedly weak points and aspects of the film, most of which are the direct 
result of failing to see or heed the text’s formal demands. In this context, we shall see how this 
interpretive blindness obscures subtly layered formal and thematic threads in which a variety of 
stances regarding individual and collective memory, responsibility, and identity are presented 
(even if as open, unsettled, tentative lines of inquiry).  
They involve current discussions about the interpretation of the recent past, but also 
problems of present-day, post-dictatorial societies: from gender issues to normalized forms of 
violence, to alternative forms of intersubjective, collective processes of memory-construction 
that escape the current binary, polarized framework of discussion. The latter addresses both the 
problematic juridical discourse and the equally problematic aspects of the memoria montonera, 
but it goes beyond them.  
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Two concrete cases – the silencing of women; the unwitting disregard or blindness to the 
figure of the child as subject of, but also as agent of, violence -should illustrate the gravity of the 
situation. 
 
2.2 Missing Anchoring Points and Not See(k)ing Contextual Information  
 
Since its release, one of the thorniest features of Carri's film has been the alleged 
oscillation between the documentary and the making of the documentary and, straddling both, 
the resort to fictional elements, such as the scripted participation of an actress playing the role of 
Carri. The "documentary" part of the film ostensibly follows Carri's search for information about 
her parents, Ana María Caruso and Roberto Carri, well-known intellectuals who joined 
Montoneros in the early 7ties. They were captured by the military in early 1977, held in the 
"Sheraton" (a police station used as a CCD – Spanish acronym for “clandestine detention center” 
in La Matanza, a partido (county) in the outskirts of Buenos Aires), and eventually disappeared 
by the Army in late 1979 or early 1980.  
The complex shifts between the "documentary" and the "fictionalized" story about the 
making of the documentary contest this seemingly straightforward "plot." Let us review Gabriela 
Nouizeilles’ classic presentation of the problem:  
The passage between the fictional and non-fictional Albertinas [n.b., i.e., which entails 
the passage between the fictional and non-fictional strata of the film] corresponds in the 
movie to the alternation of the use of colour and a movie camera for the fictional one, and 
the use of black and white and a video camera for the ‘real’ one – a distinction that, given 
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the frequent slipping of one level into the other, soon becomes hazy. Far from being the 
exaggerated symptom of narcissistic self-absorption, the multiplication of Albertinas 
seeks to throw into disarray previously held notions of fixity of meaning and 
documentary truth. (Nouzeilles 25)  
Now, how to cash out this "disarray" of "meaning and documentary truth" has been a major point 
of contention. The initial agreement on the "haziness" of the distinction between fictionalization 
and documentary soon gives way to a range of sometimes compatible, sometimes conflicting 
views about the kind, degree, and intensity of this "haziness" --and of its ensuing consequences.  
This variety of views could be roughly divided in three main groups. First, readings 
according to which Carri's film shows the exhaustion of the documentary genre. Intentionally or 
not, this “exhaustion” also targets the notion of documentary truth and its broader sociopolitical 
underpinnings,—or so the argument goes. The first and main casualty, allegedly, is the set of 
assumptions that undergird debates centered on the politics of memory (Kohan 2004, Garibotto 
and Gomez 2006; Garibotto 2011). A second group of interpretive approaches has deemed the 
film as innovative on both formal and political grounds, often framing their analysis in terms of 
Carri's pitting the testimonial documentary against her own, original version of "performative 
documentary," in which traditional forms of memory and identity construction are contested 
(Page 2005; Noriega 2009}  
This latter aspect, however, varies widely, ranging from readings that discuss Carri's 
challenge against the unwritten but forceful prescriptions of influential (and, arguably, most 
visible) views on how to deal with the legacy of the dictatorship -and, therefore, on how to 
construct a personal and collective narrative memory of the 1970s --to readings that reject the 
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very possibility of attempting to launch any sort of memory project (Noriega 2009; Ros 2012). 
Lastly, the consolidation of studies self-identified as focusing on "post dictatorship cultural 
production,” about which a brief overview was given in the Introduction, tends to regard these 
works chiefly as a generational struggle or confrontation (and assessment of) the previous 
generation's sociopolitical projects. This assessment yields, on this view, possibilities that range 
from sheer incomprehension to reconciliation (and even a continuation of sorts) of the previous 
generation’s projects— in most cases, those of their own disappeared parents (Ros 2013).  
A common assumption of these approaches is that Carri's film lends itself to the 
identification of filmic/textual "anchoring points" (i.e., textual support) to buttress the 
articulation of any one interpretation.  
In what follows, I argue that, if we take seriously what Nouizelles called "haziness" (or, 
to put it more strongly, "breakdown") of the codes that distinguish "documentary" from 
"fictionalization" --a point on which most critics agree --it follows that we no longer have 
anchoring points from which (on which we may take foothold) to articulate any given reading.19
 
Unsurprisingly, given the documentary-like appearance of the film, the voiceover --Carri's 
commentary in off (i.e., off-screen, or “off-camera) – is a fairly widespread pillar on which a 
variety of readings rest.  
Although it would seem reasonable to use the director's off-camera commentary as the 
main thread or guide on which to base one's interpretation of the film, and even conceding that a 
good number of critical pieces of this sort do offer insightful commentary, there are reasons that 
																																																								
19 Just as Abad found himself increasingly aware of the impossibility of linking an alleged piece of 
evidence with an alleged fact, we should become aware of the same such impossibility in Los rubios. 
Once the color/black-and-white code is broken, we are no longer able to distinguish "real" documentary 
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override the temptation to hold on to the voiceover. Or at the very least; that should make us 
reconfigure whichever interpretation we might advance, based on Carri’s voiceover or otherwise.  
The voiceover is not the only springboard of interpretation. Other treatments of Los 
rubios lean on a variety of formal elements or threads to articulate the interpretation --usually, a 
main element that vertebrates the reading (e.g., quite often, Carri's voiceover, admittedly) and 
ancillary ones, which may take more prominence at times (e.g., the de-contextualization effect 
created by the absence of standard biographical markers, such as photos of Carri's parents).  
Yet, rich as much of the critical output may be, these unwarranted choices are often used 
to derive or infer quasi-political statements, viewpoints, or straightforward judgments on the 
themes and "methods" purportedly presented in the film. The critical corpus on Los rubios is too 
vast to even attempt a review of the variety of “families” of interpretive proposals that sprang 
from the above move. Merely by way of partial illustration of the range of conflicting 
interpretations let us mention Kohan 2004, who argues that Carri depoliticizes the 
disappearances; Nouizelles 2005, that the surfeit of information paradoxically yields neither 
knowledge nor answers to Carri's questions; Noriega 2009, that there is an insurmountable gap 
between the two generations, which forecloses all possibilities of understanding.  
Although recent critical developments dig deeper and take stock of the complexity of Los 
rubios (and, in so doing, they attempt to dodge paths that, sometimes unintentionally, land us on 
dead-ends or gridlocks), the "price" they pay is still too high: Ocampo 2013 is probably one of 
the most insightful discussions of the non-binary structure of Carri's film, but his reading leaves 
all autobiographical issues as well as all extra-and para-textual variables outside the frame of 
discussion. Ros 2013 argues that there is a fairly distinct, relatively nuanced, non-Manichean 																																																																																																																																																																																		
from "fictionalization." 
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evaluation of the previous generation's political projects. Yet, her discussion is grounded on 
questionable assumptions that eventually lead her astray, as will be discussed in the conclusion.  
In turn, Piedras 2013 and 2014, persuasively poses ethical challenges about the way in 
which the film --and its crew-- address the neighbors. Yet his critique depends on an assumption 
that cannot be taken for granted, i.e., that the "interviews" with the neighbors are "real" and not 
"fictionalized;" that is, not "scripted" or performed with the knowledge and consent of the 
"interviewees." Again, once we are unable to tell what is scripted and what is not; what is 
"fictional" and what isn't, we have to change our deeply ingrained interpretive assumptions. 
Having said that, it would be interesting to put his discussion in dialogue with Carri 2007, which 
discusses, in fact, the question of the film’s treatment of the neighbors.  
Just as in Traiciones we find textual crossings among different media -handwritten pages 
from Abad's journal, photographs, maps, and facsimile reproductions of US Department memos -
-in Los rubios there is a variety of texts that interrupt the conventional flow of the film, 
sometimes covering the whole screen. Also, there are scenes in which Carri/Couceyro jots down 
notes that we, the audience, might get to make out on occasion, and photos that we very often do 
not get to make out, let alone make sense of.  
We are given no explanations. For instance, the photos, or fragments of photos, in which 
we see children and adults who (one might guess) are Carri's parents, are visibly altered or 
expurgated, so that we don't get to see their faces.  
Along these lines, Moira O’Keeffe makes a similar but stronger (more skeptical) point, 
which, until recently, was shared by a significant number of critical discussions of Los rubios; 
“Couceyro looks through photos, but the identities and contexts of the images are never made 
clear, and no stories or memories emerge from the exercise” (528).  
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Strictly speaking, O’Keeffe is right. However, rather than a conclusion of the discussion, 
this puzzling scenario should be its starting point. Bearing in mind the two-fold condition that 
these works propose (i.e., in this case, the need for extra-textual information; a need that 
becomes clear if we see in Couceryo’s photo-shuffling not just a barren “exercise” – which, in 
these conditions, it is – but also, as does Daniel Hernández  in “La aventura….” as an 
opportunity to read the very same object in a different way, that is, as a nudge to go beyond the 
film, since it would seem quite clear that, in the absence of contextual information, we would 
have to accept, with resignation, that all we can do is watch Couceyro’s opaque movements; 
instead, more information might allow us not necessarily to “put the pieces together,” as if it 
were a puzzle that could be complete(d); but to begin a discussion that, as far as the photos go, 
cannot yet take off.  
The texts present, perhaps, a clearer call for an active interpreter. Since most of them are 
unsourced (or better still, vaguely sourced), and assuming, prima facie, that we are dealing with a 
documentary, or at the very least with a film that has some autobiographical components--these 
gaps could reasonably be construed as the same kind of beyond-the-text calls; an invitation that, 
as the film progresses, becomes an increasingly strong suggestion. Ultimately, not following this 
suggestion proves interpretively impoverishing if not straightforwardly detrimental. Or so I shall 
argue in the next two sections. 
  
2.3 The Status of the Voiceover: Editorializing Comments in Los Rubios.  
Most "editorializing" scenes (i.e., scenes in which Carri makes seemingly judgment-like, 
direct comments about the putative main themes of the film) take place in tandem with a textual-
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crossing token --be it a text, an image, or a camera-panned construction of a different scene or 
quasi-scene --whose hierarchical place vis-a-vis the voiceover varies or is undetermined, In the 
preceding paragraph we mentioned Walsh’s Daniel and the challenges of his story. Let us add 
those of the suicide letter-cum-footnote in Walsh’s second story. And, upping the ante in terms 
of the demands imposed on the reader, let us bear in mind the performative loops produced by 
the myriad emails, documents, and textual as well as image reproductions that impinge on the 
main text during our reading of Traiciones.  
Now, in Los rubios, the usually brief but influential "editorializing" or "recap" comments 
(sometimes almost miniature speeches), delivered by Carri in "off," often include “factual” 
assessments of her search, conclusions about her recent findings, and direct reflections and 
questions about her quest (i.e., getting to learn more about her parents in the aftermath of their 
still “present” disappearance). However, the point of contention is what to make of them, or how 
to determine their status and role in the narrative system of the film, in which markers to 
distinguish fictionalization from “factual” documentary are no longer available. Is it justified, or 
even helpful, to take these seemingly assertive comments as grounding or anchoring points?  
As anticipated, my claim is that the answer to these questions will be in the negative. Let 
us start with a relatively clear example of how problematic it could be to take these editorializing 
comments at face value:  
 
 
Vivo en un país lleno de fisuras. Lo que fue el centro clandestino donde mis padres 
fueron secuestrados es hoy una comisaría. La generación de mis padres, los que 
sobrevivieron a una época terrible, reclama ser protagonistas de una historia que no les 
pertenece. Los que vinieron después, como Paula L. o mi hermana, se quedaron en el 
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medio, heridos, construyendo sus vidas desde imágenes insoportables. (I live in a country 
full of fissures. The clandestine detention center where my parents were held is now a 
police station. The generation of my parents, the survivors of a terrible time, demand that 
they be given a leading role in a story/history that doesn’t belong to them. Those who 
came later, like Paula L. or my sister, were stranded in the middle, damaged, constructing 
their lives out of unbearable images; 1:09)  
 
If the first clause (“Vivo en un país lleno de fisuras”) makes such a strong claim – it does, 
and it also sets the tone of the whole passage; the tone, but not the logic -the one that 
immediately follows ought to offer some sort of support for it; alternatively, it might qualify, 
expand, or develop it further. At the very least, it should make a claim consistent with such a 
strong opening statement. However, the next claim neither suggests nor entails the idea of 
fissure or break, but, quite the contrary, it expresses a perfectly logical, however perverse, 
continuity between CCDs and police stations. That is, it unequivocally contradicts the first 
statement.  
A CCD “is now a police station:” and, in police stations, since the 1930s, "criminals" 
were often tortured. The transition from "police station/torture center" for delincuentes 
(criminals) to "CCD/torture center" for "subversives," to --in Carri's 2003 present --regular (?) 
"police station" doesn't seem to be much of a fissure or break.20
 
 																																																								
20 The fact that this "police station" operates now under a democratic system doesn't necessarily indicate a 
break, or even a significant alteration, for certain practices have not changed much, if at all, in those 
"spaces." As Pilar Calveiro --whom Carri references in Cartografía de una película -has incisively (and 
bravely) argued, Argentine society passively accepted, or failed to see, or stopped seeing, that 
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Sometimes Carri’s voiceover comments are embedded in --or immediately follow the 
presentation of --testimonial accounts given by relatives, friends, and former cadres of the OPM 
whose positions within the organization led them to interact with, and befriend, Carri’s parents. 
A closer look at these will help to articulate our point more clearly—and in so doing a further 
issue will emerge.  
The discussion that follows, then, aims to fulfill two functions. First, it should help to 
buttress our point (i.e., that the comments of Voiceover Carri tend to have a strong and 
unjustified influence on the interpretation of Los rubios). Second, it should allow us to argue that 
a widespread critical view on the way in which Carri 
 
presents and uses (and, ultimately, judges) 
testimonial accounts is based on voiceover comments, and not on an analysis and discussion of 
the testimonial accounts themselves (whether taken on their own, or in the context of the variety 
of elements at work in the narratological structure of the film).  
2.4 Testimonial Accounts, Voiceover Commentary, and Interpretive Authority.  
The interpretation of the role assigned to witnesses and testimony in Los rubios has been 
largely influenced by the physical --spatial and sonic --format in which they are presented. Often, 
a variety of layers of mediation is interposed between the witness (or interviewee or 
testimoniante) and the viewer: taped interviews reaching the audience through TV sets that, in 
virtue of the camera angle, are often in the background, or as background of some other indoors 																																																																																																																																																																																		
delincuentes were routinely humiliated and tortured in regular police stations. The picana was an 
everyday occurrence. The distance from the police-torturing-criminal scenario, to a police-torturing-
subversive scenario, then, was increasingly shorter. (Calveiro 2001) 
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scene. At times, also, the TV sets are positioned in such a way that the screens – and therefore 
the faces of the interviewees – are not accessible to the viewers. No interviewee is identified by 
name, and sometimes their words are difficult to make out.  
Certainly, many of the testimonies in the film share some, or all, of these characteristics. 
The first impression, then, is at the very least puzzling. Moreover, the testimonial series of the 
film opens with relatively inane “discussions” among friends of the family. One, for instance, 
focuses on the conflicting accounts given by two family friends who discuss whether Carri’s 
mother was "gritona" (short-tempered and easily led to yell). This soon turns to, or connects 
with, some general commentary on the political attitudes of Carri’s parents within the context 
and dynamics of the organization.  
However, other testimonial interventions, which are far from inane, and far from being 
overly broad or general, don’t seem to have been taken into consideration when assessing Carri’s 
use of testimony. It is no coincidence that most critics follow, at times to the point of 
paraphrasing, the “conclusions” drawn by “Voiceover Carri.”  
It is also telling that her comments seem to refer to, and highlight, the aforementioned 
testimonies, and not others. She seems to use them as part of the "evidence" that will purportedly 
confirm her in the idea that the fragmentary memories of family, friends, and militants won't be 
of much use for her to reconstruct or gain some knowledge of the life and character of her 
parents, as she claims in the following passage:  
 
 
La familia, cuando puede sortear el dolor de la ausencia, recuerda de una manera en que 
mamá y papá se convierten en dos personas excepcionales, lindas, inteligentes. Los 
amigos de mis padres estructuran el recuerdo de forma tal que todo se convierte en un 
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análisis político. Me gustaría filmar a mi sobrino de 6 años diciendo que cuando sepa 
quienes mataron a los papás de su mamá va a ir a matarlos, pero mi hermana no me deja. 
Tengo que pensar en algo, algo que sea película. Lo único que tengo es mi recuerdo 
difuso y contaminado por todas estas versiones. Creo que cualquier intento que haga de 
acercarme a la verdad voy a estar alejándome. (When they can dodge the pain of the 
absence, the family remembers in such a way that Mom and Dad become two exceptional 
people, beautiful, intelligent people. Their friends structure their memories in such way 
that everything turn into political analysis. I’d like to film my 6-year old nephew saying 
that when he learns who killed the parents of his mother, he will go kill them himself, but 
my sister doesn’t let me. I have to think of something – something that be film. The only 
thing I have is my diffuse memory, polluted by all these other versions. I feel that any 
attempt to get closer to the truth will actually take me farther away;” circa 34: 45). 21
 
 
The passage insists on the "contamination" or “pollution” of her memories, and the idealized – 
fossilized – approach to memory of family and former political comrades. But, does this 
assessment match the testimonies we are presented with? Besides the minor inconsistency about 
																																																								
21 Not without some irony, it is in one of these clear examples of the unwarranted interpretation-guiding 
role of editorializing comments where we find a sentence, almost in passing, which seems to show that 
not all (or not every sentence in) editorializing comments erase, smooth over and preclude other 
interpretive possibilities. Still, this and other astute interventions that should "block" the main interpretive 
claim tend to go unnoticed for reasons that will be discussed in the next section. With very few 
exceptions, the lone but powerful sentence in the middle (i.e., the plain statement of "fact;" namely, the 
report of what Carri's nephew said) has gone unnoticed. It is the only comment that doesn't seem to have 
an evaluative component, and yet it is revealing and --as I'll argue shortly --crucial to one of the 
politically charged performative effects of Los rubios.  
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the yelling threshold of Ana María Caruso, does the audience have access to any other 
testimonial contributions that might fall outside the pronouncement of Voiceover Carri?  
It has been observed that, during the testimony of an unidentified friend of the family, 
Carri/Couceyro , is giving her back to the TV set from which the voice of the witness comes 
(Noriega 78). Few, however, mention that she turns her head toward the screen when she hears 
someone say that her father often cheated when playing soccer. “Que me eligiera Robertito para 
jugar al futbol o al volley tenía sus ventajas: me evitaba pelearme porque él se peleaba con todos; 
llevábamos varios puntos de ventaja, porque él los robaba” (“Being chosen to play in Robertito’s 
team had its perks: I never had to argue or fight, because he fought with everybody; we were 
always several points ahead—he used to “steal” them.“ ) 
Carri/Couceryro smiles, but almost immediately, her face takes on a serious, tense 
expression. She doesn't say anything. The range of thoughts that might have crossed her mind is 
a matter of sheer speculation, but, at a minimum, this scene ought to trigger the question of what 
it would feel like to have almost no memories of one’s father, and hear someone say that he used 
to cheat --and fail to know to what extent or in what contexts that "cheating" used to take place.  
There are at least two further instances in which the voices are clearly audible, and even a 
few shots in which the camera is trained at short-range, with the movie screen almost completely 
"filled" or "occupied" by the TV screen.22
 
About ten minutes after the "cheating Roberto Carri" 
testimony, we hear and see a friend of Carri’s whose tone of voice, body language, facial 
expressions, and gaze are far from reduced to, or reducible to, "political analysis," even when, on 
the face of it, politics occupies a central role in his testimony. Yet, what is moving without being 																																																								
22 This double mediation seems to have been yet another source of irritation, But is this necessarily an 
affront? Can’t it merely be a reminder of the necessarily mediated nature of testimony?  
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melodramatic is the subtle difference between "political analysis" and the impact of political 
frameworks and choices on relationships that fall within the “private sphere.”  
 
No, nunca nos peleamos… Claro, Roberto estaba clandestino… sé que no hizo ningún 
esfuerzo porque [sic] nos viéramos. En ese sentido, era intolerante, como lo
 
era la gente 
en ese momento. No sé si no se podía no ser intolerante. En última instancia estabas 
jugándote la vida, así que es comprensible. Pero en esa época se cortaba y se cortaba. Si 
había una diferencia política, bueno, nunca más hablabas ni nada, habían pasado a ser tus 
enemigos. Nunca lo viví a Roberto como tal, y sé que nunca me vivió como su enemigo, 
pero que ya no había nada que decirnos, eso era así directamente. (No, we never fought 
[or: there was never a fallout] … Sure, Roberto was underground then…. I know he made 
no effort to see each other (sic). In that sense, he was intolerant, as everybody was back 
then. I don’t know whether one could not be intolerant. Ultimately, your life was at stake, 
so it’s understandable. But back then, if you broke with someone—you broke. If there 
was a political difference, well, you just never talked anymore; they’d become your 
enemies. I never “lived” [i.e., felt] Roberto as such, and I know he never “lived” me as 
his enemy. Pero that we no longer had anything to say to each other, that was a fact;” 
24:00 emphasis mine). 
The way in which members of Montoneros negotiated the tensions between “private 
sphere” relationships with non-members of the organization varied. Sometimes, even silent 
"concessions" that run against the organization's prescriptive framework made (some) militants 
much more attuned to social interactions with micro-communities outside those of one’s own 
cell or “ambit.” (Vezzetti 96-112, 131-196; Ollier, 15-108).  
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The very fact that a former friend of Roberto Carri could feel that there was an implicit 
“agreement” involving a “break” in the prevailing mores (i.e. the implicit mandate to 
recategorize one’s friends as enemies if they didn’t opt in favor of armed struggle) is revealing as 
much as it is intriguing. In this respect, the relevance of Matilde Ollier’s theoretical and 
fieldwork-based treatment of this and related issues concerning the everyday life of rank-and-file 
members of Montoneros and other armed organizations cannot be emphasized enough.  
One last example should shed light on instances of testimonial uses in Los rubios that are 
remarkable. A friend recalls the burdens and humor of “a family of five” in which the parents of 
three girls are cadres of Montoneros—a life that involved carrying the specific paraphernalia that 
each of those disparate and demanding roles required: fierros, (firearms, in the jargon), panales 
(diapers) estaba todo mezclado!").  
Almost in the same breath – or perhaps this is an illusion of the editing – the same 
speaker --Lila Pastoriza23 --says in a more serious, reflective tone – the camera trained on her, in 
a relatively undisturbed shot, "En determinada etapa yo creo que Ana y Roberto lo vivieron 
como una apuesta… En otra... en la última etapa," she hesitates, "ya no sé cómo lo vivieron; ya 
no era tanto el desafío; yo creo que era un círculo del cual ya no se podía salir (33:22).  
Cut. The last sentence lingers on --a circle from which there was no way out. The cut and 
switch to another brief fragment (and then to Carri writing on her notebook) gives the impression 
that that hadn't been her last sentence. Still, whether the viewer is acquainted with the context 
and reference of such a sentence, the tone and the image itself chosen to describe the situation 
are quite eloquent. Carri avoids anything that might slide towards a direct, potentially 																																																								
23 Unidentified in Los rubios, but recognizable from several other works, Pastoriza is identified explicitly 
in Carri 2007 
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melodramatic approach to the issue; and here, again, she puts elision and edition to good use. 
Interestingly, the elided part does and does not seem to require more elucidation. On the one 
hand, Pastoriza – and Carri’s edition – capture the core of the issue. It gives, as it were, an 
emotional sense of completion. On the other hand, one may legitimately ask, “What was that 
‘circle” from which there was no way out?” Perhaps, the emotional sense of completion is but a 
subtle excuse to avoid doing the work required to learn what the “circle” that led to the 
disappearance of Carri’s parents means.  
Be that as it may, this fragment is an extremely well-captured instance of Carri's 
excellent use of testimony24
 
(i.e., more precisely, of testimony-related production, such as 
documentary film), which has been obscured by the other, more iconoclastic presentations of 
testimony – and by her voiceover comments.  
 
 
2.5 Identity and Memory in Los rubios: Voiceover Carri, or Ladybug “Takes”? 
 
 
"Lo único que tengo es mi recuerdo difuso y contaminado por todas estas versiones. 
Creo que cualquier intento que haga de acercarme a la verdad voy a estar alejándome (34: 45) 
These last lines of the voiceover commentary quoted early in the last section are but one of the 
many instances in which Voiceover Carri claims to be frustrated, anxious, skeptical, and, at 
times, even fearful of "depersonalization," all rooted in utterances to the effect that she isn't sure 
(or is unable to distinguish) which memories are hers, and which her sisters'.  
																																																								
24 Far from mocking or degrading testimonial work, Carri is establishing that she is interested in a 
different project, which may make use of testimony – and even testimony at its best --even if her use of 
testimony is embedded in a different project.  
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In this context, the above passage suggests skepticism about a) the fidelity of personal 
memory; b) the likelihood of reaching some “truth” through first-personal, memory-based 
approaches, as well as through third-personal testimonies (i.e., the memories of friends and 
family of Carri’s parents).  
This twofold claim is often accepted as an interpretive key of Los rubios. However 
different the interpretations of this putative feature of the film may be, the very starting point 
(i.e., Carri has no possible access to any sort of knowledge of her parents, let alone from 
memory-and testimony-related attempts) is limited, and, in a sense, reductive: it picks out 
Voiceover Carris statements, which may or may not be taken at face value; and it does not take 
into account scenes in which there are subtle suggestions that transcend the equally reductive 
claim to the effect that testimonies either idealize her parents, or turn them into agents moved by, 
and moving within, the political space of their times. Again, Nouizelles captures the thrust of 
Carri’s desire for “truth:”  
 
What Los rubios attempts to find out is who the Carris really were. [Since any piece of 
information may hold the key to what is forever lost] all angles may be relevant…. What 
were they like? … How did they behave?... Nothing is left out. From the political to the 
cultural, from the social to the personal, the film keeps collecting and presenting data that 
may or may not prove useful in reconstructing the authentic Carris (Nouizelles 269; 
emphasis added). 
  
Now, while this formulation makes explicit one of Voiceover Carri’s underlying assumptions of 
her quest for knowledge about her parents (i.e., that whatever “truth” about her parents she might 
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discover will only  be valuable or relevant if it is “authentic”), it is also the case that many other 
threads and elements of the film reject the very idea of authenticity understood as the expression 
of a supposedly deep, essential “core,” or identity – again, something like “who the Carris really 
were” – in which the authentic-inauthentic distinction is an implicit but strong criterion. If that is 
the sort of “truth” Carri is after, her probabilities of success are certainly very slim, if they exist 
at all. But then again, this is a view on truth and authenticity that the film, as a whole, hardly 
appears to endorse. Let us take a closer look at a scene that – we shall argue – radically questions 
the notion of authenticity.  
As we hear Carri’s voice questioning her parents' choices and wondering about their 
(absence's) connection with her identity, the image alternates between a still, motionless, 
reflective-looking Carri, and Couceyro, who is, instead, going in circles around a pole and 
yelling in an unequivocally artificial, contrived way -- a quasi-Brechtian parallel scene that 
seems to go against the dramatism of Carri's words and voice performance: 
 
Me cuesta entender la elección de mamá. ¿Por qué no se fue del país?, me pregunto una y 
otra vez. O a veces me pregunto por qué me dejó aquí en el mundo de los vivos… 
¿Dónde están las almas de los muertos? ¿Comparten sitio todos los muertos, o los 
asesinados transitan otros lugares? ¿Las almas de los muertos están en los que venimos 
después, en los que intentamos recordarlos? (I find it hard to understand Mom’s choice. 
Why didn’t she leave the country? I ask myself again and again. Sometimes I wonder 
why she left me here in the world of the living. Where are the souls of the dead? Do all 
the dead share space, or those who were murdered go to other places? Are the souls of the 
dead in those who come after them, in those of us who try to remember them? 1:04) 
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           Now, Carri's delivery isn't too obviously parodic. One could think that it is, in fact, a self-
referential, yet non-parodic moment, whether the way it is performed is of one's liking or not.  
           However, even conceding that what may sound like a cliché to some may very well be 
acceptable to others, there is some reasonable (even if not conclusive) evidence to speak of a 
delivery that, if not parodic, at the very least suggests that it ought not to be taken at face value – 
but as, perhaps, a conscious, "clichéd use" of the cliché. Roughly put, some of these 
editorializing comments are chiefly and conspicuously "run-of-the-mill", standard questions that 
were, even back in 2003, already commonplace, if not any less relevant, among the children of 
the disappeared.  
In the context of Carri's highly original and sophisticated film, there is little reason to 
believe that she (or her fictional self) should pose questions that, while legitimate and deserving 
of respect, can hardly be conceived of as "discoveries" or "conclusions" of (any of the) 
Albertinas in the film. At most, they might be regarded as quasi-distorted "past stages" in one's -- 
Albertina's? -- development of the elaboration of the unusual, singularly painful kind of loss that 
is at stake.  
With these caveats in place, let us, for the sake of argument, or as shorthand, refer to 
them as "parody" or "parodic features."  
There is a further issue: it is unclear whether the target of the parody is the "genre" -- so 
to speak -- of the "voiceover speeches," or the original "speaker," or -- as one may plausibly 
argue in light of the cumulative nudges to the interpreter -- the implicit addressee; namely, the 
interpreter/reader/audience. Be that as it may, Couceyro's simultaneous scream could be 
plausibly construed, in this context (and also, perhaps, parodying the easy correlations of 
commercial cinema), the "visceral" expression of Carri's pain.   
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As a result, what should be most unreflective and "genuine" -- a most purely expressive 
of grief -- becomes an almost grotesque performance of a fake scream, mirroring and supposedly 
enhancing Carri's speech.  
The scream is contrived, yet it doesn't simply create a distancing effect a la Brecht, but, in 
an odd way, it is at the same time uncomfortable and (almost) funny in its denial and 
denouncement of itself -- of itself as "authentic" scream -- and, in virtue of their connection, 
perhaps also as rejection or impugnation of Carri’s reflections. Even if one felt Carri's speech 
genuine, it seems quite clear that the textual crossing is preventing the audience from falling into 
an easy identification with Carri's speech. However, as we begin to settle comfortably, at a 
distance, and enjoy this contrast, we notice something has shifted -- something has happened to 
the scream. No settling, then, on this interpretation of the scene, for Couceyro's yelling has 
gradually shifted -- imperceptibly, until it hits us, but only once the shift has been completed: it 
is slightly disorienting to realize that now her yelling sounds "real" (i.e., not fake). Carri's voice 
recedes, and Couceyro’s scream begins to feel almost piercing.  
So, is there some truth or authenticity to the scream? And, should that "truth" be extended 
to the speech? Paradoxically, the most "real" is what we know to be "unreal:" we know that 
Couceyro is, after all, acting; she simply changed roles: from a grotesque yelling, to a 
"believable" yelling: both equally "unreal" performances of an actress. And still… what about 
Carri's comments? 
In a rather schematic fashion, we can say that if we are attentive to the interplay of the 
"scene within the scene," or the textual-crossing between Couceryo's and Carri's split scenes, we 
might entertain at least five scenarios (without being able to settle on any one of them); scenarios 
that, in rough outline, could be put thus: 
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i. the whole scene is an enactment of the phoniness of the editorializing scenes; as we initially 
thought, as measured and sober as Carri's speech might want to be, it cannot address those issues 
in that seemingly reflective manner without missing the mark; and, for those spectators who 
might fall for it, the loud "footnote" -- Couceyro’s grotesque yelling -- functions as a rectification 
or at the very least a questioning of Carri's part in the scene; 
ii. in a Traiciones-like move, we simply fell for one of the movie's performative traps: we took 
the good performance of an actress for an "authentic" scream. That is, a "true" expression of 
grief, when she was simply mimicking it; she is acting. Worse, less than a minute earlier the 
yelling sounded unequivocally contrived. Again, a gradual shift blinds us to the change, as in 
Abad's long email to Bea Pina, and we are easily deceived, if only for a moment;  
iii. there may be some truth to some visual aspects of that scene. Perhaps, one may wonder, 
Carri's non-verbal facial expression, at times, (and not her comments) might convey something 
"true" about her recap of her recent findings? 
iv. the relationship between performance, authenticity, and truth is seriously questioned. The 
shift in the yelling; its grief-conveying quality, may show that there could be some truth to some 
(unidentifiable?) aspect of the scene. The fact that it is embedded in an acting performance -- 
rather, that it is a performance -- might show at the same time, paradoxically, that whatever 
"truth" we may have sensed in the scene was not actually in the scene; it might have been, 
instead, that the scene gestured at some truth that is not, and cannot be, captured by direct speech 
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-- no direct speech summing up conclusions or even complaining about the unintelligibility of 
the decision of Carri's parents to stay in the country captures that elusive truth that was, perhaps, 
the cause of the alternating truth-sounding and phony-sounding layers.  
v. performance may be part and parcel of every act and every utterance. The combination of 
Couceyro's long scream (with its changing tones and qualities) with Carri's speech may have 
been a further enactment of the fact that every act and utterance inevitably involves an element 
of performance. This scene, after all, is embedded in a film in which the audience does not know 
what is scripted and what isn't; in which the distinction between the construction of the film 
sequences and the "film proper" broke down soon after the code for this and other distinctions 
were established. 
 Some of the above scenarios are, if taken in isolation and not as interpretive lines of the 
scene, almost trite, commonplace knowledge. That there are some elements of performance in 
social interactions is almost a platitude. The interesting questions are what are exactly those 
elements, how should we characterize them, what is the scope of the performance elements, and -
- further -- in what instances they count as just parts of social life, and when do they begin to 
slide toward some sort of deceit or any other objectionable terrain.  
Having said that, to reject all performance as expressive of some form of deceit or 
wrongdoing, and to search instead for a "pure," utterly "genuine" ideal of authenticity is as naive 
as it is pernicious. 
At the very least, this scene should make us wonder what is authenticity, either in a work 
of art or in one's life. Yet, as intimated earlier, no interpretive trajectory remains settled -- 
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including the above, conjectural one. For, embedded between two arguably commonplace 
questions, Carri's register and tone shifts, moving farther away from the general, broad, well-
known rhetorical questions, and zooms in on a more specific statement: "y cuando llego a esta 
pregunta me revuelve la ira… y recuerdo, o eso creo, a Roberto, mi padre, y su ira o su labor 
incansable…" (“and when I reach that question, anger sickens me… and I remember, or so I 
think, I remember Roberto, my father, and his anger and his tireless work”) 
Our point is not to argue that this last clause is "literary better" than the passage in which 
it is embedded, but that there is a difference between the "zooming in" onto a comparatively 
specific, embodied, ire-laden utterance, and the much broader, general, and (perhaps) inane 
statements that precede and follow the said clause. For, “recuerdo, o eso creo, a Roberto, mi 
padre, y su ira o su labor incansable,” is followed by “hasta la muerte” (“until his death”). That 
is, “recuerdo, o eso creo, a Roberto, mi padre, y su ira o su labor incansable, hasta la muerte” (“I 
remember, or so I think, I remember Roberto, my father, and his anger and his tireless work until 
his death”) 
In a 2003 Latin America, the intertextual connection with Che Guevara’s dictum – “hasta 
la muerte” referencing “hasta la victoria siempre” -- has lost its force, to say the least. Yet, this 
doesn’t mean there is necessarily a mocking element. It could be construed in a variety of ways. 
Still, it’s hard to conceive of any one of them not being commonplace, if not stale.   
Moreover, the subsequent questions oscillate rapidly and blur the (relative) "specificity" 
of Carri's commentary and the clichéd or overly-used, weakened rhetorical constructions. 
Granted, while these may express the standpoint of a youth or even a child, they are formulated 
in a rhetorical clothing that clashes with what (for the sake of argument) we referred to as clichéd 
expressions. 
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If lines like the already cited, “¿Dónde están las almas de los muertos? ¿Comparten sitio 
todos los muertos, o los asesinados transitan otros lugares?” (“Where are the souls of the dead?” 
Do all the dead share space, or those who were murdered go to other places?”) may be regarded 
as clichéd, it is not so easy to do so with the ones that immediately follow: "Las almas de los 
muertos, ¿están en los que venimos después, en los que intentamos recordarlos? Y ese recuerdo, 
¿Cuánto tiene de preservación y cuánto de capricho?” (“Are the souls of the dead in those who 
come after them, in those of us who try to remember them? And that memory, how much does it 
have of preservation, and how much of whim? 1:04). Clichéd? Incisive? Uncomfortably 
oscillating between the two, or even, perhaps, among these and other possibilities? 
Uncomfortable is, probably, the only characterization one may reasonably give. 
It would seem, then, that all talk of “authenticity” (“the authentic Carris”) is, at the very 
least, put into question. And even if one wanted to bracket the issue (i.e., the sense in which the 
film uses the terms “truth,” “authenticity,” “knowledge,” and the like, applied to her parents), it 
would still be the case that Carri does get acquainted with pieces of information that she seemed 
to be ignorant of.  Take Couceyro/Carri’s reaction when hearing that her father used to cheat 
when playing soccer. This comment seems to catch her attention, from which we might infer that 
she didn’t know what is now being (to some extent) revealed. Perhaps more importantly, the 
testimonies discussed above – not only that one about Roberto Carri the soccer player, but the 
ones about Roberto Carri dealing with the tensions between extra-OPM friendships and intra-
OPM demands, or Pastoriza’s comments about a life in which fierros (weapons) and diapers 
coexisted in the same time and space, to her grimmer  impressions about the shift in the attitude 
of Carri’s parents towards the risks of armed struggle -- speak to aspects of their personalities 
that, even discounting the drawback of possible “memory betrayals,” are hardly irrelevant.  
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A clarification is in order: the above considerations should not be regarded as claiming 
that the film allows us to state, conclusively, that Carri does get to learn new things about her 
parents. But they should be understood as claiming that this possibility is indeed advanced in the 
film, and not rejected, as Voiceover Carri and many critical treatments of the film appear to state. 
This possibility is advanced, however, within the context of what would seem a deep questioning 
of the authentic-inauthentic distinction. 
Should we stop at this seemingly aporetic “conclusion”? In what follows, the discussion 
of a scene that could be regarded in some sense as “mirroring” the one just discussed (i.e., 
Voiceover Carri and Couceyro screaming) should incline us to respond in the negative. The film 
doesn’t “settle the issue” by merely unsettling it and offering an aporia. On what grounds could 
we say so? 
The following scene, in which a different conception of truth, memory, and identity – 
and, perhaps, of authenticity as well -- seems to come to the fore, goes against the 
aforementioned skepticism expressed by Voiceover Carri. It is the “Vaquita de San Antonio” 
(Ladybug) scene – or, rather, sequence of takes-- during which Carri discusses with Couceyro 
how to deliver the lines of a specific childhood memory of Carri's, followed by the delivery 
given by the actress.  
Two threads run simultaneously, at times intersecting, at times blending into one: a 
"direct narrative" or first-order thread in the delivery of Carri's lines; an indirect, meta-narrative, 
or second-order thread in the form of Carri's discussion with Couceyro. 
In this scene (made of a series of scenes or “takes”, actually), two threads run 
simultaneously, at imes intersecting, at times blending into one: a "direct narrative" or first-order 
thread in the delivery of Carri's lines; an indirect, meta-narrative, or second-order thread in the 
 79 
 
form of Carri's discussion with Couceyro. "Entrevista vaquita de San Antonio toma 1" 
(“Ladybug Interview Take One;” 1:12), then, opens with what in a conventional documentary 
would be a "behind-the-scenes" discussion between director and actress.  
The scripted text of the scene begins with "Odio…" ["I hate…] and a list of things Carri 
loathes or used to loathe as a child, with an emphasis on the typical "birthday wishes." The list 
ends with,  "Y odio sobre todo las velitas." (“And what I hate the most is birthday candles”). 
Couceyro gives a first pass. Immediate cut. Shift toward the second-order thread: Carri 
gives her directions: “Go faster, as if you were listing, enumerating … whatever may begin to 
come – more or less... but it’s cool, an enumeration… and if you begin to feel like you’re 
forgetting, it’s cool that you do make a pause” (“más rápido, como enumerar… así, lo que se te 
vaya… más o menos… pero está bueno una enumeración… y si te vas olvidando está bueno que 
hagas una pausa”; 1:12).”  
Let us note that “Lo que se te vaya—“ (“Whatever may begin to come—“) strongly 
suggests an elided “ocurriendo” (“come to mind”). That is, “Whatever may begin to come to 
mind” (“Lo que se te vaya oucrriendo”).  There follows a scene or concatenation of scenes in 
which mediation, critical distance, and, perhaps, a subdued, subtle emotional proximity, are 
interweaved, or shifting rapidly: we listen to Couceyro's/Carri's list of things she hates, but on the 
screen there’s a close-up of Carri’s profile, stooped over her camera, shooting intently; and for 
the first time in the whole film she looks relaxed – extremely focused yet relaxed – and as 
Couceyro progresses, Carri smiles, very briefly. (1:13).  
 
Odio tener que pedir un deseo al soplar las velitas para mi cumpleaños, porque siempre 
desee que vuelva mamá, que vuelva papá, y que vuelvan pronto. En realidad el deseo 
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siempre fue uno, pero lo estructuraba en tres partes para que tenga más fuerza. [“I hate 
having to make a wish when I blow the candles on my birthdays, because I’ve always 
wished, ‘Let Mom come back; “let Dad come back; and let them come back soon.” 
Actually, the wish was always one, but I used to structure it in three parts so that it was 
stronger.”]  
 
Pause. Carri's profile still looking through the camera. Almost a smile still there, and a whisper, 
“Buenísimo; corte.” [“Great; cut.”] A briefest pause, and Carri is back in her role of director -- 
not necessarily aloof (actually, not aloof at all), but certainly "outside" that one brief, affect-laden 
moment. “I wouldn’t repeat the word ‘hate’;” (“No repetiría la palabra ‘odio’”) says Carri 
looking at Couceyro, “because it’s very strong, and to say it again would sound a bit too --“ 
(“porque es muy fuerte, y volver a decirlo suena demasiado—”)  
Cut. Rapid succession of performances, variations (both in tone and text) of the 
“Vaquitas de San Antonio” lines, in black and white, until the final take, in color, has Couceyro 
looking at the camera -- at us -- in what would conventionally be regarded as the "final take.” 
  And yet, watching only the "final" version would have obscured the richness of the other 
performances. Why should this matter? Because one could conjecture that the series of filmic 
takes captures different aspects of Carri's recollection or remembered experience of the same 
event—or, perhaps, of different aspects of the infinitely nuanced palette of emotions she must 
have experienced during the long days and long nights of waiting.  
One could object that there is no reason to affirm the scenes have anything to do with 
Carri’s “actual” experience. Granted. In fact, that is part of our argument.  
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Still, they are possible, and plausible, articulations of the memory of a child (Carri or 
not] waiting for her disappeared parents.  
Moreover, they show that the lack of clear distinction between “authentic” and 
“inauthentic” is not as problematic as it might initially appear to be.  Let us expand on this claim. 
The performance of Ladybug, in its repetition and variations, does call attention to itself 
(even granting that ‘we can’t tell what performance is and what’s ‘real’, or authentic). Yet, this 
doesn't in itself warrant the "conclusion" that there is nothing but empty self-referentiality. 
Scripted or not, Ladybug is one of the scenes in which Carri is most involved and in 
which (in the film) most work is being put. Furthermore, even if we accept for the sake of 
argument that there is such a thing as a one and only authentic performance, we would be hard 
pressed to decide which of the many performances is "more authentic” or “more genuine" or 
"better' in whichever way one might want to understand these terms. 
Isn’t it possible that one may find the whole series as more valuable than any one take, in 
the sense that no single take can capture the complexity of the memory in question? Also, why 
should we assume that “authenticity” or "sincerity" wouldn't require some work to be expressed 
as faithfully as possible? (Again, assuming there is such thing as a “more authentic” correlate). 
 From a different angle, if we regard drafts of writers, studies of papers, variations of a 
musical piece (even rehearsals) as valuable (and we don’t question their ‘authenticity’), why 
question this series of performances? Why not think of them as "different takes" of a musical 
piece, or studies for (of) a (possibly finished) painting?  
 In sum, if we stick to the lens of performance understood exclusively qua deceit, we miss 
the highest and highly original expression of a most painful childhood memory – whether “real” 
or not; whether Carri’s or not.  
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Even bracketing these issues, it is still the case that the putative recollection is conveyed 
without falling prey to melodrama or cliché, and yet revealing a complex, multi-layered cluster 
of affective and quasi-cognitive mnemonic attitudes.  
In a similar vein, Gustavo Noriega affirms that this sequence -- or, rather, this sequence’s 
“multiplication of visual textures” [“multiplicación de las texturas visuales”] - allows us “to feel 
the emotion [of Carri’s memory] without it [n.b., the emotion] flooding us” (“sentir la emoción 
sin que ésta nos inunde;”50) 
Although Noriega might be going a bit too far (can we feel her emotions?),  he goes on, 
and succinctly captures one of the main achievements of this scene. Carri “puts into scene the 
childhood pain … and looks for the best way of expressing it,” while “avoiding … emotional 
blackmailing” (50). Thus, what is crucial is “what Albertina does with that pain,” which is, 
certainly, “something different from mere victimization” [“pone en escena el dolor infantil … 
buscando la mejor forma posible de expresarlo …  eludiendo … el chantaje emocional … [lo 
importante es] lo que Albertina hace con ese dolor … algo distinto a la mera victimización”] 
(50). 
Now, we would like to suggest that there is an equally important, though much less 
discussed, point. All of the above (i.e., the satisfying, ground-breaking expression of Carri's 
recollection; the series of filmic takes that illuminate different modulations of the memory, as 
well as its explicit but not overdone affective charge) is, at least in part, the result of the 
discussion Carri has with Couceyro. Put less strongly, all of the above shows the influence of the 
intersubjective elaboration that resulted from Carri’s discussion with Couceyro.  
 Notice that Carri's directions to Couceyro do not silence her -- Couceyro is not a mere 
mimetic device, but a co-creator of the performance. Recall that Carri encourages Couceyro to 
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improvise with “lo que se te vaya ocurriendo;” Coucyero doesn’t have to limit her enumeration 
to the specific memory-tokens of Carri’s. Part of the success of the scene is this porous, fertile 
reelaboration – we see Carri being surprised by some of Couceyro’s contributions, for instance.  
All this might be mildly de-emphasized, though it shouldn’t be obscured, by the fact that 
Carri gives Couceyro feedback and suggests that she make certain changes (e.g., “I wouldn't 
repeat the word odio…"). Yet, the fact remains that they discuss the scene; that Carri herself 
encourages Couceyro not to feel constrained by her memory tokens; and that there is, as 
mentioned, even an element of improvisation (both in tone and lexical choice) in a scene that 
purportedly conveys Carri’s personal memories.  
 It would seem as if Carri's anxieties about truth, memory, and identity were no longer a 
source of concern. Recall her worries about not having memories she could truly call her own, 
but merely a reconstruction based on the recollection of her sisters. Whatever happened to these 
worries; to her skepticism about truth (“the more I try to reach truth, the farther away I am”); to 
the identity-threatening “contamination” of different versions?  
 Perhaps the key questions should, instead, be: Whose worries are these? And, what 
conceptions of truth, memory, and identity are the object of those worries? 
 The contrast between Voiceover Carri (i.e., the Albertina Carri that takes shape in the 
editorializing comments) and the Albertina Carri we see in the Ladybug Scene couldn’t be 
starker. Ladybug should be an abhorrence if regarded from the perspective of Voiceover Carri. 
Conversely, the Ladybug scene presents an Albertina Carri utterly satisfied when enacting a 
personal memory of her childhood in an articulation that rests on a view on memory that would 
be unpalatable to Voiceover Carri. 
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Our main claims should begin, then, to look plausible. At the very least, by now it should 
be apparent that Voiceover Carri and her narrative clash with other versions of Carri and her 
search. This, in turn, should be sufficient to give plausibility to the three points we set out to 
defend. First, that Carri’s editorializing comments are no reliable guide or pillar on which to 
anchor interpretation. Second, that favoring Voiceover Carri is not only an unreliable interpretive 
move, but an unwarranted one that obscures other, richer interpretive possibilities. Third, that 
there is no privileged “anchoring point” to adjudicate interpretive issues. 
In what follows, we aim to argue that the above points are sufficient to weaken both the 
juridical discourse and the more extreme and intransigent versions of the post-memory 
discourses on which the memoria montonera rests. In so doing, we shall argue for the fourth and 
last point we aim to defend: that Los rubios presents a “centripetal” requirement—a demand to 
look for contextual information without which the film qua textual artifact, as well as the 
interpreter, is left severely wanting. Moreover, without meeting this demand, the very legitimacy 
of Carri qua interlocutor can be undermined by appeal to putative “truths” about the status of the 
child in general, and of the child’s mnemonic capacities in particular. 
 
2.6 Context Restitution and Interpretation. Blindspots and Silencing.  
 
Earlier, we argued that Voiceover Carri seems to endorse a notion of authenticity that is, 
at the very least, in need of support, if not straightforwardly obsolete. Likewise, Voiceover 
Carri’s worries make sense only on the assumption that she endorses an atomistic view of 
memory and identity, which seems to work under the model of property. More specifically, it 
seems to work under the model of private ownership, whereby memory tokens are indexed to a 
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specific, clearly defined person, whose “memory storage” forms an interrelated collection of 
items that are partly or wholly constitutive of that person’s identity. Let us think, for instance, of 
John Locke’s influential view on personal identity. 
The Ladybug scene, instead, seems to suggest a notion of memory closer to an 
intersubjective, activity-based undertaking in which specific narratives are tentative stepping 
stones (not always “purely” ours) rather than stable configurations in dispute. From Ladybug, it 
should follow that the borders between personal and collective memory aren’t so stark; that they 
have a strong deliberative component and should therefore be more open to revision and 
discussion--- certainly much more than any sort of atomistic view in which agents own 
something like "pure" or undiluted memory-tokens, insulated from diachronic and synchronic 
social forces. 
And yet, to claim that Ladybug Carri is the “real” (or “authentic” or “genuine”) view 
advanced by Los rubios would be as unwarranted a move as the one made by the manifold 
critical readings that rest on Voiceover Carri qua privileged guiding thread. Sympathetic as one 
may be toward Ladybug Carri, the code remains broken.  
Perhaps the clearest “reminder” that this is so (and, therefore, that we cannot take any one 
feature -- be it thematic, formal, or plot-related -- as fully authoritative or interpretation-guiding) 
is the much-discussed DNA scene. 
As is well-known, a relatively simple blood test can determine the kinship between 
people, or between people and human remains. It has been instrumental in establishing the 
identity of Dirty War bodies that haven’t (yet) fully and literally disappeared -- and, by 
extension, the identification of the relatives.  
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In the so-called “DNA scene,” we see, first, how Couceyro/Carri goes through the first 
phase of the test that confirmed the match between her DNA and that of her parents. A close-up 
of the sudden red droplet appearing on Couceyro’s finger highlights the “inverted” code: color 
film should be for Carri, not for Couceyro’s fictional scenes. Almost immediately, the same 
scene, only in black and white, shows us the “real” Albertina Carri, instead of Couceyro.  Did 
Carri undergo the DNA test – there and then? Obviously, the match – and the test – took place 
years ago. Perhaps Carri went ahead with the test anyway, for the film? Either way, it is a re-
presentation. We are not seeing anything that could have a firmer grip on standard truth-markers 
– whether “documentary” or otherwise.   
The Ladybug scene is, in this respect, no different. Could we draw an interpretive 
trajectory on its basis, and flesh out, for instance, the implications of the potential views on 
identity and memory that Ladybug suggests? Certainly. Would we have better textual support to 
claim that it is a superior ground for interpretation? We would not. 
If regarded not only in the context of the fact-evidence-memory-truth link (or lack 
thereof), but also in the context of the problems inherent to the “original/copy” distinction (both 
addressed, as will be remembered, towards the end of the previous chapter), it could be argued 
that the DNA scene puts even more pressure on these issues. And then again, just as in Abad, one 
may be tempted to ask whether this pressure leads us to skepticism.  
From the outset, it was highlighted that all three works are based on high-profile, well-
known facts, such as the disappearance of Carri’s parents. To some extent, then, one could rule 
out radical skepticism.  
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Still, this could leave us with little to do. That there is a “real” link between these works 
and historical facts is true; but this claim could be trivially true, if, for instance, we fail to show 
that the nature of this link is worth fleshing out. Let us tackle a more specific issue.  
We argued above that, contrary to what is said in the editorializing comments and the 
critical readings that are grounded on them, Carri’s search was not barren; that she could 
(whether on or off-camera) get acquainted with some aspects and facts about her parents, which 
she didn’t know prior to her search. But, could she? Is this claim consistent with the outright 
questioning of the “reality” of any and every scene of Los rubios once the color/black-and-white 
code is broken? Shouldn’t the extreme DNA scene give us pause?  
If we cannot know what is fictionalized and what is not; if the texts and quotations that 
“interrupt” the film are unsourced, or vaguely sourced; if the letters and photos that are shown to 
us have been tinkered with in such a way that, as said earlier with O’Keeffe, neither the identities 
nor the contexts of the images are accessible to us, Can we legitimately say that we are 
minimally equipped to offer even the most tentative reading of the film?  
Here, if not earlier, the effects of these interpretive hurdles (should) exert pressure and 
unleash the film’s “centripetal” impetus, which (should) make us search beyond the film proper. 
We might, and probably should, reframe our assessment and consider the possibility of reading 
these gaps as a call for the interpreter to act; or, in Elena Lopez Riera’s stronger words, as “an 
invitation, almost an obligation, to participate” (48)  
In other words, before drawing skeptical or otherwise restrictive conclusions, there is a 
remaining line of inquiry. The one thing we do know is that Carri’s parents were, indeed, 
disappeared.  
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Following the Panero line presented in Traiciones, perhaps we could, or even should, 
look for a potentially missing piece that might yield relevant contextual information. Even 
though the internet could be a starting point, the film itself gives us tips. When Carri and her 
crew visit the "Sheraton" -- the CCD-turned-police-station where Carri's parents were held 
captive— we can clearly hear a whisper, “Hide the Nunca más!”  
Thus, we are fairly easily led to the well-known report on Argentina’s desaparecidos, a 
document that does feature some of the letters and photos whose absence from Los rubios was 
lamented by some critics. Ironically, the letters that Carri so jealously guarded in her film are 
accessible in a book that in the eighties became, almost obscenely, a fashionable best-seller. 
The actual beginning of Los rubios, then, could be double-dated: 1978 and 1985. The 
former is the year during which Carri’s parents exchanged letters with their daughters; the latter, 
the year of publication of Nunca más. 
The report lists all 364 CCDs by their names (chosen with macabre humor by the 
military), followed by a brief description, geographical location, and military command (e.g., 
“Sheraton;” First Army Corps via Artillery Group Ciudadela). There follows a brief description 
of the system of letter-exchanges handled by one “Raul” (a pseudonym). Ana María Caruso's 
letters include comments about their situation, domestic recommendations, reading suggestions – 
a strength that is almost unthinkable under their living conditions. And, although Roberto Carri 
could be the strong man who fought his way through a soccer match, or initiate a hunger strike at 
the CCD so that hunger became his choice, it is Ana María – Carri’s mother -- who makes a 
calm, dispassionate presentation of the extreme options and possibilities the military brutally 
discussed in front of them. 
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Caruso’s letters, in turn, offer clues and names that open new lines of inquiry (e.g., the 
reference to H. G. Oesterheld). Now, once we readjust the lens and go back to the film in search 
of “centripetal nudges,” it is not too difficult to spot them – and to realize that they were there; 
that we “saw” or “heard” them; and that we didn’t pay the attention they deserved. Consider, for 
instance, the already discussed testimony of Lila Pastoriza: she says “los fierros” for “firearms.” 
Semantic displacements and jargon are both points of entry and points of departure that allow us 
to connect film and world.  
At the beginning of this chapter we mentioned the texts that “interrupt” the flow of 
images. Most of them are unsourced or, at most, vaguely sourced, yet they present themselves as 
(conventionally or prima facie) “truthful” references. The military dicta; some poetry lines; the 
titles of books we do get to make out -- these are but a few clues, some of which rapidly yield 
information that helps us recalibrate different aspects of the film.   
For instance, the title of one of the books doesn’t correspond to the quotation that is read 
out loud – arguably adding one more reason to argue that Carri doesn’t state, but puts into scene 
a playful rejection of the idea of the survivor/victim as unquestionably truthful, while confirming 
the need for “confirmation;” the requirement that the viewer join her search.25 Interestingly, one 
of the books is penned by Carri’s father. This thread was followed in a revealing study that 
presents a parallelism between the “search and research” that Carri’s father did for that book, and 
Carri’s own “search and research” for Los Rubios (Ocampo 2013).  
																																																								
25 Some poetry lines are by Francisco “Paco” Urondo, key poet of the sixties and seventies and prominent 
montonero, whose connection with Carri’s father can be tracked to the newspaper Noticias, funded by 
Montoneros. The trajectories of Urondo and Carri’s parents, in turn, shed light on some of the film’s 
scenes – Urondo was also “trapped” and disappeared during the dictatorship. 
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In yet another unexpected move -- which might, however, be analogous to the gesture of 
wearing the blond wigs, i.e., pushing and reappropriating an initially unwelcome event -- Carri 
first withholds personal and family information (in the film), and four years later she makes it 
public (in the book). Yet this "publicity" is far from typical. Los rubios: Cartografía de una 
película (2007), a book roughly organized in the manner of a film-production booklet (the Table 
of Contents includes these labels: Introduction, Pre-Production, Shooting, Post-Production, 
Interviews, Letters, and Launching), includes an annotated draft of the script (which, however, is 
not exactly accurate: again, Carri's actions militate against a naïve reliance on the voice of the 
author), photos, facsimile copies of letters in a Traiciones-like format, material that didn't make 
it to the final cut, and background information (such as the names of the interviewees, along with 
transcripts -- including a section called, "Discarded interviews")  
All this material operates almost as a slingshot toward the film itself, and yet, it also 
points outside the film; or, rather, as a circular, feedback loop, further continued in others' 
writings about the film; hence Carri's comment: "La peli sigue escribiéndose " (The flick keeps 
writing itself"). Note that Carri says writing itself, and not filming itself -- It's almost as if film 
and book formed part of the same work of art.  
One instance of this feedback loop is found in the implicit responses that Carri’s book 
gives to objections to Los rubios – interestingly, even to objections that were made years after 
the publication of her book. For our purposes, what Carri says about the memory of children 
deserves special attention.   
We mentioned that Carri’s and Alcoba’s works have been criticized on the grounds that 
their childhood memories are problematic. Even a sympathetic reading like Gustavo Noriega’s, 
which has been referred to already, assumes that such criticism is valid.  
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It is worth following his train of thought, for it encapsulates two core assumptions shared 
by the many objections mounted on the impugnation of the child as a fitting speaker--and it does 
so from a mostly sympathetic standpoint. 
“The flick is merciless with the neighbors,” writes Noriega; “with everyone -- save the 
children [“la peli es impiadosa con los vecinos del barrio; con todos, salvo con los niños”]; and 
he mentions, in this respect, a scene in which “the little ones speak of death … with ingenuidad 
[n.b., “naiveté” or “innocence”] not deprived of malice” [“los chiquititos hablan de la muerte… 
con ingenuidad, no desprovista de malicia.”] (39; emphasis added). 
In the scene in question, Couceiro is chatting with los chicos del barrio in a casual, 
comfortable manner, yet the subject of the conversation is, mostly, violent or deprivation-related 
deaths that took place in the barrio. Interestingly, there is a cut to Carri's comments about how 
she learned -- how she was told -- about her parents' murder/disappearance, which meshes with, 
and goes back, to the initial scene, when we hear the voices of the children discussing the way in 
which several neighbors died: one, heart attack; another, liver disease; a third one jumped in 
front of a train – or was he the one who shot himself? Discussion ensues. Soon, it dissolves in 
general laughter, when one of the kids says the man killed himself “because he couldn’t stand 
[name of a woman] anymore” [“Porque no soportaba más a [Fulanita de Tal”]] (min.40).  
One is left wondering what kind of malice is that, which on the one hand leads the 
children to make black-humored jokes about a recent suicide, and on the other, allows them to 
retain the naiveté that “saves them” from Carri’s critical gaze. It must be, it cannot but be, 
something very different from “adult” or “real” malice.  
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How could we make sense of this difference? Noriega sees no problem here, as he goes 
on to link the naiveté of the children – the alleged naiveté of the children – with a feature that, he 
feels, pervades the whole film. The children are just an instance of a this more general issue.  
With a forgiving tone, the critic affirms that, for all its merits, for all its incisiveness, Los 
rubios is marked by a certain naiveté. The whole film, in fact, cannot escape suffering from 
“ingenuidad política,” which is, as Noriega explains, a sort of “incomprensión infantil que se 
arrastra hasta el presente” (“childish incomprehension that drags itself through the present;” 50). 
What present? Again, Noriega is forthcoming: ““ through the present, reaching the 
woman Albertina who shoots Los rubios as expression of her estrangement” (“hasta el presente, 
hasta la Albertina mujer que filma Los rubios como expresión de su extrañeza”), cashed out as a 
“total incomprehension of the irretrievable world of the parents” (“incomprensión total del 
mundo irrecuperable de los padres,” 50). 
 To conceive of the child under the figure of innocence and purity would render children 
unable to understand whatever falls within their protected scope; and, in many versions of this 
view, they are equally unable to act or behave wrongly—or in any other “impure” fashion. 
Implausible as it may sound, knowledge of wrongdoing is supposed to be a necessary condition 
for acting wrongly. “Without that knowledge, they cannot do, or intend to do, anything wrong” 
(Brenan and Erpp 2015, 3). 
And “malice” would be one such feature. Hence Noriega’s claim. Implicitly, he is 
suggesting that the child cannot really comprehend the phenomena or events she is talking about. 
This incapacity is but a manifestation of the child’s purity “in mind and deed.” The attribution of 
malice is, at best, shorthand for something that resembles “real” malice; but that is not, for it 
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doesn’t share its less savory aspects, protected by, and embedded in, a cherubic purity or naiveté 
that doesn’t allow the child to see – to understand – what malice really is.  
Noriega is no anomaly in projecting from the illusory “empty” purity of childhood 
experiences – deprived of understanding, and therefore unreliable qua witness or speaker of 
whichever experiences or memories she may have. Whatever they experienced during childhood 
is blurred by that lack of knowledge. Hence Noriega’s brutal claim to the effect that Carri’s 
political naiveté is some sort of “condition” she has dragged since, and from, her childhood.  
Samantha Brennan and Jenn Erpp have recently discussed the more prevalent 
(mis)conceptions of childhood in the Americas, and the way they work in different contexts. The 
“innocence” or “purity” of the child depends on ignorance—ignorance of wrongdoing, or evil, or 
sin, or whatever normative concept one may favor. Conversely, knowledge of wrongdoing, or 
evil, or sin, obliterates the state of purity or innocence. But, as long as our children remain 
“protected” from it, they will remain innocent, and, therefore, good.  Now, there remains a 
problem her. The question of whether we can be or do X without knowing what X is (i.e., without 
being able to conceptualize or grasp X in some relevant sense, whether fully verbal or not) 
doesn’t present itself to the believer.   “Without that knowledge, they cannot do, or intend to do, 
anything wrong” (Brenan and Erpp 2015, 3). 
Although, empirically, this notion flies against all evidence, one begins to understand 
how, or why, Noriega may fail to see anything but innocent children in the Couceyro scene, 
which escapes, of course, Carri’s judgment Neither does the possibility of there being degrees of 
X; e.g., threshold or liminal areas.  This is not to say that they can explain away everything. 
Purity, indeed, is fragile. As we have seen in Abad’s example about the global attribution of 
character traits, the “pure” woman is trapped: either she is pure, or, if she is not, she is ipso facto 
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at fault -- impure to some degree (i.e., sinful, wrongful, etc.). That is to say, there may be degrees 
within one category (e.g., purity), but not among different categories (from those available to 
women, that is). Likewise, if purity is attached to, or is a property of childhood, there won’t be 
significant transitions between the child and the adult. 
The child and her experience are “saved,” and immune to judgment, at the price of being 
deprived of agency. Therefore, even if Carri, and, by extension, her generation, does remember 
events from her childhood, both she and her memories are unreliable: the infant’s ignorance 
doesn’t allow her to have a minimally accurate comprehension of her experience—at best, she 
will have access to a distorted or flawed understanding of her experience, which will lead to an 
equally distorted or flawed memory of her experience. Neither the child nor the adult retrieving 
the child’s memory of this or that experience, can escape the impugnation to which their own 
childhood purity condemns them.  
But Noriega takes a further step when he adds – and here the apologetic proviso is with 
which the sentence opens is quite telling -- that "[m]ás allá de las cualidades personales que 
pueda tener Albertina Carri… hay un dato biográfico [que justifica el juicio respecto de su 
incapacidad infantil]  …. Cuando sus padres fueron secuestrados, Carri tenía tres años. 
Demasiado joven para recordar” (“beyond the personal qualities Albertina may have . . . there is 
a biographical fact [which justifies the judgment about her incapacity while being a child] When 
her parents were kidnapped, Carri was three years old. Too young to remember;” 50).  
Now, he has added an impugnation of the child as capable of remembering at all.  While 
there is a legitimate question regarding the stages in memory development (e.g.., at what age is 
an infant capable of forming memories?), Noriega’s statement is, at the very least, partial. For, 
although Carri hadn’t turned 4 years old when her parents were taken away, he is omitting the 
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fact that they were in touch for a full year before they were disappeared forever. Personal 
differences aside, many people report having memories of events that took place when they were 
within that age range.  
We said in passing that there are other figurations of the child, which may or may not 
coexist with this one. Let us resume this discussion once we’ve seen the kind of testimonial 
injustice of which Alcoba is victim.  
Is this a totally satisfactory answer? No. But, as Carri herself put it, 
 
[the generation of my parents often tell me] “you were in kindergarten.” Yes, I was, but 
something happened there. Mine is a possible memory, and I don’t have to bow my head 
reverentially to those who were my parents or to their generation.” (“vos estabas en 
jardín de infantes” Sí, estaba en jardín pero ahí algo pasó; la mía es una memoria 
posible y no tengo por qué hacer reverencias literales a los que fueron mis padres o a su 
generación” (Carri 2007, 111). 
 
Lastly, Noriega appeals to a widespread objection that attempts to render the actors of the 
seventies immune to judgment – the alleged “quiebre generacional” (“generational break) which 
“cercena toda posibiildad de comunicación” (“severs all possibility of communication;” 48). The 
idea of a generational break is a common feature of a family of views, whose different strands 
cash out that break in different terms, and explain it by appeal to different reasons. But all are 
adamant about the existence of such powerful break that putatively prevents mutual 
understanding.  
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Some argue that the sheer obliteration of most left-of-center political actors also 
obliterated the mores and habitus (understood, roughly, in Bourdieu’s sense) that informed their 
project and modus vivendi (Casullo 2004). Others, that the seventies had an ontologically unique 
status, which was given by the shared acceptance of a regulative ideal (or, more often than not, a 
teleologically defined “reality-in-the-making”) ,i.e., the Revolution (Caletti 2006).  
With the loss or annihilation of this crucial component of the “world” of the seventies, 
gone were the possibilities  attempts to comprehend them. Again, for one reason or another, 
understanding is inaccessible to those who no lo vivieron (“didn’t live it”).  
Weak as these arguments are, they still have some purchase among (many) former cadres 
of the armed organizations, but also among a number of academics.  The idea that the 
Revolution was inevitable, and that it was, moreover, around the corner -- a la vuelta de la 
esquina – was not part of the ontological fabric of the universe, which, somehow, ceased to exist; 
it wasn’t either something along the lines of, let us say, a Foucalutian episteme, or a Khunian 
paradigm, or any other conceptual scheme we must share in order to make sense of ourselves and 
the world, and from whose “outside” we cannot speak. This is even more serious when the onus 
is on the advocate of such bizarre views.  
Before leaving he subject, let us remember that the proletarization  projects also rest on 
similar assumptions. The discussion is long and not always exciting (for a concise presentation, 
Vezzetti 2002 and 2009). The former cadres or current intellectuals who reject the idea of any 
contact between our generation and theirs, seem to treat the idea of the Revolution as an 
ineradicable part of their experience, yet now inaccessible due to epistemological or ontological 
reasons, which are, often little or poorly explained.  
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Yet, they all share the following point: the Argentine’s seventies cannot be 
comprehended in any meaningful way by anybody who didn’t “live through them.”  
This amounts to much more than an argument to the effect that the direct witness or 
political actor has a privileged epistemic access to the (understanding of the) events. The claim 
is that there is no epistemic access at all for those who were not in direct contact with the time 
and events in question.  And more so in the case of – children. 
Let us note that there is a double silencing of the child. First, silencing qua inability to 
see and hear – inability to “read” – the situation of the children as portrayed in the “chatting 
scene” – the scene in which the children talk with Couceyro about the violent deaths in the 
neighborhood. These children, who, according to Los rubios, live in the same borough where 
Carri's parents attempted to “blend with the masses,” as the CN of Montoneros recommended 
(i.e., a putative process of “proletarization” that would be achieved by moving to working-class 
barrios); these children, then, “real” children of the proletariat, can hardly be said to be there by 
chance. The methodology of disappearance was, pace Walsh, one side of a twofold operation; 
the other "side" (and part of) the disappearance machinery was “planned misery” [“miseria 
planificada"] for generations to come.  
Failing to see, to hear the voices of these children-- children whose futures are doomed – 
could be construed, then, as part of the process of disappearance. Pushing Pilar Calveiro's 
conclusions about the poder desaparecedor and its mutations, this blindness may be part of the 
illusion of "disappearing the disappearing power”—whereas, instead, it could well be just a 
different way of replicating the process, i.e., failing to see (unwittingly but prima facie culpably, 
i.e., negligently) the forms in which the disappearing project of the military regime lingers on. 
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The figure of the child as “pure” or “innocent” or “saved” is but one of the ways in which this 
blindness manifests itself. 
Second, the silencing of the child focuses on the child as speaker, construed along the 
lines of the above discussion of Noriega’s view on Los rubios and politics. That is, a view on 
Carri’s film – and Carri as a person – qua locus of “total incomprehension,” i.e., an impugnation 
of the child as legitimate speaker and interlocutor. This silencing will be present, with a different 
modulation, in Alcoba's Manèges , to which we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 3: But Who's the Girl? Laura Alcoba's Manèges: petite histoire argentine (2007) 
3.1 Who's Speaking? Free Indirect Discourse and Speaker-Utterance Attributions. 
  
With La danse de l’araignée (2017), Laura Alcoba closes the series begun a decade ago 
with her opera prima, Manèges : petite histoire argentine (2007) --La casa de los conejos (2008); 
The Rabbit House (2008) – and followed by Le bleu des abeilles (2013) --El azul de las abejas 
(2014). Manèges was an immediate critical and commercial success in its French and Spanish 
versions. In some quarters, it is regarded as firmly established in "the landscape of the memory 
of the dictatorship" (Ducrozet 2014). Critical interest grew significantly in the last few years, and 
the “landscape” became less uniform. Although passionate endorsements and equally passionate 
rejections sprang from its very publication, they were very much in the minority. Conversely, in 
the last two years or so, along with nuanced discussions form a variety of perspectives, there has 
been a resurgence of critical works that present either a blanket rejection or endorsement of 
Alcoba’s book.  
As suggested in the Introduction to this thesis, this polarization seems to follow an 
analogous general climate in public and private discussions about the politics of memory that 
have taken place for the last fifteen years. The same slim volume, within the same time-frame 
(2014-2016), has been judged to be a pro-dictatorship pamphlet by some readers, and dismissed 
as propaganda montonera by others.  
At this point in the overall argumentation that concludes with this chapter, it will hardly 
come as a surprise to see the approach and orientation of the following discussion aiming in a 
different direction – even if, in so doing, it implicitly rejects the claim that Manèges endorses 
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specific political views. Instead, this chapter presents and fleshes out three ways in which 
Alcoba’s work challenges our interpretive practices.  
First, Manèges' nimble use of free indirect discourse, conversational implicatures and 
other rhetorical, pragmatic, and performative devices, prevents us from making speaker-
utterance attributions (i.e., matching a given utterance to a specific speaker) in crucial dialogue 
scenes. If we have no textual support to match a given utterance with a given speaker, and, in 
addition, all speakers are equally likely to have proffered the utterance, we have no way to 
adjudicate the issue.  
Needless to say, who the speaker is makes a crucial difference in the sense and 
connotations of the utterance, the dialogue, and often the entire scene, unsettling our whole 
interpretive landscape. While we cannot settle on any one interpretation, I argue that the 
scenarios Manèges suggests are worth exploring, and that, in fact, the impossibility of reaching 
interpretive closure is conducive – or should be conducive, if my argument is sound --to forms of 
interpretive discussion that are likely to break the tendency toward polarization prevalent in 
textual and political accounts of Argentina's recent past.  
Second, the reading process demanded by Manèges involves the triggering of 
"performative loops" analogous to the ones discussed in Abad's Traiciones. While the latter 
targeted, for the most part, our memory, the former aims at our capacity to make judgments, a 
tendency that, as is well-known, is bound to be exacerbated when contentious issues are under 
discussion. In an opposite direction – what was earlier dubbed centripetal effects --the narrative 
voice “suggests” that the reader go beyond the text in a variety of ways.  
If the first two points involve the identification or perception of textual features and 
cognitive-affective abilities that may unwittingly go amok, the third and last point focuses on 
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two specific themes that have been touched upon when discussing Traiciones and Los rubios. 
Namely, the figures of the child and the woman.  
The narrative is based on relatively straightforward and well-known events: in late 1975 
Laura Alcoba's mother moved with her 7-year old daughter to a small house in the outskirts of 
La Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina, where they lived until mid-1976 with a young couple --Diana 
Teruggi and Daniel Mariani--who belonged to the same guerrilla cell of Montoneros that was in 
charge of printing Evita Montonera, the official media outlet of the organization. The Evita 
aimed at (and, on the leadership’s view, was crucial for) the OPM’s cadres, i.e., it was not aimed 
at a general audience. Its contents included official communiqués regarding ever-stricter rules 
and procedures; concrete orders for all cells as to how to approach and deal with the rapidly 
changing fighting conditions; directives and advice on how to move in the (also rapidly 
changing) territorial divides or zones --"safer" areas, vulnerable spaces, territories heavily 
infiltrated and dominated by the enemy, etc.; updates on the latest developments in the military 
and political fronts, and vignettes depicting specific combats or highlighting the actions of 
specific militantes.  
The “front” for the printing press was a make-believe, minimally functional, small 
business purportedly specialized in rabbit-breeding and rabbit-based dishes. The services 
included home-delivery, which along with the few real food-orders they managed to get, was 
actually used to deliver, first and foremost, stacks of Evitas to key distribution points in a rusty 
Citroen van driven by the young couple.  
Despite a seemingly auspicious beginning, soon things deteriorated. As paramilitary 
squads first, and military forces later—after the March 24 coup—began to close in, tensions 
mounted, and Alcoba's mother engaged in protracted negotiations that eventually played out in 
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her favor: by mid-1976 she was allowed to leave the rabbit house with her daughter, with a view 
to going into exile. The young Laura sorely lamented saying goodbye to Diana, with whom she 
had forged a close relationship.  
A few months later, her mother reached Paris, while Laura lived with her grandparents 
keeping as low a profile as she could until her new "official" passport arrived. Only then could 
she fly safely to France, and be reunited with her mother – two years later. What Laura doesn’t 
know when she meets her mother again is that the house of rabbits – along with Diana and six 
other militants who were in the house – was obliterated during one of the largest-scale, most 
brutal military crackdowns launched by the regime. Diana's husband, Daniel, wasn't in the rabbit 
house, but was murdered soon thereafter in another safe-house.  
Their months-old daughter, Clara Anahí, was the only survivor, and, as per military 
orders, was taken unharmed, and "placed" in a military or pro-military family --a destiny shared 
by over 500 children of desaparecidos. Isabel “Chicha” Mariani, mother of Daniel and mother-
in-law of Diana, has been searching for Clara Anahí since then, eventually co-founding and 
presiding Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo for a decade.  
To this day, Clara Anahí hasn’t been found.  
Formally, Manèges appears to be equally straightforward. There are a few exceptions: 
three short texts (a Prologue-Letter and an Epilogue-Letter, both of which bear the typical 
markers of authorial texts, and both addressed to Diana; and an author-penned middle chapter 
briefly describing a particular aspect of Alcoba's research.). Also, there is a passage from Poe's 
"The Purloined Letter" inserted or, rather, quoted, in the Letter-Epilogue, and the graph of a 
crossword puzzle drawn by Laura in the second half of the book.  
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The main text is, otherwise, a seemingly simple narrative; a conventional, smooth textual 
surface (divided in equally conventional chapters), narrated in first person by a 6-year old --soon 
a 7-year old, i.e., Laura-qua-child, who is, however, fairly intellectually precocious. This overall 
and widespread feature is apparent from the very opening of the book, when Laura explains: 
 
Si nous avons quitté notre appartement, c’est parce que maintenant les Montoneros 
devient se cacher. C’est nécessaire parce qu’il y a  des personnes que sont devenues très 
dangereuses : ce sont les hommes des commandos de l’AAA, la Alianza Anticomunista 
Argentina, qui enlèvent les mitants comme mes parents et les tuent ou les font disparaitre. 
Alors il faut que nous nous mettions à ‘labri, que nous nous cachions et aussi que nous 
répliquions. Ma mère m’expliqué que ça s’appelle « vivre dans la clandestinité » 
« Maintenant nous allons vivre dans la clandestinité. (“If we’ve had to leave our 
apartment it’s because, from now on, the Montoneros have to hide. It’s necessary, 
because there are some people who have become very dangerous: men from the 
commandos of the AAA, the Argentine Anti-communist Alliance, who “pick up” [n.b., 
kidnap] militants like my parents, and kill them or make them disappear. So we have to 
move to less exposed places, safe places to protect ourselves; to lay low and try to  go 
unnoticed; and also to retaliate My mother explains that this is called "going 
underground." [n.b., pasar a la clandestinidad] (7).26 
 
																																																								
26 "Pasar a la clandestinidad" was the more widespread expression; shortly afterwards,"vivir en la 
clandestinidad"' was also used --and that's what Alcoba writes in the French original, "vivre dans la 
clandestinite" --yet to refer to the condition and characteristics of haber pasado a la clandestinidad, i.e., 
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Laura's mother highlights that it’s very important not to say anything to anyone. To bring the 
point home, she tells her about a boy whose parents had forgotten to explain to him “to what 
extent it is important to be silent” (“a quel point il est important de se taire;” 9). The police 
raided the place, and the boy, quite unaware of the consequences of his actions, pointed at the 
hiding place where his parents hid compromising material. This landed them in jail. The text 
goes on:  
 
Mais pour moi, c’est différent. Je suis grande, je n’ai que sept ans mais tout le monde 
dit que je parle et raisonne déjà comme une grande personne. Ça les fait rire que je 
connaisse le nom de Firmenich, le chef des Montoneros, et même les paroles de la 
marche des Jeunesses péronistes par cœur. Moi, on m’a tout expliqué. J’ai compris et 
j’obéirai (But my case is different. I’m a grown up; I’m only seven but everybody 
says I already talk and reason like a grown-up. It makes them laugh that I know the 
name of Firmenich, the chief of Montoneros, and that I know  by heart the lyrics of 
the Peronist Youth march. They’ve explained everything to me. I’ve understood, and 
I will obey; 18)   
 
The above, as well as other exchanges, are not given directly, in dialogue form, but by 
appeal to free indirect discourse (or a relevantly similar variation of it), which undoes standard 
ways of linking speakers and utterances. As said above, the nimble use of this device, often in 
the form of a “natural” shift, leaves us with neither explicit markers (e.g., dialogue tags, inverted 																																																																																																																																																																																		
of having gone underground; of having crossed a threshold that involves living, or, more bluntly, 
surviving, in that space that suspended, or cancelled, almost all "normal" forms of social interaction] (7). 
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commas, indentation, etc.) nor implicit ones (e.g., conversational implicatures).  As anticipated 
above, even critical pieces that focus on the use of narrative voice (including Karen Saban’s 
excellent discussion [Saban 2012; 2013], which does make an incursion into Alcoba’s use of free 
indirect discourse, as do shorter but incisive pieces such as Daona’s and Peller’s) don’t draw the 
full implications of its operation in Manèges, i.e., for our purposes, mainly a) its effects on 
speaker-utterance attributions (e.g., their dislodging and suspension); and b) the way in which 
Manèges artfully leads readers to miss or fail to see this operation.  
Let us see how this occurs in the above passages. It seems we are before an unequivocal, 
straightforward dialogue, even if rendered in good, old-fashioned, “reported speech,” which 
gives a faster pace and agility to the prose passage. And yet, the smoothness with which the text 
moves from that form of indirect reporting to free indirect discourse (or a relevantly similar 
variation of it) makes it difficult to realize that the standard markers of speaker-utterance 
attributions are no longer there. As a result, we may likely go on reading, unwittingly projecting 
one of the many possible and plausible sets of speaker-utterance attributions that are offered by 
the text, but which are simultaneously withheld. For, despite the suggestive variety of possible 
matchings between utterances and speakers, there is no textual indication or support whatsoever 
that would give us reasons to choose one over the others.27
 
Therefore, if we do keep reading and 
making specific attributions --regardless of whether we do so intentionally or not; inadvertently 
or not; unconsciously or not --we shall be exerting violence on the text. That is, we shall be 
making arbitrary choices, on the basis of which we articulate a given interpretation of the scene. 
 
																																																								
27 Another reason why this absence of textual markers may go unnoticed, of course, is that the 
identification of those markers has become almost second-nature, and we don't usually (or consciously) 
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For instance, if we reread the above-quoted passages (especially the one beginning, "But 
my case…"), we should notice that there are at least four interpretive possibilities. It could very 
well be what her mother said to Laura after telling her the rather grim story of the boy who 
unwittingly led his family to jail. After all, it is reasonable that a mother should want to appease 
her 7-year old, and give her some reassurance after telling her such a story. Grammatically, all 
we have to do is replace the possessive “my” with “your,” and we have what could be a typical 
phrase to reassure a child: “But your case is completely different; you’re a grownup now.”  
Still, the mother could have just told her the story, quick and to the point, and then 
remained silent. If this were the case, the whole scene changes: the mother is leaving Laura alone 
to gather strength on her own. That is, we would have to conclude that 7-year old Laura is 
cheering herself up, silently talking to herself, after a smooth transition from her mother's words 
to her own thoughts: "I’m 7 years old now, and everybody says that I speak and think like an 
adult." In this scenario, Laura, would be next to her mother, but left alone, in a situation in which 
they could be gunned down at any moment.  
Third, part of the sentence could have been uttered by her mother, and part by Laura. 
Alternatively, part of it could have been an utterance, and part of it, a thought of Laura’s. Fourth, 
the passage could be construed as a repetition or recasting of her mother's words, perhaps told to 
her daughter in past circumstances, and retrieved now by Laura in order to cope with the 
unwelcome news and the more unwelcome silence. There remain other possibilities. For our 
purposes, though, these should suffice.  
 
 																																																																																																																																																																																		
interrupt or even slow down the reading pace to make these matchings, let alone stop and reread to 
confirm whether we've made the right ones.  
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In sum, we have no way to decide which of the above possibilities is the case --we cannot 
settle on any set of speaker-utterance attributions, and therefore, on any one interpretation. This 
operation becomes increasingly important in the increasingly politically-laden scenes. 
There is a related aspect of Laura’s speech that is worth noticing. As seen above, Laura 
picks up issues of “adult conversations” (e.g., the Peronist Youth march; the snippet of 
information about the chain of command within the OPM— the name of the first commander of 
the OPM’s Conducción Nacional – henceforth, CN -- Mario Eduardo Firmenich). Laura “will 
obey,” as she said, because she’s “a grownup:” and she’ll do so, she adds, “even if they come to 
hurt me . . . even if they bore little nails through my knees. Really, I have understood to what 
extent it is important to keep silent” (“[m]ême si on venait à me faire mal.  … Même si on me 
plantait de tout petits clous dans les genoux. Moi, j’ai compris à quel point il est important de se 
taire; ” 18).  
Evidently, Laura picks up adult speech not always in a smooth way, but, at times, as 
incrustations or clashes with her child-like speech. Torture described as driving “little nails” or 
“small nails” (“petits clous”) into her knees sounds more like a child trying to translate or 
grapple with the unpalatable, almost incomprehensible reality of torture, into the worldview of a 
child.  
This uneasy linguistic blend may suggest, without stating it explicitly, that Laura may be 
struggling to put together and make sense of, on the one hand, the harsh realities of the adult 
world towards which she’s being pushed, and, on the other hand, the safety of her childhood 
world. The tone of the narrative, then, shifts among the following:  
a) sense of vague danger accompanied by an equally vague notion that she has a duty to fulfill;  
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b) a sense of game-playing; and  
c) a sense of simple normalcy, of being just like everybody else living their everyday life.  
 
The actual unfolding of the above scenarios isn't as clear-cut as this brief schematic 
sketch might suggest, and, moreover, at times it would seem that the shift becomes a blend of 
sorts, or an oscillation that blurs the borders of these three scenarios. Furthermore, Laura 
develops rudimentary (and, sometimes, quite elaborate) defense mechanisms that are connected 
with these scenarios --and with the needs of the guerrilla cell. When the "feel" of childlike play 
prevails, Laura sometimes resorts to literal playing, though, more often than not, she has to 
negotiate her (stereotypically "infant-specific") desires with her increasingly habitual chores -
soon-to-be duties --that her living situation demands. Soon thereafter they meet the young couple 
with whom they'll share the small house that hides the printing press: a 24-year old Diana 
Teruggi, whose pregnancy is not very noticeable yet, and her husband Daniel Mariani. Laura is 
immediately fascinated by Diana, and they will become very close.  
In what follows, I discuss one scene in which the mechanism of speaker-utterance 
attributions exemplified above becomes very relevant. If successful, this discussion will make a 
good case for the view here advocated, and help as well to show the points where the polarized 
interpretations are wanting.  
3.2 Between Interpretation and Naming: Disappearance qua Social Isolation  
Laura sits by the door in the late afternoons and watches passersby. In time, she notices 
and enjoys the brief but everyday presence of a neighbor, coming home from work. Laura’s new 
acquaintance is in her mid-to late twenties --a bit too "old" for a 7-year old, but not for Laura, 
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accustomed by now to spending most of her time among adults; and a bit too young for the 
young woman, who is nevertheless taken by Laura’s loquaciousness and inquisitive mind. 
Eventually their little chats grow into an invitation to have tea. Laura is thrilled. The blend of 
Laura's "adult woman" roles with her typically childlike fascination when trying on her 
neighbor’s shoes, for instance, makes the brief description of their tea-party both a vivid 
illustration of the complexity of Laura's position, and a respite from the sense of danger that 
besieges the narrative. Or so it seems. For, the next day, Laura's mother storms into the kitchen, 
screaming at her, demanding that she explain what happened with their neighbor. Diana calms 
both mother and daughter down, and tells Laura that the neighbor had asked them what was 
wrong with "that poor girl," who went about saying she had no last name. Laura is confused and 
doesn't seem to remember. Diana patiently helps her to reconstruct the scene:  
 
 
J’ai juste dit mon prénom car je sais que c’est la partie de mon nom que je vais garder. 
Ensuite, je crois qu’elle m’a demandé : Et ton nom de famille? Sincèrement, je ne me 
souviens plus de la suite. J’ai dû paniquer, car je sais très bien que ma mare est 
recherchée et que nous attendons qu’on nous donne un nouveau nom et de faux papiers. 
Est-ce que moi aussi je suis recherchée ? D’une certaine manière oui, sans doute, mais je 
sais bien que je suis là par hasard.  
(I only said my first name because I know that's the only part of my name that I will be 
able to keep. I'm allowed to keep. I think she  asked  me, And what’s your last name? 
And, really, I don't remember anything of what happened afterwards. I must have 
panicked, because I know very well that my mother is being  chased, and that we're 
waiting for our new last name and false papers. Are they looking for me as well? In a 
 110 
 
way, yes, no doubt about it; but I also know very well that if I'm here, it's entirely by 
chance; 72). 
  
At the beginning of this kitchen scene it was clear who the speakers were, and who was 
saying what (the author used dialogue tags), but, as Laura withdraws, and we reach the quoted 
passage, we don't even know whether this is still the report of the dialogue (and, if so, we don’t 
know who the interlocutors are), or Laura's thoughts, or simply the continuation of the narrative.  
The passage reads well; we get a clear idea of the overall situation. Furthermore, the 
smooth interweaving of what could have been her mother's words, or Diana's, or Laura's – or 
even Laura’s thoughts, and no longer a report of the dialogue --easily makes readers fail to notice 
the problematic issue of speaker-utterance attributions. The more widespread view is that the 
passage is, at most, a blend or combination of the two narrators, i.e., Laura-qua-child, and Laura-
qua-adult narrator --the latter smoothly and imperceptibly insinuating herself into the narrative of 
the child.28
 
From this starting point, readings differ vastly as to the kind, degree, effects, and 
evaluation of this interplay between the two narrators. At their most extreme, some of these 
readings construe this scene as Laura’s decision to side with the cause of her mother – and that of 
Montoneros (Ros). Others draw the opposite conclusion (Santos 2014 and 2015).  
Yet, if there is no way to determine who the narrator is, both of the above groups of 
(admittedly, very roughly sketched) readings lose their footing. The following discussion 
(mainly focused on the fourth sentence and on the much-discussed statement about "chance") 
																																																								
28 In some, Adult Laura comments on aspects of, or on events experienced by, her younger self. Peller 
2012 argues that Adult Laura is leaving traces of the way she regards this long-past event, thus showing 
some compassion towards some of the less-than-welcome experiences her younger self went through, 
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aims to argue for this crucial point, which, if sound, undoes the polarized interpretations, and 
suggests a broader, deeper critique than the ones these interpretations seem to read in Manèges.  
Let us start with the fourth sentence, "I know very well that my mother is being chased” 
(there was an arrest warrant, her picture on the papers, etc.). It could, as most accounts affirm, be 
Laura's utterance. But it could also be an unspoken thought of hers. Furthermore, there are many 
ways of "transposing" the above passage in dialogue form, and in the case of this statement, all 
we'd have to do is change two pronouns, and then it'd fit perfectly well in a dialogue where it is 
the mother who says, "You [instead of "I"] know very well that I’m being chased [instead of "my 
mother"]"  
If we ascribe the utterance, then, to Laura's mother, and we bear in mind that we know the 
basic outline of the scene (i.e., her mother stormed into the kitchen in anger), then it's quite likely 
--not certain, but very likely --that the utterance was part of, or was relevantly related to, a rather 
violent, perhaps guilt-inducing, reproach: "You know very well that I’m being chased!" which 
would have, in turn, conversational implicatures related to reproach (e.g., “If you knew, How 
could you do such a thing!”) However, the very same utterance would take on a very different 
meaning if attributed to Diana. Coming from Diana's lips, the utterance could be either a much 
milder reproach, or even the opposite of a reproach: a defense of Laura.  
This possibility gains even more plausibility if we not only switch the attribution of the 
utterance (i.e., if we shift from the mother to Diana), but we also change the addressee: it is 
perfectly consistent to read the passage as if that utterance were proffered by Diana, and yet not 
addressing Laura, but her mother, in which case it could be construed as a plea in defense of the 
girl: "I know very well that you’re being chased…" would then be the free indirect discourse 																																																																																																																																																																																		
without sounding self-indulgent or melodramatic. See also Punte 2013 and 2014.  
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rendering of, "She [Laura] knows very well that….”" which Diana could have said to Laura's 
mother, making the case that the blunder was not a result of Laura's silliness or forgetfulness or 
irresponsibility, but, on the contrary, of a deep awareness about, and concern for, her mother's 
situation. And it might have been this awareness and concern what made Laura freeze instead of 
coming up with some explanation.  
This interpretation could be further strengthened if we take a small further step and 
attribute the preceding clause (“I must have panicked”) to Diana again. This is indeed plausible, 
given the proximity of the two clauses ("I must have panicked, because I know very well that my 
mother is being chased"), and, perhaps more importantly, given the likelihood that it be an adult, 
and not a 7-year old, the one speaking of "panic attacks."  
Yet this doesn't mean that Diana is a "better" candidate than the other adults: it favors the 
suggestion that any adult might be a better candidate than 7-year old Laura --her mother; Laura-
qua-adult narrator… and still, we shouldn't forget that young Laura's precociousness doesn't 
allow us to rule out that it might have been she who uttered the stereotypically Argentine middle-
class psychologizing conjecture about panic attacks.  
The underdetermined possibilities notwithstanding, we could --and, insofar as we want to 
make sense of the scene, we must (hypothetically and temporarily) "fix" one or more speaker-
utterance attributions, yet only under the hermeneutical proviso that this pairing or set of pairings 
is no more legitimate than others, i.e., only under the proviso that these pairings allow us to 
explore interpretive possibilities on which we cannot settle; scenarios, so to speak, through 
which we engage with the situation the characters face.  
For the sake of simplicity, let us go back to the first instance discussed above; and, for the 
sake of argument, let us "fix" the interpretation --more modestly: the attribution --of that first 
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clause as an utterance proffered by Laura's mother; lastly, let us assume that it was indeed the 
"correct" attribution, i.e., that it was, without a doubt, a furious reproach to Laura. Even though 
we could legitimately grapple with a variety of questions that might come up in this light (e.g., 
how would Laura feel, or what does this outburst allow us to infer about her mother's character, 
and/or about her relationship with Laura; or what is the connection between these questions and 
the broader context of military repression), we wouldn't be able to answer them in more than a 
very tentative fashion. We could judge her mother harshly, but how harshly? Do we have enough 
information to settle this issue?  
These questions depend, in part, on the way or ways in which we flesh out this very 
general interpretive starting point (i.e., the claim, taken as the "right" attribution, that reads, "'You 
know there's I’m being chased me' is an angry reproach that Laura's mother directs at her 
daughter"). And the way we flesh out this statement is likely to vary, depending on the 
subsequent pairings between speakers and utterances.29 
 
"Are they looking for me as well?" asks 
Laura a sentence or two later. The answer to this question, widely assumed to be uttered or 
thought by Laura herself, could very well be attributed to her mother. Again, all we'd have to do 
is switch a few pronouns (i.e., from "In some sense, yes, no doubt about it, but I know very well, 
too, that if I'm here, it's just a matter of chance" to "In some sense, yes, no doubt about it, but you 
know very well, too, that if you are here, it's just a matter of chance"), and, at once, we'd be able 
																																																								
29 In other words, the various speaker-utterance attributions, even if taken one at a time, will change the 
meaning of other clauses (and of their respective speaker-utterance matchings) with which they form a 
web. That is, they could reconfigure, in whole or in part, the conversational implicatures of specific 
exchanges, but also of whole sets of exchanges, for, even within whole sets, each speaker-utterance 
pairing is a link in the thread or web of utterances that form a conversation.  
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to construe these two lines as a mother-daughter exchange in which the mother attempts to 
temper, or make up for, her violent outburst. How to interpret "chance" here is an open question, 
but it could certainly be construed as part of the overall reassuring answer, e.g., roughly, in ways 
that would convey that Laura is not to blame, and that they are not really after her; that she is, 
simply, a "non-combatant" daughter of a montonero cadre.  
Then, the picture of the abusive mother would have to be modified --not necessarily ruled 
out, but at the very least reconsidered or tempered. Consequently, even if we construe "I know 
that my mother is being chased," as an indirect rendering of an angry utterance proffered by 
Laura's mother, the interpretation that might begin to take shape is halted or reshaped or 
suspended.  
More generally, even if we fix the first clause by indexing it to a given speaker, 
subsequent speaker-utterance attributions (and/or their being unsettled, and therefore subject to 
change) would likely make us reassess the meaning of the "fixed" utterance.  
However, we need not draw skeptical conclusions. We can explore different possibilities 
by fixing some speaker-utterance attributions and not others. Moreover, we could start in a very 
simple way, by fixing, ex hypothesi, all or most of all subsequent instances of unstable or 
indeterminate speaker-utterance attributions. The combinatory possibilities are innumerable, and 
they all open up interesting, concrete interpretive paths that yield different scenarios, different 
psychological and intersubjective scenarios, within the same scene, episode, or chain of 
episodes.30
  
																																																								
30 A caveat: it is not possible to settle on any one interpretation, but this doesn't mean that we can simply 
read anything we want into the episode, for the "brute elementary data" (pace Arendt), or basic "facts" are 
indisputable, and impose constraints on their interpretation. In the scene at hand: Laura said she had no 
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The text, then, demands that we entertain a wide range of possibilities, excluding the 
possibility of adjudicating among them. Now, the widespread critical tendency is the opposite. 
As said above, most critical accounts tend to fix speaker-utterance attributions arbitrarily, and to 
regard them, at best, as the central or most important ones; and, at worst, as the only possible 
ones.  
Not only does this tendency exert violence on the text (for there is no textual support to 
favor one interpretation over others --let us emphasize: not just over one other, for, as we hope to 
have shown, what's at stake is not an issue of ambiguity between two interpretations); not only 
does it impoverish the interpretive suggestions of the text; worse, it also contributes to reinforce 
the dichotomic, irreconcilable, gridlocked "stalemate" among different accounts of Argentina's 
ties vis-à-vis political violence.  
If what has been argued so far is accepted, we would have to accept too that Alcoba's text 
shows us not only that our interpretive practices exert violence on, and distort, the text, but also 
that -- regarding the events in question -- it is certainly too soon to judge (i.e., to draw normative 
conclusions). Moreover, it is too soon even to think that we have a minimally or sufficiently 
elaborate descriptive view (i.e., a minimally “thick” and nuanced descriptive view of the events 
in question). If the few but very different interpretive possibilities sketched above are plausible --
and let us emphasize that they all refer to one event involving three people in one single 
(his)story of one single thread of Argentina's Dirty War ---then, a much more complex picture of 
the seventies begins to emerge in the interpretive horizon of Manèges; a picture that doesn’t 
allow for, or that shows the inadequacy of, dichotomized, polarized views.  																																																																																																																																																																																		
last name; her mother stormed into the kitchen in anger, and an argument ensued. These “hard facts” set 
parameters allow us to rule out certain interpretations.  
 116 
 
3.3 Memory, Sociality, Agency: Self and Judgment in (Reading) Manèges  
 
It is quite telling that Laura appears to have forgotten --erased, pace Abad? -the whole 
episode in which she told her neighbor that she had no last name (including the belated 
realization that her answer was far from convincing). It wasn’t until the reconstruction she 
engaged in with the help of Diana that she managed to remember (not without lacunae and 
uncertainties) the main features of the episode. This suggests, on first blush, a view on memory 
not quite identical with, but resembling that of, the intersubjective views discussed in regard to 
Traiciones and Los rubios.  
Again, as in Carri and Abad, we find a variation of the notion that the reconstruction of a 
fragile memory can hardly be elaborated in the isolation or solipsistic space of a Cartesian 
cogito, nor in the restrictive confines of (many) liberal conceptions of the self, according to 
which one's memories are conceived of, as it were, under the model of --or from the standpoint 
and standards of --ownership in general, and property ownership in particular. If this is so, my 
memories are not altogether "mine" if they are in whatever ways "mixed" with yours, for, if that 
happens, my memories lose their (and ipso facto my) uniqueness as an individual (property of 
my)self.  
Instead, as in Abad and Carri --memory (both collective and personal), as well as identity 
and other related notions (e.g., agency, autonomy, etc.), is presented mostly qua intersubjective 
activity. The flipside, however, is that when intersubjective activity is restricted, reduced, or 
subjected to detrimental circumstances --as is the case of the process the guerrilla cell is 
undergoing --the effects on one's identity and related features is much more pronounced. And 
this is, it would seem, the situation Laura finds herself in. 
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The mounting pressures and the increasing isolation, in addition to Laura's cunning and 
eagerness to be part of her little community's "world," gradually lead the guerrillas to give Laura 
more space in their activities. They oscillate between treating her almost as another member of 
the cell, and refocusing on the fact that she is, after all, a 7-year old. That is, they oscillate 
between attributing to Laura character traits and abilities of an adult (along with their attendant 
agential features) and recalibrating these attributions to those of a child.  
By the same token, Laura wavered between prolonged moments in which what 
predominated in her was the desire to be, and behave like, an adult—in part, driven by the desire, 
and even anxiety, of Laura (and in this she displays a feature common to Argentine middle-class 
children) to please her mother—and moments in which she became dimly aware that there was 
something amiss in her almost-impossible attempt to fit an impossibly stretched-out set of 
shifting roles.31
  
A case in point is that of the relationship Laura establishes with an external militante. 
Besides the members of the guerrilla cell, two "external" cadres visited the house to build the 
embute: “the Worker, and “the Engineer.”  
Laura begins to spend time at the working zone, intrigued by the construction, and is 
pleased with the conversation she begins to have with the Engineer, while he supervises the 
remodeling of the house. During one of their encounters, he tells her that his design and 
architectural plans for this embute were inspired by Poe’s "The Purloined Letter," which captures 
Laura's imagination.  
																																																								
31 
 
In these moments, she felt outbursts of childlike “cravings” for playing games and partaking in 
activities conventionally associated to her coevals. Diana, who would give birth in a few months, often 
indulged her, playing with her, but also giving her school-like lessons.  
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The imminence of the Engineer's arrival energizes Laura. "Each time the Engineer comes 
to the house to work, I rush to the construction area” (“Chaque fois que l’Ingénieur vient 
travailler a la maison, je me précipite sur le chantier,” 60) she says, , as if the distances within the 
small house of rabbits justified or even allowed one to "rush" or run anywhere. The actual house 
is small; the patio where the "construction area" was located, even smaller; the false wall that hid 
the embute before the brutal military crackdown obliterated the area no longer exists, but there is 
a line of bricks or traces of bricks that survived the attack, which gives an idea of the 
approximate dimensions of each of the "areas" Laura inhabited. One would be hard-pressed to 
speak of "amplitude" in such reduced spaces, let alone "rush" or run toward the "working zone." 
Laura’s spatial perception, then, is likely influenced by her emotions, feelings, and expectations. 
Captivated by the mechanism of the embute, she has now something to look forward to – 
a sense of possibility that opens up and gives amplitude to the house, which seems to swell up or 
shrink with the ebbs and tides of Laura’s perceptual and emotional states. 
When the Engineer finishes the embute and shows his work to Laura, he is euphoric; his 
work is impeccable; he praises and thanks Poe's story again, and then explains to Laura how 
even the remote-control system that opens and closes the doors --two loose wires --would be 
absolutely hidden by being absolutely exposed; that is to say, hidden in broad daylight: resting 
on a visible corner, as if left there by dint of negligence or clumsiness.  
 “Everything's working perfectly well,”, he says. “Soon I'll stop coming, and you won't 
see me again” (“Tout fonctionne à la perfection . Bientôt, tu ne me verras plus.). Laura is taken 
aback, and rests her gaze on his face.  
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Se tournant vers moi tandis qu’il teste une nouvelle fois le dispositif d’ouverture et de 
fermeture de la porte d’el embute, il prononce ces mots avec un grand sourire qui 
illumine son visage tout entier. Je n‘avais jamais remarqué à quel point il était beau. Ses 
cheveux sont très foncés, presque noirs, mais sa peau est claire, laiteuse. Quant à ses 
yeux, je ne saurais dire de quelle couleur ils sont exactement. Gris-bleu, gris-vert ? C’est 
que la couleur de ses yeux change selon le temps qu’il fait, selon la lumière aussi, et puis, 
je crois, selon son intention à lui, selon l’éclat qu’il veut bien leur donner … il est bien 
plus grand et élancé, me semble-t-il. Je me sens si petite á côté de lui... (60) 
 
 
Laura stalls, her back pressed against the last false wall of the housee that hides the 
embute, and plays with her hair. Then she musters courage and says, “It’s awesome, this thing 
you’ve done. Maybe you could build another embute, a smaller one, in the house? I don’t 
know… In  the living-room, or in my bedroom, for instance » (“C’est génial, ce que tu as 
fait…Tu pourrais peut-être faire un autre embute, plus petit, dans la Maison. Je ne sais pas... 
Dans le salon, ou dans ma chambre, par exemple ;60). 
The Engineer laughs heartily, and explains he has to go work elsewhere. Embarrassed, 
Laura retreats to her room. Note the inverted, or disarrayed, chronology:  
“Je me sens vraiment ridicule de lui avoir demandé ça. Je crois même que lorsque j’ai 
entendu son éclat de rire, j’ai rougi,” is a commentary that entails some distance in time, and not 
the immediacy that the sntence-order suggests. Only after that reflection does she  « return » 
« return » to the patio, about to retreat to her room, where she will wonder « I think I blushed as 
soon as I herad him lough” (61).  
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She rummages through her clothes and moves things around, pretending to be busy, but 
she tells herself, “I’ve wanted to play the adult, the militante, the housewife, but I know well that 
I’m small, wholly small, incredibly small” (“J'ai voulu jouer à l'adulte, a la militante, a la 
maitresse de maison, mais je sais bien que je suis petite, toute petite, incroyablement petite 
même. " (61)   
Regrettably, other than a bowdlerized observation to the effect that Laura feels "un cierto 
enamoramiento" (“a sort of crush” Daona 2013); or that the text is humorously suggesting a fake 
erotic attraction to argue that her interest in the Engineer operates merely as a deviation from, or 
rejection of, concerns about the relevance of the Montoneros cause (Santos 2015),32 the clear 
markers of a sexualized child - more so: of a sexualized girl-child -- have been for the most part 
gone unnoticed, ignored, or smoothed over.  
Interestingly, her being “petite,” or, rather, that condition of “smallness,” of which Laura 
speaks, is quite semantically dense: at times it seems she refers to being a child ; other times, to a 
sheer matter of size, and not age or any normatively related notions of adequacy or inadequacy, 
propriety or impropriety. Other times, instead, she does seem to refer to inadequacy, but not of a 
moral, but a physical and (perhaps) psychological sort, unrelated to her age or considerations 
regarding her status as a child, but, rather, as an inadequacy that doesn't allow her to fulfill her 
desires: she wants to help Diana kill the rabbit that will be their dinner, and she blames her being 
petite again. However, "petite" is often attached to the very objects of her desire: recall that she 
																																																								
32 Santos 2015 ingeniously remarks that “il pronounce cet mots” includes the word embute, which, the 
critic observes shrewdly and humorously, involves, if we imagine or mimic the pronunciation of the 
word, a movement of the lips looking as if they were giving a invisible kiss.  
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referred to the embute as "cette petite piece secrete" (57);" [this small secret room]; she asks the 
Engineer to build "un autre embute, plus petite… dans ma chambre" (61).   
In this connection, Sarah Ahmed’s view on space, orientation, and desire could be a lens 
through which we may have an initial grip on these issues: “If orientation is a matter of how we 
reside in space,” Ahmed writes, “then sexual orientation might also be a matter of residence; of 
how we inhabit spaces as well as 'who" or "what " we inhabit spaces with " (Ahmed 2006, p. 1). 
This attempt to rethink the “sexualization of space, as well as the spatiality of sexual desire" may 
be judged, the theorist says not without playful yet serious irony, “odd, bent, and twisted” (and 
so much so, let us add, in the case of the more widespread, normative views of infancy). Ahmed 
hastens to add that the role of spatial proximity with other bodies doesn't exhaust the analysis, 
nor other, grimmer possibilities that are, in some cases, a cause, and in others, an effect, of 
disorientation, which affects the spatial and affective (and sexualized) relations among people 
and objects. 
Also, if, as seen above, losing her last name accentuates what could be called a “pre-
disappearance process,” (i.e., an increasing process of social isolation), it is also the case that 
restrictions in (or, conversely, expansions of) her agential attributions accentuate the tensions 
involved in the constitution of Laura's sense of self. Socially transmitted in linguistic and non-
linguistic forms, these agential attributions include naming certain traits or abilities (as well as 
actions or concepts tied to those traits or abilities), and/or ascribing them to this or that person 
without explicit naming (e.g., expressed in commands or requests based on the assumption that 
one has the requisite ability to perform them).  
Bracketing the factual or fictional status of (some or all) scenes in Manèges, the uneasy 
balance between attributions that become agency-enhancing, and those that are agency-thwarting 
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– amply documented by varied ongoing research programs (Ahmed 2006 and 2010; Susan James 
2015; Velleman 2009 and 2013) --is vividly incarnated in Laura-qua-girl, and perhaps in Laura-
qua-adult as well.  
But this isn't the whole story, for, in addition to the external pressures --the externally 
imposed isolation --there is a well-documented phenomenon that in a way intersects with, or, in 
the complex constellation of factors at play, worsens, the effects of external isolation; namely, 
the attempt made by most militantes to pull in the opposite direction: to intensify and strengthen 
the social bonds among members of the same cell, and the tendency to weaken those with non-
members, as was mentioned briefly with regard to the testimony of Roberto Carri’s unidentified 
friend in Los rubios (Vezetti 2002 and 2009; Ollier 2009).  
Once the Engineer is done and stops coming to the house, Laura's social life is virtually 
reduced to her interactions with Diana, very sporadic meetings of all the cell members -- five or 
six people -- and brief conversations with her mother, who works non-stop in the depth of the 
printing press, so close and yet so far from her daughter.  
News of the military's crackdowns on houses and embutes, murders and disappearances, 
turns the house of rabbits into a fragile hiding place. The unmentioned thought that theirs might 
be the next safe house to fall turns everyday contacts and sounds from the external world into 
ominous, possibly mortally dangerous signs. Only Diana and Laura are in the house when the 
door knocks, and “Diana too was in fear” (“Diana aussi a eu peur” (116), we read, not fully 
aware yet of the reasons why the text should emphasize Diana’s fear. 
In any case, , Diana walks slowly toward the door. Laura is terrified, and her reaction 
brings to mind the brief passage by Ahmed, though showing a different nuance; it lends itself, in 
fact, to a variety of approaches. Suffice it, for now, just to highlight her simultaneous desire to 
 123 
 
hide (and survive); and the seemingly contradictory desire to adjust her movements to the 
rhythm of Diana’s, and to blend or fade into her until she disappears:  
 
accrochée à sa robe, des deux mains, me cachant derrière elle, marchant au même 
rythme que Diana. Je ne sais pas si c’est était pour être encore plus près d’elle.  J’aurais 
peut-être voulu qu’elle me prenne dans ses bras. Je crois que j’aurais voulu surtout 
coller à son mouvement a elle, m’y fondre au point de disparaître. (Weaved into her 
robe, holding tight with my hands, I hid behind her, walking at her same pace. I don’t 
know whether I did so to be even closer to her. I wanted, perhaps, that she take me in 
her arms. I think I would’ve wanted, more than anything, to adjust to her movement and 
let go, dissolving in until I disappeared; 117). 
 
Again, an abrupt shift. When Laura recognized the voice of the blond neighbor of the 
thousand shoes, she breathed again. Would  Laura want to come over for a cup of tea?  
But let us go back to the kitchen scene, triggered, precisely, by the previous tea-party 
with the neighbor: Laura's feeling of vulnerability first, and panic soon thereafter, when she was 
asked her last name, would seem to show that she is aware --in however inchoate a way, i.e., at 
an emotional level, at least -of the state of suspension she is in. If and when her new (counterfeit) 
papers arrive, she will be able to have a name. Until then, she will remain in a state of 
uncertainty regarding something as deeply attached to one's sense of identity as one's very name.  
Being asked her name and being unable to answer such a simple question was a painful 
confirmation of her suspended status in the world of the living. Granted, a name is a convention, 
but one that not only children, but also adults, find of importance for their sense of identity. It's 
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not by chance --no pun intended --that, upon being hurled into any of the more than 300 illegal 
detention centers that were active during the military regime, the first thing military personnel 
used to do to the newcomer --the soon-to-be disappeared --was to deprive her of her name, and 
replace it with a number.  
If a paradigmatic scene that shows the operation of free indirect discourse revolves 
around hiding Laura's last name, another scene revealing of yet another strategy central to 
Manèges revolves around unwittingly displaying her last name. Laura is wearing a sweater that 
has, in embroidered, small letters, the name of her uncle—that is, her father’s last name --which 
would easily give them away. One of the cell members begins to chastise Laura for being so 
negligent. In the previous pages, the narrative had consistently and gradually built up and 
configured a Laura fairly well adjusted to her role of the careful, adult guerrilla, so when the man 
begins to chastise her, we are disposed to "take sides" --to "side" with him --and reproach Laura, 
until (one would hope) we "catch ourselves:" we realize or "remember" that we are siding with 
an adult who is verbally abusing a 7-year old. Presumably, we shift from siding with the adult 
abusing Laura, to reframing our interpretation, and, at the very least, to wonder about the 
appropriateness of attributing such responsibility to a 7-year old. We may go further and "side" 
with the girl, while, correlatively, censoring her abuser.  
The kind and degree of reader's endorsement or "siding" with one character or the other is 
very likely to be variable. Yet, it need not be a strong empathetic reaction, whereby the reader 
vicariously experiences a (variable) array of affective engagements. As Angela Smith and 
Jennifer Saul have forcefully argued, the mere (and even transitory) absence of attitudinal 
stances (e.g., cognitive or affective discomfort or dissonance) that we would consider an 
appropriate way of being “attuned” to events (e.g, our relative—again, even if transitory—
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“indifference” to the scene of brutal verbal abuse) constitutes sufficient grounds for questioning 
in our capacity to judge and evaluate actions (Smith 2004 and 2006; Saul 2015).33
  
Are we, or have we been, vicariously complicit in a scape-goating process? From the 
safety of our abrupt shift --siding with Laura, against the man --we may hasten to deny it; or we 
may acknowledge a minimal degree of "distraction." If Laura --wholeheartedly, it would seem --
blames herself and believes she is entirely responsible for putting the whole guerrilla cell in 
danger, we, as readers, may conceive of ourselves as witnesses, or even bystanders. Yet this is a 
subject position that doesn’t entail being free from responsibility, as the “distraction” in which 
Manèges made us slip shows. Again, a minimally honest assessment reveals that, if only for a 
shortest instant, we were impassive or mildly supportive of a scapegoating process that targeted a 
7-year old.  
It might be something more (or less) than a scape-goating process. The five or six people 
who live in the safe-house --the house of rabbits --are all under pressure, barely able to meet the 																																																								
33 We caught ourselves siding with the adult, and going ahead with scape-goating Laura. But, is this so 
serious? Wasn't it a mild, harmless shift in a readers' attitudinal "orientation," which is rapidly corrected 
and doesn't lead to harmful behavior? Sara Ahmed, Harry Frankfurt, Angela Smith, and David Velleman 
are but a few scholars who would question this claim. From very different starting points and theoretical 
commitments, they redefine the space and range of effects of "activity" (i.e., not full-fledged action, and 
yet an attitudinal stance that transpires and has a variety of positive or negative valences) and "passivity," 
the latter conceived of not as "quietism" or "suffering" or "immobility," but --in the versions I find most 
persuasive --as a stance based on "I cannot rise to the occasion," says Laura ("No estoy a la altura [de las 
circunstancias]"), or --in the original French, there is a non-humorous pun that conveys both Laura’s 
taking responsibility (i.e., a result of her victimization?) and the acknowledgment --perhaps elliptical --
that she is just a child: “Je ne suis pas à l’hateur.” The "original French," is, perhaps, a bit of a misnomer, 
given the interplay between Alcoba’s French and her Spanish "translation," which is yet another instance 
of hybrid suspension or in-between languages.  
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minimum requirements of a life that wouldn't look suspicious, while trying not to leave the 
house, because being outside always entails the risk of being stopped by the police, the military, 
or the paramilitary cracking down on guerrillas or suspected guerrillas. Could the adults, then, be 
checking every detail? Shouldn't Laura --so precocious and smart in so many respects --take care 
of something so (purportedly) obvious like not letting her last name be shown?  
The episode, then, might be not just an instance of scape-goating. Granted, on the face of 
it, it'd seem to fall squarely under scape-goating, but upon reflection it might be regarded as a 
blurry zone in which scapegoating and impossible double-binds intersect. In turn, the reader's 
judgment (or the judgment we pass on the reader?) also breaks down, and cannot fit the neat 
distinctions of the grid made by the concepts of perpetrator, victim, witness, bystander, and the 
related concepts of gray zone, double-bind, scapegoating. In this failure, the text is implicating us 
in a way that puts pressure on our conceptualization of the events we are reading about, as much 
as on our conceptualization of ourselves as interpreters.  
In a way, Manèges --and, from different angles, Los rubios and Traiciones as well --
respond to the need for a more nuanced, fine-grained elaboration of categories that have begun to 
be used, more often than not, as facile end-points, when they should be starting points to begin to 
grapple with these issues; conversation starters, and not conversation-stoppers. It would seem 
that placing Laura in the broad category of victim, and the Engineer in the broad category of 
perpetrator (or, let us say, in the slightly more nuanced but still insufficient category of forced 
perpetrator, or victim-turned perpetrator); our understanding and judgment of the events were 
close to being satisfactory.  
If this is our conclusion, one would be hard-pressed not to wonder whether "reasoning" 
pieces of this kind are the expression of intellectual laziness, compassion-and/or evil-fatigue, or 
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fascination with the roles of victim and perpetrator --or whichever combination of the above one 
could think of  (LaCapra 2009; 2013). 
The insufficiency of the above considerations --including the suggestion to characterize 
these episodes as in-between phenomena, at the intersection of scapegoating and double-binds --
suggests a further interpretive move, which, while not yet minimally adequate, unveils or calls 
attention to these inadequacies. To call it an "interpretive move" might be too generous. It is, 
rather, an observation aimed at blocking the temptation to feel satisfied with the above 
considerations. Namely, if all we've done is shift from siding with one character to siding with 
the other --aren't we still within the binary logic of friend and foe; within dichotomy structures 
that our interpretive practices have been trying so hard to leave behind --and for the most part 
failed to do?  
Put differently, this oscillation between siding with the adult, and siding with Laura, 
complex and richly layered as it may be (re)conceptualized, thorny as the double-bind nature of 
the oscillation is, does not escape, if we leave it at that, a deeply binary "trap:" Is the moral of the 
story that we are in a state of suspension between two alternatives, i.e., between finding 
ourselves, at times, either sideling with the "bad guy" and, other times, with the "innocent" 
victim?  
In sum, unless we do work out a more fitting schema or conceptualization of the grid, we 
might be moving too quickly, unwittingly or not, toward yet another dichotomic, double-bind 
conclusion, which would, quite likely, put an end to a discussion that has barely begun.34
  
This 
																																																								
34 Happy as we may have been to characterize the episode as a case of scape-goating-meets-double binds, 
to think that thus we are not presenting a simplistic picture is a bit too quick --or naïve, or facile. 
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very lack of solid ground that Manèges sheds light on reminds us that there is a sore need to 
focus on these loci of violence, vulnerability, and precariousness that yoke large groups of 
people, as much as large, if weakened, capacities or frameworks of description and judgment. 
Like Traiciones, the performative loop in Manèges undermines (or gives us a more precise view 
of) our limited epistemic position. Unlike Traiciones, the focus isn't our own memory, but our 
view of self-knowledge and self-interpretation, which bears strongly on antagonistic discussion, 
as well as on (or as a function of) the confidence with which we hold our convictions, weigh 
evidence for or against them, and are willing to change our minds in light of evidence contrary to 
them.  
In sum, it bears strongly on our capacity and flexibility to see, hear, and evaluate 
phenomena about which we were not aware, or about which we hold deeply ingrained 
convictions. Performative “loops” of this sort weigh against Manichean views that are still very 
much alive in the memory regimes of the seventies. Furthermore, they put into question both the 
assumption of societal “innocence” --and the opposite tendency: the hasty condemnation and 
demonization of sociopolitical actors, who acted, or failed to act, in ways that are prescribed 
according to present-day, hindsight-influenced, and ideologically-driven standards.  
Now, is this exercise in close reading doing enough “work” to justify drawing 
conclusions about issues concerning the politics of memory and recent history? On its own, it 
might not. However, if – in addition to the exploration of the intra-textual operations driven by 
the text’s centrifugal impetus – we take heed of the second “condition” imposed by the text --- 
i.e., the need to go beyond the text to restore (part of) its context -- our situation qua interpreters 																																																																																																																																																																																		
Certainly, each of the two are, on their own, complex and "unthinkable" enough; compounded, they are 
certainly formidable; regarded as closing the discussion, unacceptable.  
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may change. That is, provided we take seriously the fact that Manèges points in many directions 
outside and beyond itself, in a centripetal impetus that blurs the borders between text and world.  
   
3.4 Context and Restitution. Puzzled Letters. 
 
Earlier, we mentioned and touched upon a third text, in addition to the Prologue and 
Epilogue, in which Alcoba-qua-author explains a particularly important aspect of her research.  
The word embute was the first thing that came back to her “from the instant when I started to 
look into my memories” [“[d]és l’instant où j’ai commencé à fouiller dans mes souvenirs.”] (49).  
She tells us how strange it was to remember the word, but not its meaning, and how much 
stranger it was to pronounce it and feel a flood of memories streaming down through her – but 
the meaning of the word still eluding her. “Car ce terme tant de fois prononcé et entendu, 
indissociablement lié à ces morceux d’enfance argentine que je m’efforçais de retrouver et de 
restituer, je ne l’avais jamais rencontré dans un autre contexte.” She searches various 
dictionaries, but, “pas de trace d’embute”  (49 ).  
Not without differences, Laura’s search brings to mind that of Abad’s. Both are rather 
bizarre, and Laura’s becomes increasingly so when she “lands” on  a Mexican blog devoted to 
“des questions sexuelles plutôt techniques et pointues.” Soon, in a grotesque, eerily funny, 
oneiric atmosphere, Laura begins to ask questions during a debate whose title seems more apt for 
a self-help book than for an obscure blog on risqué sexual practices: Beso negro is the theme 
(“black kiss” is used across Latin America in the same sense and meaning – roughly, the 
equivalent of -- the of the American English expression, “rimming”). But the debate takes place 
under the ridiculous, “Intro to X”-sounding name of Beso negro: ¿qué es?. 
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Tancredo, as if springing from the forest after killing Clorinda (Freud 1920; Caruth 1996) 
responds to Laura’s call. Alcoba writes that “one person .. under the name of Tancredo wrote: 
[n.b., in Spanish in the original) the word embute is much used by don Nadie (Mr. Nobody) ( 
“une des personnes… sous le nom Tancredo écrivait: La palabreja embute, tambieen es muy 
empleada por don Nadie” (53).  
But this Don Nadie, Monsieur Personne, or Mr. Nobody can’t be found. And, since 
everyone appears under a pseudonym, Tancredo may not be Tancredo. And Nadie, or Personne, 
or Nobody, may be nobody.   
Again the issue of names and identity. With an added component: the charged wordplay 
making a less indirect allusion to disappearances, yet one in which something close to humor 
prevails  (e.g., the aforementioned  Tancred, landmark in trauma studies, from Freud onwards, 
Caruth 2013) ; the contrasts between French, Spanish, and English: personne – nobody – sounds 
like the Spanish persona (person); and “nobody” is, if split in its two components, “no body,” 
which is the thrust of the cruel methodology of disappearances: presumably dead, but no body to 
confirm whether this is so. No corpus delicti  – an expression that blends the physical and the 
legal aspects of the crime.  
But Laura limits herself to say that don Nadie couldn’t be found. Eventually, some 
vaguely referenced Argentines tell her that the word embute “seems to belong in the jargon of the 
revolutionary movements in Argentina, dated for years, and visibly disappeared” (“semble bien 
appartenir a un forme de jargon propre aux devoted to mouvements revolutioaries argentins 
années plutôt daté et visiblement disparu (53, emphasis added). 
Again, the humorous (?) paradoxical formulation: “visibly disappeared.” And again, not a 
reference to the real desaparecidos, but to a word.  
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Lastly, the serious, authoritative authorial tone with which this short chapter began (tone, 
and content: Alcoba is apparently speaking of the search that led her to bring back the memories 
on which the book is based) gradually shifts toward an implausible, half-funny, half-grotesque, 
half-playful series of statements.  
 Like Carri, Alcoba may be not only nudging us to confirm what she is saying, but also, 
perhaps, warning us about the alleged authority of the voice of the witness or survivor. 
Alcoba’s brief embute reflection is but one of the many nudges to the reader— perhaps 
the most conceptually explicit. However, there are others, which take different forms and 
emphases. Perhaps the most urgent, in terms of the need to understand the characters and the 
sense of relevant scenes in the narrative, is the one presented in a scene in which Laura created a 
crossword puzzle.. 
Stuck in the house, Laura accepts Diana’s offer to give her grade school-like exercises. 
Now, as a surprise, Laura attempts to design a crossword puzzle – she manages four or five 
words, which she put together on the grid, laboriously and with some frustration.   
Diana approached her, looked over her shoulder, and smiled. Laura feels she partially 
succeeded, for she had chosen words to make Diana laugh [“pour faire rire Diana”] (125); also, 
words that “spoke a bit about what was happening to us” [“parlaient un peu de ce qui nous 
arrivait”] (123), since all of them alluded to Evita Montonera. Among them, “le slogan qui 
servait toujours a clore les articles les plus importants du Evita Montonera ou les declarations de 
Firmenich” (125). Next to a reproduction of the crossword puzzle, the page reads thus:  
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Horizontales: 
 
Del verbo “ir:”                                                          VA 
Imitadora fracasada y odiada:                                  ISABEL 
Del verbo “dar:”                                                       DA 
Patria o…                                                                 MUERTE       
 
Verticales: 
 
Asesino:                                                                   VIDELA 
Casualidad:                                                             ASAR 
Literatura, música:                                                 ARTE  
 
Diana points out a spelling mistake: Laura had spelled “azar” (“hasard”/"chance") with 
an “s,” that is, “asar”, or “to grill,” as Diana explains. “That’s where “asado” comes from. The 
word you’re thinking of is a noun that means or refers to the occurrence of something 
unexpected, . But it must be written with a Z” “) (“C’est de là que vient le mot asado …. Le mot 
auquel tu pensais, c’est le nom commun qui a le sens d’occasion ou événement imprévisible” 
Mais il s’écrit avec un z” (124)   
Laura’s revised version looked almost the same. She simply changed one spelling 
mistake for another: she corrected “azar,” so that the word she so much loved be correctly 
spelled, but inevitably turning “Isabel” into “Izabel.” She made, however, a minor revision in the 
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directions. To the original line – “Imitadora fracasada y odiada,” (in Spansih in the original; 
“Hated and Failed Imitator”) she added a parenthetical clarification. So, the initial line, 
 
Imitadora fracasada y odiada:                                                            ISABEL  
 
became, 
 
Imitadora fracasada y odiada (con una falta de ortografía):      IZABEL 
 
All Laura did was have the courtesy of warning her reader that there is a spelling mistake. 
Perhaps, this is yet another displacement: if the verb “to disappear” is seldom used to refer to the 
“methodology” of the military regime, but to losing everyday objects; if there’s not a single 
gunshot or drop of blood in the whole book, but the streets are criblée des trous (16), perhaps 
Laura’s “trick” is yet another displacement -- an allusion to the complex, often confusing, 
relationship between words and world.   
Laura doesn’t change the object to which the definition refers (i.e., she doesn’t change 
the word, “Isabel,” which is the “object’ to which the definition refers—the “reference,” one 
might be tempted to say). Instead, she changes the definition or "description" of that "reference," 
so that there is an artificial "fit" between definition and word – between description and reality, 
so to speak.  
This move – changing the definition or description, as if that were to change reality – was 
a move typical of the military regime, and, according to Rodolfo Walsh's critical reports to the 
CN of Montoneros, an error the organization was prone to committing, too (Walsh 1976).  That 
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is, assuming, for the sake of argument, that nouns can be regarded, even if playfully, as “second-
order” objects, which we identify by way of descriptions or definitions.  Of course, proper names 
make things much more complicated, so, changing the “description” of “Isabel” is not such an 
easy compromise as Laura tends to think. Ironically, a proper name—a proper last name – is 
what Laura is missing; or omitting. Still, when she receives her new false name, which one will 
be her “real” name?  
The configuration of the tensions between performance qua acting and “identity,” and 
between original and copy, are given here another turn . If in Traiciones, Roux obliterated the 
distinction between original and copy by drawing a “new’ original from a “copy” whose “real” 
“original” was in the hands of Mr. Rey, , which one is Laura’s name? Which papers stipulate her 
real name? In a crossword puzzle, she can resort to facile solutions. But, as we have seen in the 
kitchen-neighbor scene, things aren’t so easy in the real world.35 
Now, what to make of the crossword puzzle proper? The plea to go beyond the text in 
order to restore -- reponer or restituer -- the necessary context couldn’t be clearer. First, all 
foreign editions of Manèges feature the puzzle –and the “directions” -- in Spanish. So does the 
original French edition. The first step, then, will involve a dictionary. But soon we should realize 
that, like the suicidal translator in “Nota al pie,” a dictionary won’t really help. His Appleton was 
no longer useful. Likewise, What use could we make of knowing that “imitadora” is the feminine 
form of “imitator” or someone who mimics or pretends to be someone else, whether in jest or 																																																								
35 During the neighbor episode, Laura had sensibly wondered, « Je crois qu’elle m’a demandé : « Et ton 
nom de famille ? » …Ça n’existe pas une petite fille de sept ans qui ne connaît pas son nom de famille et 
qui pense qu’il est possible de ne pas en avoir… Mais qu’est-ce que je pouvais répondre, alors ? C’est 
quoi, mon nom ? (73)  
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with the intention to deceive? One may start with some general background information – a few 
lines in a footnote36 can dispel some doubts – or, perhaps, we might get to understand the brief 
sentence, “Failed and hated imitator” or perhaps “failed and hated fake. “But, in what sense is 
that related to Isabel? And why would “Patria o Muerte” would make Diana laugh? 
In the absence of a minimum of historical knowledge, we can hardly make sense of any 
of these questions; and, insofar as they are relevant to understand Diana (as well as many issues 
of the narrative), we can hardly make sense of relevant aspects of the narrative. In this case, 
contextual information – the second condition imposed by these texts – seems to be not a luxury 
but a condition of possibility of reading itself. 
																																																								
36 The first three words are, Muerte, Videla, and Isabel, i.e, "Death," "Videla" (at the time of the events, 
Gral. Videla was de facto President and head of the military junta); "Isabel" was the nickname of María 
Estela Martínez, maiden name of Mrs. Perón, who came to marry the exiled leader years after the death of 
Eva, and years still before he could come back. But when he returned in 1973 and ran for President, he 
chose her as running mate;; no one quite liked it – or her --, but still, he won with over 62% of the votes 
with the ticket “Perón- Perón;”’ took office, held the Presidency for nine turbulent months, and died on 
July 1, 1974. Then, Isabel, VP, was sworn in. It would be Jose Lopez Rega, personal secretary of Perón 
for over a decade, the one making major political and policy decisions. Former policeman, rabid anti-
Communist, and head of the Ministry of Welfare (appointed by Perón himself), the Minister was in 
charge of attending to the needs of the health-care system, of unions and professional associations, and, 
among many other things, of commanding and equipping the paramilitary death-squads of the AAA— 
mentioned by 7-year old Laura on the first page of her book. The other words were Va, Dar, Arte, and 
Azar, i.e., "[He or she] goes," "To give," "Art" and "Chance," which -- Laura says -- was formed by 
chance, while she was working on two other crossed words. 36  The crossings, if we go back to the 
previous page, permit reading fragmentary phrases such as VA – ISABEL – DAR – MUERTE (“Dar 
muerte,” in Spanish, means “to murder” The death-squads began to operate under her Presidency; 
possible under her husband’s) 
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The first place to look for, we hope it is evident by now, is Evita Montonera proper.  
Evita Montonera, the whole reason why everyone is risking their lives in the rabbit house, is 
withheld from us; but scenes like this one strongly suggest that it is on us to search for the Evitas 
and try to make sense of Diana’s (and the whole cell’s) actions.  
And, as it wouldn’t be hard to guess, a fairly simple internet search can take us to reliable 
sources where the collection of Evitas can be downloaded in PDF form. 
 The juxtaposition and parallel reading of the Evitas and Manèges takes on, somehow, a 
form analogous to that of some of Traiciones' texts (e.g., recall the juxtaposition of the US State 
Department memos on the "detention" of Susana Panero, who might have led to the Borges 
poems: no commentary on the juxtaposed texts). 
 Before taking a quick look at the issues of Evita Montonera corresponding to the period 
in which Laura Alcoba lived in the "rabbit house" --from late 1975 through July/August 1976) –
let us give a brief overview of the “ending” of Laura-qua-girl’s story. 
Her narrative closes in a few deceptively brief pages. By mid-1976, Laura’s mother 
negotiates a way out --she wants to take her daughter away from the rabbit house, with a view of 
going into exile. After some protracted negotiations, she is allowed to leave. 
The story narrated by Laura-qua-child ends here. There follows a transition toward the 
epilogue-letter; this transition takes the form of brief paragraphs separated by asterisks, which 
highlight the main points of her post-rabbit-house life, from a guarded, low-profile stay at her 
grandparents,' through her trip to France, once the new papers finally arrived.  
After the last asterisk, the text takes on a more explicit letter-like "tone" and form of 
address, which, like the prologue-letter, bears all the markers of authorial texts that precede 
and/or succeed fictional and non-fictional narratives (e.g., prologues, introductions, epilogues or 
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post-scripts, etc.). Therein, Alcoba recounts how she learned of the attack on the house of 
rabbits, referencing a conversation with her mother as well as the laconic words of her father, 
who gave her the well-known and much-debated book, Los del 73. Memoria Montonera, from 
which she quotes the account of the attack on the house of rabbits; she also cites excerpts from a 
newspaper piece (quoted in the aforesaid book), which cites, in turn, the official military 
communiqué. (Note the layers of mediation, which, strictly speaking, aren’t necessary). 
The seven montoneros – Diana among them – contained the attack for almost four hours. 
Only when mortars and other light artillery were brought to the place and used to blast the walls 
did the military forces manage to break into the house and murder the seven youth. (Painceira 
2007; 2010).37 They murdered everybody, except the one-month old daughter of Diana and 
Daniel, who was taken alive, and “placed” into a military or pro-military family. 
In 2004 --we are told in the epilogue-letter --Alcoba visits Chicha Mariani, and they go 
together to the house of rabbits, which has become an important sitio de memoria. (Wallas 2013; 																																																								
37 In what was probably an unintentional admission, the official account coincides for the most part with 
the manifold accounts that have since then been amply documented: police and military forces surrounded 
the house; snipers and machine-gun teams took aim from the roofs of neighboring houses; and yet, Diana 
and six other cadres contained the military for three hours and forty-five minutes, armed with FALs 
(semi-automatic rifles) and .45 mm pistols. Only when reinforcements carrying mortars and other light 
artillery were brought to the place did the military forces manage to break into the house and machine-
gun the seven montoneros.  See Painceira 2007, probably the most reliable study of the last days of, and 
the attack on, the house of rabbits, its repercussions, and the still unsolved gaps in the events that 
followed, including questions regarding the disappearance of the body of Diana --machine-gunned from 
behind, but subsequently burnt and carbonized in situ --and the fate of her daughter, Clara Anahí, who 
was taken alive by the military, and to this day searched relentlessly by Chicha Mariani, first on her own, 
then as founding member of Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, and nowadays from the Clara Anahí Foundation, 
an NGO created as an institutional resource against past and present political and social 
“disappearances.” 
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2014). With some difficulty, Alcoba asks how the military found out about the guerrilla cell and 
the printing press. Mariani tells her that the information was given away by the man who built 
the printing press—the Engineer.  
Alcoba protests: he didn’t know where the house was. He had always been brought to the 
house “tabicado” (blindfolded).   
Mariani explains that he didn’t have to know where the house was. It was more than 
sufficient to know, as he did, how to look for the house. Since he had designed and built a whole 
new part of the property, where he had set up the embute and the printing press, he would be able 
to identify it, provided his point of view was that of a regular designer or architect when looking 
at the “map” or on-paper design  (now, mostly on computer) displayed on a big design-table 
when they work—or when they show their customers the way the house is coming. These 
“maps” are, one could say, drawings on scale seen from above.  
Chicha Mariani explains that the military combed the whole city in helicopters, block by 
block, with the Engineer to tell them which was the house (130).   
Alcoba is stunned. She regains some composure, and says to herself, as if to confirm 
what she’s heard, “C’était donc l’Ingénieur” [So it was the Engineer] and, with an eerily aloof, 
cold tone, she wonders, “Avait-il infiltré le mouvement dès le début, ou avait-il tout simplement 
craquée sous la torture?” [Had he infiltrated the organization from the beginning, or did he 
simply break down under torture?”] (139-40) 
Soon thereafter, Alcoba picks up “The Purloined Letter,” and begins to read. When she 
reaches the passage in which Dupin explains his theory, Alcoba remembers very vividly the 
Engineer. But she is more specific about what she remembers: “Je me souvenais avec une grande 
netteté de son regard et de son sourire tandis qu’il exposait sa théorie.  C’était étrange d’entendre 
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ainsi, de nouveau, l’ingénieur, derrière les mots de Dupin” (I remembered with palpable clarity 
his eyes and his smile while he presented his theory. It was strange to listen to the Engineer 
again, behind the words of Dupin; 140).  
The memories of the Engineer while explaining Poe’s theory come back to her ; and, with 
them, the attraction she felt for him. If the scene of Laura-qua-child approaching the Engineer 
was lost on the reader, the lexical choices might help. Now, in 2004, she speaks of “son regard et 
de son sourire.” Thirty years and thirty pages earlier, she had referred to his big, grans smile that 
lit (or “illuminated: “brightened) him entirely” (his “grand sourire qui illumine son visage tout 
entire,”)“ adding that she’d never admitted the extent of his good looks.  
But the Engineer’s voice in Dupin’s words., bringing  memories with erotic undertones, , 
are suddenly interrupted. “The famous passage about “excessive evidence” left me frozen. I 
reread, unable to believe at first; horrified later. I have read I more than once since then. (“le 
fameux passage sur  “excessive evidence” m’a glacée. Je l’ai immédiatement relu, incrédule 
d’abord. Puis épouvantée. Depuis, je l’ai relu plus d’une fois.” (141) 
She reproduces the famous ten lines in which Dupin describes the game.  
Yet then again, immediately after quoting the short passage, Alcoba writes, 
straightforwardly, with candid bravery, that since she read that passage, she hears the clear 
pronunciation of the Engineer’s voice in her head—“Since I reread that passage listening to the 
voice of the Engineer over the words of Dupin…” (“Depuis que j’ai relu ce passage en entendant 
résonner dans ma tète la voix de l’Ingénieur sur les mots de Dupin; 141)—but thinking, in 
astonishment, how he had managed, after all, to figure out how to apply the “game” to the 
military chase of the house of rabbits; how he was “capable of reading, from the sky, the lines 
and the figures… the enormous letters, the bloated characters” that allowed him to spot the house 
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(“capable de lire, depuis le ciel, les lignes et les traits … les lettres enormes, les gros caracteres;” 
142). She wonders whether it was all part of a detailed plan; whether they were pawns in a game 
they could not control. “Il y a des manèges subtils, trop subtils… pour dominer autrui et avoir le 
dernier mot. “ (142, emphasis added). It is worth noting the contiguity between domination and 
having the last word.  
And she asks herself whether those manèges are also “[p]our retrouver une lettre volée, 
ou pour sauver sa peau, quitte à provoquer un massacre ? (“to retrieve a stolen letter, or rather, in 
order to save one’s skin, cause a massacre, or let it take place? 142) 
The appearance of symmetry, or Design -- as opposed to Chance – is clear… initially. 
Soon a sort of trompe-d-oleil complicates the problem. The binary Design-Chance rests on  the 
letters-qua-alphabet characters that she couldn’t decipher, whose initial idea rests within a letter-
qua-epistle which is part of a text (Poe’s story) within another letter that is part of yet another 
text/story (i.e, the epilogue-letter within Alcoba’s book). 
Despite this appearance of symmetry and perverse order, which might point at a secret 
design or intentionality, Laura refuses to accept such a thing, to favor that “placeholder” that 
recurs in her speech: chance— with a non-capitalized “c” (“Hasard” in the original French). 
“Non, ça ne peut être si simple. Et Poe ne peut pas être de mèche. Non. Pas plus que Dupin. Je 
veux croire qu’il y a le hasard.  Je veux croire aussi qu’il y a bien d’autres ‘excessives 
évidences” (143)  
But, at the same time, chance doesn’t fully satisfy her – was it by chance that she couldn’t 
outwit the Engineer? Neither a carefully designed plan – Design – nor mere randomness – 
Chance – seem appealing. But, is there a way out of this dichotomy?  
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Again, Alcoba as much as Abad and Carri seem to require a kind of reading that we may 
be ill-equipped to embark in. We are required to hold on to the discomfort and feeling of 
unsettlement that the compressed, cunningly crafted last pages of Manèges both instill and 
dissolve.  
As mentioned earlier, critics often refuse to accept this uncertainty, and prefer to advance 
reading hypothesis that, while not implausible, are not warranted. A recent critical piece claims 
that although Laura brings up again “the question of the intentionality and responsibility of the 
engineer,” she refuses to adjudicate on those matters, and that she prefers instead “to settle the 
sense or meaning of the story (and of History) in mere chance” [“la cuestión de la 
intencionalidad y responsabilidad del ingeniero ... [pero se resiste a atribuírsela] para asentar el 
sentido de la historia (y de la Historia) en el mero azar”] (Santos 2015, 17) 
Yet, there is no such definition. There is however, the possibility – even the imperative – 
to check out some information. Thus, the ambivalence about the Engineer, for instance, could be 
dispelled. 
Yet, immediately after wondering about the role of the Engineer in the demise of the 
house of rabbits, the authorial voice shifts and “changes the subject,” addressing Diana again, 
and at the same time asking the reader to heed the plea of Diana's mother-in-law, Chicha 
Mariani, who is still searching for her granddaughter.  
“Clara Anahí lives somewhere,” writes Alcoba. “No doubt under a different name, she 
probably ignores who were her parents and how they met their deaths.” Then, addressing Diana, 
thus reminding us that the Prologue and Epilogue are “letters” in which the “intra-textual” 
addressee is someone who isn’t there, she adds, “But I'm sure, Diana, that she has your bright 
smile, your strength, and your beauty.” (“Clara Anahí vit quelque part. Elle port sans doute un 
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autre nom, elle ignore probablement qui furent ses parents et comment ils sont morts. Mais je 
suis sûre, Diana, qu’elle a ton sourire lumineux, ta force et ta beauté,” 143). 
“This, too, is excessively obvious” (“Ça aussi, c’est d’une excessive evidence,” 143), 
ends Alcoba’s Epilogue-Letter to Diana -- and, with it, the book.  
This is, perhaps, the most explicit of the many "invitations" to go beyond the book, 
outside the text and into the "real-life" correlate of the events therein narrated. And it's also the 
most effective – and, perhaps, the most misleading, for it’s more than tempting to follow 
Alcoba’s shift and focus our attention on this issue – unquestionably important (probably one of 
the symbolic pillars of the increasingly broader political relevance and interests of Grandmothers 
of Plaza de Mayo) – but in so doing, losing sight of the other, thornier ones. 
 
3.5 Not the Last Word? To See and Not See What’s Before Us.  
 
Recall the observation and the question that Alcoba, in 2004, poses almost in passing: “It 
was, then, the Engineer. Had he infiltrated the organization from the beginning, or did he simply 
crack under torture?” (“C’était donc l’Ingénieur. Avait-il infiltré le mouvement dès le début ou 
avait-il tout simplement craque sous la torture ?)  
Here, as anticipated in the last section, the intra- and extra-textual movements must work 
in tandem. On the one hand, the derisive or cavalier attitude when referring to someone speaking 
under torture should bring to mind the two other scenes in which torture becomes part of the 
conversation. On the other hand, this seemingly extraneous issue could be construed, again, as a 
call for the reader to restitute or bring back contextual information. 
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Let us start with this last point. The presentation of the trial in absentia of Roberto Quieto 
--bracketing the appropriateness of the term "trial" --is a central feature of the 12th issue of Evita 
Montonera (December 1975/January 1976). Its complementary and (purportedly) "reinforcing" 
counterpart is also pervasive in the same and subsequent issues --and this time it does transpire in 
a few moments of Manèges: the heroic deaths of "true" revolutionaries, who --unlike Quieto --
either died in combat or (allegedly) didn't speak under torture.  
If the capacity to withstand torture is simply a matter of "ideological conviction," as the 
official line of Montoneros' held (and had published in the Evita more than once), then Quieto's 
behavior was indeed tantamount to treason, as the verdict of the trial concluded. The barrage of 
propaganda in the Evitas contrasted with the puzzled reaction of many sectors of the montonero 
militancia, for whom the issue of torture was still an open question, and for whom it was hard to 
change views about Quieto overnight.  
Needless to say, to take for granted  a sort of equivalence between speaking under torture 
and infiltrating an organization -- an equivalence between, let us say, Lt. Astiz infiltrating 
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, and Roberto Quieto’s “treason” in the torture chambers – is, at the 
very least, a proposition that cannot be accepted without reasonable argumentation and evidence.  
Some cadres were absolutely convinced that will-power and political conviction could 
win over physical and psychological pain. Others believed it could be possible; others hoped it 
would be. (Vezzetti 2009; Ollier 2009 for fieldwork on these issues).38  																																																								
38 Yet others thought it was sheer naiveté or idiocy to even entertain such an idea, which seems to rest on 
either voluntarism, or some form of dualism – a radical separation between “mind” or “soul” and “body,” 
whereby strength of the former might control and, somehow, be inaccessible to the pain of the latter. 
Others – Walsh among them – rejected the idea, and considered it was impossible to know what or how 
would one’s organism would react under extreme, limit-situations. 
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Differences notwithstanding, it is a historical fact that the normative view of the OPM 
was that a true revolutionary could, and must, withstand torture. This was a hard-and-fast 
“order” of the CN. And yet, their conceptual confusion (to put it charitably) became evident 
when they manufactured and distributed cyanide pills for their cadres. A real montonero 
withstands torture…. But how many “real montoneros” do we really have, if we must launch 
mass production of cyanide? So, while keeping the normative view on torture, the CN also 
admitted that the main error was to be captured alive. If one didn’t die in combat, and ran out of 
ammunition, the cyanide pill would take care of any potential ideological lapses. 
El Negro Quieto, as he was known and called with unanimous affection by thousands of 
working class Peronists and left-wing militantes – had been a leader of the Peronist Resistance 
from times prior to the creation of Montoneros. Unlike the younger generation that led the OPM, 
Quieto had risen from a social stratum in-between what Argentines call, rather vaguely, lower 
middle-class and the “clearer” (?) working classes (the Montonero leadership came from middle-
to upper-middle class, university-educated, Catholic background).  
Quieto had managed to earn a law degree, and moved from legal to underground battles 
against right-wing forces in light of the repeated coups that rendered legal procedures mostly 
ineffectual. Courageous but not reckless or suicidal, he was known for the careful consideration 
he gave to operations in which the lives of cadres under his command were at risk.  
When he was detained in December 1975 -- caught, inexplicably, in broad daylight, 
during a visit to his family (a visit that was meant to be short in light of the dangers that 
contacting one's family entailed by that time) -- the Montonero leadership launched a national 
and international campaign demanding that Quieto be freed. Among others, Sartre and Simone 
de Beuvoir signed the petition.  
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The campaign was halted abruptly days later, when some Montonero safehouses "fell," 
thus evincing that Quieto was, or had been, “cantando” --speaking under torture. Hence the trial 
in absentia, the death sentence, and the campaign against Quieto's reputation, backed by 
allegedly "real," "committed" revolutionary conduct whose examples flooded the pages of Evita 
Montonera.  
It is against this background that the pictures of Diana and the Engineer become more 
complex. It is against this background that one should read Diana’s words when, after meeting a 
fellow militante Diana says to Laura, "See that woman? They tortured her, but she didn’t talk. 
They did horrible things to her; you know, things one cannot talk about with a girl of your age.  
But she didn’t open her mouth.” (“Tu vois, cette femme. Elle a été torturée mais elle n’a pas 
parlé. On lui a fait des choses horribles, tu sais, des choses que l’on ne peut pas dire a une petite 
fille de ton âge. Mais elle n’a pas ouvert la bouche;” 119) 
Laura didn’t ask any questions to figure out what those things were. “I too know how not 
to talk; how to keep silent.” She just imagined them. Laura concludes with the following 
confession. “And I thought of the woman, who didn’t open her mouth…. and then I told myself . 
. . that is what being a strong woman is.” (“je me suis dit, de moi a moi, qu’être une femme forte, 
c’était ça,” 119) 
Diana seems to make this comment with admiration, though it’s not clear whether there 
might have been something more than admiration. In any case, Laura picks up, or understands, 
or thinks she understands, that withstanding torture is not a supererogatory action, but, rather, 
something closer to an obligation or requirement. The issue is handled with subtlety and, again, 
reading and rereading carefully offers a variety of possible scenarios, but does not settle the 
issue. 
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It is not moot to bring back Diana Taylor’s early discussion of the then- politically 
incorrect issue of "mirror-reactions" of many organizations, and, more so, of women, who had to 
"prove themselves" and unwittingly mirrored, or followed in one way or another, a script that 
was not an alternative, but a "contra" attitude and behavior -- counter-hegemonic, and therefore 
tied to the hegemonic – the “hyper-masculine”, pace Franco 2013 -- ideology of male cadres 
who, paradoxically, claimed and demanded that the OPM members be "uncontaminated new 
men," freed from bourgeois excrescences.39   
Having said that, or precisely because of that, the possibility of Diana’s (Teruggi’s, not 
Taylor’s) views on the demands of the hombre nuevo and the “real” or “strong woman” having 
had some influence on “adult Laura” cannot be ruled out—though it does appear to be “out of 
character”, as a provocation of sorts. What can, and must, be ruled out is the notion of a blunt, 
mechanical, monocausal relationship between Diana-qua-martyr and Laura-qua-impressionable 
child who is “indoctrinated.” 
Again, by posing a Diana that is at once “real” and not always – not often – transparent; 
by posing scenarios in which slightly different “Dianas” would act in slightly different ways, the 
text compels us to grapple with the problem.  
																																																								
39 Diana Taylor’s early and lucid discussion presents further points that help us think about these issues. 
What does it mean to confront an hegemonic power? Does that turn us, inevitably, in a mirror image—
counter-hegemonic? Does this picture constrain women to replicate “scripts” against which Vicky Walsh 
and her generation fought? For more recent discussions, see Ahmed 2010 and Franco 2013, chap. 5, in 
which she analyzes, from a feminist perspective, the Codes of Revolutionary Justice of some Argentine 
armed organizations. For a different, though equally critical, view of the Codes, see Vezetti 2009 and the 
recent hybrid pieces of Urondo, daughter of Paco Urondo—whom we mentioned earlier—a renowned 
poet and montonero officer, who was demoted because he began to see his soon-to-be second wife before 
getting a formal divorce—and for not bringing up the issue to the CN of Montoneros. 
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Manèges doesn't lionize Diana --it presents her as a remarkable woman, yet with the 
limits that no ready-made revolutionary consciousness can shake off. Even if it is not a live issue 
anymore -- or even if it is not an issue for, say, a middle-class American – the question is not 
futile. More so if one aims to understand, to attempt to understand, both Alcoba’s text, and – to 
some degree – the life and times in the rabbit house—and in the seventies. Like the “different 
Carris” in Los rubios, perhaps adult Laura, in the Epilogue, is planting a carefully crafted 
problem, and not, as it would appear if we follow publishing conventions, expressing a personal 
opinion or a view of Laura Alcoba qua person or qua author. 
After all, immaculate heroes are easy to make, and quite convenient too: they aren't at our 
reach: we are not at their height; we are petite; we cannot but admire them; sit together and spin 
yarns about them, but never discuss the ways in which we might be able to follow and deepen 
the tracks they opened with their discoveries--and the ways to avoid their mistakes and blind 
spots; especially, to concoct ways of spotting them before the mistakes are made.  
A scared Diana -- “Diana aussi a eu peur” (116), writes Laura when the door knocks, 
near the end --. who nevertheless walks cautiously to the door -- Laura under her dress – ready to 
peep and act according to the circumstances, is more admirable than the idealized image of a 
fearless warrior, who, in the montonero imagery, was also very feminine, very much fulfilling 
the role of housewife, and at the same time ready to fight like the ideal guerrero. (the ideal 
warrior, or the ideal of the warrior). A more “real” Diana, a scared Diana—more like us—
establishes an example, perhaps, with a certain comparative demand for reaching the standards 
of the admired behavior. 
It is against this background, too, that Manèges has begun to cause unease among some 
former montoneros—and satisfaction among others. Both among former cadres and among 
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readers and critics, there is an incipient but increasing polarization. The picture of Diana is not 
that of the more widespread, quasi-hagiographic versions cherished by the memoria montonera.  
In the last chapter, we argued that the child is doubly silenced: first, as legitimate speaker 
and interlocutor about the events Carri is bringing up; second, as agent or bearer of some agential 
features, probably in an in-between state that tends to cause discomfort—hence the projection of 
“pure innocence” (Brennan and Erpp 2015, 3) onto children who seem to be already in need of 
hardening themselves if they want to survive.  
In the case of Alcoba, we find something similar, only this time focused on sexual 
innocence. The narrative of one of the last persons alive to have shared everyday life with the 
heroes of Calle 30 cannot be construed as a sexualized child. This would mean that, to some 
extent, she is not pure—and is not, therefore, to be trusted or regarded as reliable.  
If sexualized at an age when girls should be utterly ignorant of sinful matters, forced to 
“grow up” abruptly, through no fault of her own, but nevertheless neither pure (and therefore, no 
longer a child) nor adult; neither innocent nor blameworthy, she is nevertheless not to be trusted. 
She is the “knowing child,” who, actually, is no longer a child, for her childhood has been 
“stolen.” And she is dangerously close to the third myth Brenna and Erpp discuss: the “out-of-
control” prepubescent child—the “other” kids who might corrupt mine. The “bad girls” who, 
according to surveys carried out in the US and Canada, can taint our children. This “out-of-
control” child, whose figure is “not neutral with respect to race, class or gender” (p. 7) – mostly 
identified as African American, of “twisted” inclinations (LGBT) and/or “ignorant and 
uneducated (socioeconomic status). 
If sexualized, Laura is no longer a child – she had known evil – and she was not an adult 
either. She was a “knowing girl” or an unfortunate being whose childhood had been stolen – the 
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very expression some interviewers and critics began to use to refer to Alcoba’s life in the house 
of rabbits. To which Alcoba usually responds that it’s obscene to speak of hers as a “stolen 
childhood” in the context of State terrorism, when so many children were really stolen.  
Still, before the questions about “the girl” (“Who’s the little girl?” became, around 2014, 
the most frequent question surrounding, and addressed to, Alcoba)surrounding Alcoba), she was, 
for the most part, regarded as innocent and asexual. A view that carries a double risk: allegedly 
“asexual” children are not well-equipped to deal with their own desires—or with other people’s. 
Keeping them in the dark, or leaving the learning of those “things” to others, may ultimately be 
detrimental to their well-being.   
Worse, the “innocent” child is erased qua person, and becomes a tabula rasa where 
adults might find a certain unconfessed appeal, since they are “that which is not yet, but can be, 
corrupted” (Brennan and Erpp 2015, 4)   
Along the same lines, and, perhaps not by coincidence also in the context of a discussion 
on what girls should and should not know about an adult world devastated by violence, Castillo 
writes in regard to Caryl Churchill’s play, “Seven Jewish Children”,  
 
If innocence and purity are figured in the child, and otherness in the inassimilable 
stranger, what… if the other to be expelled is itself described by the figure of the child? 
… this fear of the oppressed and objected minority also enforces a kind of ineluctable 
intimacy. The child, an inappropriate object for either hate or (sexualized) love, becomes 
the most potent representative of this confounding and undesired intimacy. children seem 
eternally suspended between nations, families, and homes. Their contagious discomfort 
models our affective response. … the fascination with a safely-distanced, victimized child 
 150 
 
serves as one form of melancholic, nostalgic connection to the collective, just as the 
nesting instinct brings us back to individuals, families, our own homes. (Castillo 2011, 
132; emphasis added)  
 
Alcoba was silenced in her childhood, under a terror regime that aimed to paralyze a 
whole society but that targeted (as a means to spread terror, and also as an end in itself) the very 
group of people with whom she lived. What is more striking and unsettling is that she should 
also be silenced 40 years later, under a democratic regime. Certainly, this does, at least, unmask 
the fact that it is a society still captive or prey to blindness and other forms of conscious or 
unconscious bias (Saul 2015). 
Not only do we silence aspects of the child that we may find uncomfortable; we silence 
relevant aspects of the account of an adult woman – of her life as an adult, even when, naturally, 
such life coexists, so to speak, with the “selves” of our past.  
Be that as it may, it is still the case that we are not responding to (the figure of) an adult 
woman owning up to – taking responsibility for – her adult experiences. It is an address – a call -
- of a woman who owns up to her desires – whether erotic or violent—without yet settling the 
issue.  
She faces a disquieting quandary: still attracted to, yet loathing, the Engineer; perhaps 
even inured at the idea of torture when she wonders how he gave away the safe-house. Perhaps 
wanting to disengage from the feelings of attraction, which at times she seems to do – when 
they’re replaced by anger – yet soon again enjoying his voice spinning in her head.  
Granted, this could be a fictional addendum to the “faithful” memories of Alcoba. Yet, in 
this juncture—in the context of an almost complete silence about the issue – the question of 
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whether her quandary is veridical or not seems to be beside the point. If even from the safe 
distance of reading we do not see, or we pretend not to see – if we are not capable of facing the 
address of an adult person qua sexualized woman, still attracted to, yet despising the Engineer, 
perhaps inured at the idea of torture when she wonders how he gave away the safe-house -- what 
should we conclude? How not to conclude that we have not yet risen to the occasion? That no 
estamos a la altura or on n’est pas a l’hauteur? 
Manèges brings up a rare opportunity to discuss historical events in the context of a non-
agonistic, exploratory, scenario-projecting proposal to think together, to think through and out 
and beyond the complexities of the militancia and the repression. And, instead, the text is 
reduced to a device framed within the logic of friend-or-foe, and both "Laura" and Diana are 
either mechanically reified and purified, or dissected and thinned down, eviscerated. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
If what I have argued about the challenges posed by Laura Alcoba’s Manèges/La casa de 
los Conejos/The Rabbit House (2007), Héctor Abad Faciolince’s Traiciones de la memoria 
(2009), and Albertina Carri’s Los rubios (2003) is sound, or at the very least merits consideration 
in light of its plausibility, we should think, ro begin to think about revising certain practices. For 
a start, we would tentatively propose the following two changes.  
a) renouncing "argumentative," or "strong" interpretations, which often, despite our 
efforts, still partake in agonistic models. These, in turn, may easily slide towards interpretive 
analogues of zero-sum games, which tend to take the form of explicit or -worse --implicit binary, 
dichotomic structures in the context of which texts and "textual support" are much more easily 
violated, for the sake of “not losing ground.” 
b) taking up a much more active role in the construction of the (sense of the) work itself; a 
role that may, and often does, involve two opposing but complementary movements: careful 
(intra)textual analysis (i.e., a centrifugal impetus characteristic of the works discussed in this 
dissertation); and an equally careful extra-or para-textual inquiry (i.e., a centripetal impetus 
leading the interpreter --nudging her, and at times almost gently pushing her --beyond the work 
itself) in search of information that, sometimes, becomes as important as to constitute a condition 
of possibility of intelligibility of (relevant aspects of) texts.  
Other times, it places the interpreter in an in-between vantage point from which one may 
pursue equally compelling avenues of inquiry: some lead us further "away" from the text, while 
others "return" to it.  
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It is not a matter of abandoning textual support in toto, but, rather, of abandoning a 
certain way of using the text to give credence and plausibility to a given interpretation. If, as I 
argue, in these texts there is no “strong” textual support (i.e., no textual support that can be 
strong enough to bolster a given interpretation over others), no strong readings are warranted.  
On the face of it, these points seem to involve a severe loss. Yet, as we argued in this 
dissertation, the impossibility of settling on any one interpretation opens up the possibility of 
exploring more thoroughly, with more "time" and detail --again, "reading more slowly," as 
Daniel Hernández suggested in "La aventura de las pruebas de imprenta” -- the different 
scenarios that these texts suggest.  
These works propose, in other words, that we engage in reading projects whose common 
denominator is the following pair of features: the strong suggestion of many different 
interpretive possibilities, and the equally strong suggestion of the impossibility of adjudicating 
among them. Each of these possibilities, in turn, branches out into several further ones.  
The assessment of these possibilities yields a wide range of scenarios --some very similar 
to one another, with just a slightly different nuance or change here and there; others, instead, are 
radically different and even mutually exclusive --which, needless to say, involve different 
assessments of the characters' attitudes and actions; of the scene under discussion; and therefore, 
of the impact and overall interpretation of the text. 
It is worth emphasizing that abandoning strong interpretations does not entail any less 
commitment. The text certainly engages the reader and commits her to grapple with questions 
that tend to be thorny and thornily avoided: What would we have done in that situation? Not qua 
question, but as a condition of intelligibility of the text, provided we accept it on its own terms, 
i.e., provided we accept the impossibility of settling on, or articulating, any "reading" or 
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"interpretation" of the thorniest, most politically charged scenes, and accept, instead, that they 
are scenario-eliciting artifacts embedded in the narrative. 
Moreover, in light of the second condition – contextual information – a counterpoint-like 
form of reading is likely to enhance the interpretive interplay among different textual artifacts.  
This may sound as little more than a Pyrrhic victory, especially if we bear in mind the 
serious epistemic limitations that Abad “imprinted” on us. However, first-hand experiences of 
our epistemic limitations (should) carry more weight than merely reading about them. Put in 
slightly hyperbolic terms, epistemic fragility or precariousness might prevent or reduce our 
second-nature tendency to approach the discussion from a standpoint that tends to be, from the 
outset, laden with political and interpretive "armors" --entrenched biases --which are, as is well-
known, more pronounced when dealing with politically fraught issues like the ones these works 
grapple with.  
The second point --the demand for a much more "active reader" than the over-used 
expression connotes --leads to performative operations that bear a resemblance to those of 
Traiciones, which, along with those of Manèges and Los rubios, form a complementary set or 
constellation of performative loops that act on the reader, in a frequently unsettling way that 
makes these works' demands --- -interpretive as much as ethical --almost physically apparent.  
Talk of "imposition" and "demands" might be misleading; perhaps it is more accurate to 
speak of these performative loops as making almost physically apparent the terms of engagement 
that these works present or pose to (or require of?) the reader. One important corollary of this 
challenge is the questioning of voices that we have been trained to consider as either fully 
authoritative or as having a vastly superior claim to authority – as having “the last word;” and in 
this case, the three works go for a very provocative instance: the voice of the survivor/witness. 
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Like many other issues in these works, this is a problem that is being presented as subject for 
debate, as a conversation-starter, and not, necessarily, as a pre-conceived conviction to be 
defended, or attacked, disregarding whatever arguments against our own position there may be. 
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